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Abstract 
This dissertation examines different instances of resistance to dominant socio-cultural 
regimes through new media. In order to showcase this, I focused on three case studies: 
the first one was the work of Amalia Ulman, a new media artist who uses selfies in order 
critically engage with the representations of femininity on Instagram. Ulman’s work was 
then linked to the feminist bibliography around what Amelia Jones defined as ‘radical 
narcissism’. Following that, I engage with a discussion of Grindr, a popular gay dating 
application. I was particularly interested in how Grindr disrupts heteronormative 
constructions of the public sphere. Finally, I discuss Pokémon GO, a location-based 
smartphone application that gained the attention of the public in 2016. Pokémon GO, 
similarly to Grindr, disrupts normative understandings of space by introducing an 
augmented reality narrative in physical locations. I expand on this idea by developing my 
own location-based application that inserted poems rather than Pokémon, in different 
places within the city. My analytical framework is informed by Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
with a particular focus on understanding selfhood in the context of the emergence and 
normalisation of new media technologies. By understanding selfhood as an inherently 
psycho-social construction I was able to identify the political significance of subjectivity 
and its relation to technological advancements. 
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Introduction 
New communication technologies such as mobile phones and the internet have changed 
the way we think and how we interact with each other. In this research project I explore 
the relation between subjectivity and technology. Focusing on mobile technologies, I 
suggest that these challenge traditional understandings of psychic structures and 
processes, requiring us to interrogate the concept of selfhood. I theorise the mobile 
phone not only as portable computational device, but also as a prosthetic element 
attached to our bodies, as a window into the world, as a source of anxiety and as tool for 
creative expression. This allows me to identify instances where mobile technologies, 
facilitate processes which disrupt normative regimes and I think of the mobile phone as a 
mirror helping us to construct an open-ended image of ourselves, a tool in the search for 
sexual pleasure, and a facilitator of creativity.  
In all my case studies I examine the relation between communication technologies and 
selfhood. This question of the self informs my engagement with the concepts of 
narcissism and ego formation and develops into what I introduce as the ‘poetics of self’. 
My analysis of mobile media is informed by psychoanalytic theories, which offer a 
complex and suggestive vocabulary with which to examine questions relating to the idea 
of the self. In the following literature review I present psychoanalytic sources that are 
central for my theoretical framework. My theoretical interlocutors, writers such as, Laura 
Mulvey, Joan Copjec, Slavoj Žižek, Alenka Zupančič and Julia Kristeva, mainly draw 
upon Lacanian psychoanalysis, though we can suggest that they go on to fashion their 
own unique approaches to psychoanalysis. In addition to this, I also include a discussion 
of psychoanalytically informed consumer research and I reflect on the potential ways of 
bringing together consumer research and psychoanalytic theory.  
Besides employing psychoanalysis, this research project also aspires at putting forward a 
new mixed methodological framework that incorporates creative practices, especially 
poetry. The research project is grounded through qualitative methodological tools such 
as cultural analysis, case studies, and ethnography. The more original methodological 
aspect of this dissertation comes in the fifth chapter where I employ creative 
methodologies, poetry as research and locative media technologies in order to 
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investigate contemporary media phenomena. The epistemological questions posed by 
are addressed in my chapter on methodology, where I suggest that creative 
methodologies and psychoanalysis could enrich consumer studies by offering embodied 
and multi-sensorial data, and a psycho-social perspective. My approach could be 
described as creative geography, autocartography or simply as artistic practice-based 
research. It has allowed me to construct a complex investigation of mobile media and to 
reflect on the relation between media, space and psychic structures.  
The first section of my narcissism chapter focuses on the different conceptions of 
narcissism in Freudian psychoanalysis. Narcissism was initially discussed by Freud as a 
psychopathology that completely separates the subject from society (Freud, 1911) but as 
the years passed Freud changed his opinion, presenting narcissism as a normal function, 
essential for the ego formation (Freud, 1923). I go on to examine this theoretical position 
in relation to the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan’s description of the ‘mirror phase’ 
(Lacan, 1966). Lacan, following Freud, considers the mirror phase essential for the birth 
of the ego and his analysis of the mirror is essential in my analysis of new media 
phenomena such as the selfie. In order to better understand the mirror phase argument, I 
examine the ontological repercussions of the Lacanian domains of psychic reality, 
namely the imaginary, real and symbolic orders.  
My discussion of the mirror phase allows me to consider the screen of mobile media. 
Following Laura Mulvey’s (1999) argument I examine the screen as another kind of mirror 
which can shape our subjectivity and perpetuate social norms. Then I draw upon Joan 
Copjec’s (2015a) critique of Mulvey’s argument in order to produce a non-deterministic 
understanding of the mobile screen which allows me to re-approach self-portraits (and 
selfies) as a feminist strategy. In order to better substantiate this claim, I turn to Amelia 
Jones’ theory of ‘radical narcissism’. According to Jones (2007), narcissism can be used 
strategically to disrupt patriarchal representations of the female body. Jones supports her 
argument by showcasing examples of 70s feminist body art. These examples revolve 
around the idea of self-portrait as a means of self-expression and we can easily apply 
Jones’ political conclusion in our theorisation of selfies as a cultural phenomenon.  
The main case study in this dissertation which illustrates the above arguments is Amalia 
Ulman’s artwork Excellences & Perfections. This piece was a durational Instagram 
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performance during which Ulman presented a series of selfies portraying a persona that 
embodied different clichés of new media feminities. The project attracted attention as it 
effectively thematised gender performativity in new media contexts and due to the large 
number of followers Ulman attracted in the course of her performance. In my discussion 
of Ulman’s work, I engaged with multiple criticisms that deemed her approach as 
narcissistic. In order to refute these accusations I employed the notion of ‘radical 
narcissism’ as described earlier and the concept of over-identification as developed by 
Slavoj Žižek in his discussion of Slovenian rock group Laibach. According to Žižek 
(2014), the best way to criticise the existing socio-cultural regime is by taking it more 
seriously that it takes itself. In that sense I framed Ulman’s project as an over-
identification gesture that highlights an oppressive regime by exaggerating its effects. My 
arguments present a marked contrast to critical new media studies approaches that focus 
on centralised and corporate infrastructures, and the ways in which new media re-affirms 
power inequalities in contemporary bio-politics. My political critique is instead concerned 
with identifying the moments of discontent, disjuncture and disorganisation of current 
power regimes, rather than promoting an alternative project that might allow individual or 
communal political emancipation. 
In Freud’s writing, homosexuality is also considered a form of narcissism (Freud, 1911, 
1910). In Chapter Three, ‘Gay Spatialisation: Towards a Real Imaginary’, I attempt a 
queer theoretical re-appropriation of this psychoanalytic claim, a project that is in 
conversation with Leo Bersani’s reading of the Freudian corpus. By expanding on the 
notion of ‘radical narcissism’, in the first section of this chapter I discuss a provocative 
self-portrait by Robert Mapplethorpe. In this sexually-explicit image Mapplethorpe poses 
with a whip half-inserted into his anus. This image allows me to reflect on the specificities 
of homosexual narcissism and also initiates a conversation around the (ir)representability 
of sexuality in discursive regimes. This leads to a discussion of the ‘drive’, one of the 
fundamental psychoanalytic concepts that links sexuality with psychoanalytic concept of 
the Trieb, translated variously as ‘instinct’ or ‘drive’. 
This discussion of the drive is then linked to the main case study of the chapter which is 
the gay dating application, Grindr. In order to theorise Grindr I follow Bersani’s (Bersani, 
2002) argument around what he calls sociability, a feeling of co-existence ‘un-
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contaminated by desire’. In order to better understand the concept of sociability and its 
relation to homosexuality, Bersani presents excerpts from Freud’s ‘Group psychology and 
the analysis of the ego’ and ‘Leonardo da Vinci, a memory of his childhood’. The first text 
suggests that homosexual subjectivity is somehow related to the formation of social 
bonds and the second provides a potential explanation of why that happens. In order to 
better understand the theorisation of subjectivity in ‘Leonardo’, I briefly present the 
Freudian theorisation of the Oedipus complex. This is crucial as Oedipus (and most 
importantly post-Oedipal theories) play an important role in both this and the following 
chapter. In ‘Leonardo’, Freud presents us an account of a ‘failed’ Oedipus complex which 
leads to Leonardo’s homosexual position. Bersani suggests that this failure should not be 
assessed as a negative result as it allows for a different intersubjective mode of 
relationality. Traditional Oedipalization creates heterosexual subjects that can only 
conceptualise the Other as a radical alterity while the psychoanalytic homosexual 
identifies with his mother’s desire and thus ends up looking for himself into the world. 
Bersani’s homosexual renders the world into a familiar yet dispersed and incomplete 
version of himself and according to Bersani, this process is exemplified in the case of 
cruising.  
I examine Grindr as a networked version of cruising. In order to see the similarities and 
differences, while taking in account the medium’s specificity, I follow Tom Roach’s 
analysis of Grindr (2015a). Roach, inspired by Bersani, expands on the notion of 
sociability and creates his own concept of ‘shared estrangement’ in order to better 
describe the new media specificity of the phenomenon. For Roach, the key to 
understanding Grindr’s facilitation of shared estrangement comes by analysing the 
language of the medium. In fragmented Grindr chat expressions, Roach identifies a 
break of identity and a disruption in the meaning making process. This argument leads us 
to an analysis of the sinthome, a concept introduced by Jacques Lacan in 1975. In his 
seminar on the sinthome (2016), Lacan theorised the diminishing importance of the 
symbolic order in the articulation of reality. This, according to Lacan, is related to the 
diminishing centrality of the paternal law and the expansion of the role images play in the 
meaning making process in the rise of new communication technologies.  
In the sinthome seminar, Lacan focuses on James Joyce’s writing, as he considers the 
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Irish writer an archetypal example of a new mode of relationality to the symbolic order. 
Joyce, according to Lacan, used his poetic language to make up for the absence of the 
paternal metaphor from his psychic structure (Lacan substantiates this claim by 
combining biographical information from Joyce’s life history and by reading Joyce’s 
texts). Joyce proposed a new understanding of language that goes beyond meaning, 
focusing instead on the materiality and resonance of the signifiers, the sound of the 
words rather than what they mean. This new understanding of language re-frames the 
signifier outside the ontological assumptions that defined it so far, and most importantly it 
allows us to conceptualise the signifier outside the operational framework of castration 
and the paternal law. The sinthome is proposed as a new self-made articulation of the 
three domains of reality (imaginary-real-symbolic).  
This theorisation of the signifier reduces the importance of the symbolic order as the 
domain that grounds all meaning. This thesis argues that the imaginary - the domain of 
images and sensorial stimuli - seems to better represent contemporary psychic 
phenomena. This new understanding of the imaginary is essential in our discussion of 
mobile media as the smartphone screen becomes an essential element of the 
subjectification process. In the last section of this chapter, I further discuss the ways 
images disrupt linguistic systems by focusing on emoji. Emojis are ideogrammatic 
characters, inserted in text messages in order to animate them. Emojis appeared for the 
first time in Japan, a country that already had a writing system that combined phonetic 
and ideogrammatic elements.  
According to Lacan (“Preface to the Japanese Edition of the Écrits,” n.d.), it is this quality 
of the Japanese writing system that renders psychoanalysis – which was developed in 
the west – inefficient/unsuitable for Japanese people. Lacan claims that psychoanalytic 
treatment relies on the metonymic function of the signifiers, whereas ideogrammatic 
characters acquire their meaning through the metaphoric function. By expanding this 
argument to discuss emoji, I come to the conclusion that logocentric psychoanalytic 
models need to be updated and opened up to multi-media and artistic tools if they aspire 
to capture and properly analyse psychic phenomena of our times. Following this 
conclusion, in my last chapter, I develop a creative methodology that utilises a locative 
media platform to produce a series of site-specific textual interventions. Mobile media are 
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the starting point of my theorisation, as they blur the lines between private and public 
sphere and allow media consumption anywhere in the city.  
My theorisation of mobile media starts with the Walkman and expands to consider recent 
examples of locative media projects that create site-specific narratives. Central to my 
understanding of virtual – and in the case of mobile media, augmented reality 
environments – is the figure of the cyborg, as theorised by feminist philosopher Donna 
Haraway (1999). Cyborgs are assemblages of biological and mechanical components 
and exemplify our era of hybridity as they combine virtual and physical elements. 
Following my earlier analyses of the sinthome, I theorise cyborgs as sinthomatic attempts 
to create an ontology that goes beyond the paternal metaphor. My methodology is 
informed by theories of translatability, as multimedia applications rely on the translation of 
information/affect from one medium to another. I then engage with media theorist Scott 
Wilson’s discussion (2010) of the hikikomori phenomenon, which can be understood as a 
manifestation of the sinthome era. The hikikomori is a psychiatric epidemic/social 
phenomenon that emerged in Japan in recent years, where children of middle class 
Japanese families reject social life and become digital hermits – never leaving their 
rooms and compulsively playing video games. Using the hikikomori, Wilson develops a 
different conception of the unconscious that goes beyond the signifier and incorporates 
sounds and images. For me, Wilson’s analysis is crucial as it opens space for thinking of 
the sinthome in relation to networked realities of our times. In this context, I introduce an 
analysis of Pokémon, a cultural product that links many discussion threads I presented 
so far.  
Pokémon, like the hikikomori, exemplifies the era of the sinthome, where the paternal 
metaphor has declined and new post-symbolic forms of communication and creativity 
have emerged. Pokémon GO is an augmented reality mobile game that combines 
traditional Pokémon game objectives (to collect and train as many Pokémon as possible) 
with location-aware technologies. Interestingly, according to Japanese psychiatrist, 
Masaru Tateno (2016), the locative multiplayer game Pokémon GO had a positive 
influence among the hikikomori patients he was treating during the time the game gained 
its popularity in the summer of 2016. In my analysis of Pokémon GO, presented in 
Chapter Four, ‘The Psyche is the Map: Locative Interpretations of the Symptom’, I show 
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how it might connect the real and virtual world environments opening new possibilities for 
sinthomatic endeavours. The implication of urban space in the gameplay allowed me to 
rethink the concepts of ‘sociability’ and ‘shared estrangement’ as presented in the 
previous chapter.  
In order to investigate the potential interaction between the intimate psychic and the 
mediated real world, I set up a small experiment/game. I invited ten poets/writers to 
reflect on Pokémon GO by writing their poems about Pokémon and placing them in 
specific spots on the map. The resulting project, ‘Pokémon Poetry Go’, is built on the 
previously developed ‘Pokémon Poetry’ series developed by me. For the making of 
Pokémon Poetry Go, I used Echoes, a platform specifically designed to host locative 
creative projects. I contextualise the process of making this project by including 
ethnographic notes around its development. The final section of this chapter presents a 
series of poems that are discussed in relation to their placement in the city and the 
Pokémon character they represent/accompany. The discussion of the poems takes into 
account the phenomenological aspect of consuming a creative locative project in the city 
of Athens, a discussion of the project in relation to the psychoanalytic points I made in 
the earlier chapters, and a literary analysis that takes in account the theorisation of poetic 
discourse by Julia Kristeva in her seminal Revolution in Poetic Language (2016). 
My use of Echoes is part of my more general interest in location-based services, which 
links to my earlier theorisation of the spatiality of desire as it takes place in the case of 
Grindr. In my ‘Pokémon Poetry Go’ project, I expand on a group of media technologies 
defined as ‘locative media’: media specifically delivered upon the user’s geolocation. I 
consider location-based services, or more specifically locative media, an opportunity to 
discuss a series of psychic, technological and socio-spatial phenomena along with their 
political implications. I aspire to build a psycho-social understanding of locative media, as 
locative media affect not only the ways we understand, access and communicate within 
social spaces, but could potentially shape social spaces as such. My analysis emerges in 
the intersection between subjectivity, technology and space, or better defined: where 
subjectivity becomes spatialised through technology.  
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Methodological issues 
As discussed, my research project is based on the investigation of three different mobile 
media applications. I approach each of them in different ways in order to open theoretical 
discussions.  In ‘Beyond the Selfie Principle’ I engage with Amalia Ulman’s ‘Excellences 
and Perfections’. My analysis of this work is informed by cultural theory and cultural 
analysis. In the discussion of this case study I attempt a three-fold analysis. First, I focus 
on the cultural context of the work, the pre-conditions for its emergence and its effects on 
the social field. I include a contextualisation of the work within art history by drawing 
similarities between Ulman’s work and feminist body art from the 70s. Second, I attempt 
an understanding of the medium Ulman uses. The medium-specificity of the work and the 
form it takes are in themselves rich in information with regards to its political implications. 
Third I discuss the work in relation to psychoanalytic theory. Following the Freudian and 
Lacanian approaches I do not aim at explaining the work through psychoanalytic theories 
but rather attempt to use the work in order to broaden the horizons of psychoanalytic 
thinking.  
My next chapter ‘Gay spatialisation – towards a real imaginary’ takes as its main case 
study the gay dating application Grindr. While I retain a cultural analytical point of view, I 
also focus on the functionality of the application. The technical characteristic of the 
application alongside the phenomenology of technological experiences such as the 
experiencing of the smartphone’s touchscreen play a central role in the development of 
my argument. My Grindr chapter is also informed by auto-ethnographic observations with 
regards to the language of the medium. My analysis of language in this chapter goes 
beyond more conventional discourse analysis which focuses on the contextual 
understanding of discourse. Rather I focus on structural functions of language as such, in 
particular the difference between metaphor and metonymy as theorised by Lacan, in 
order to showcase how language of Grindr poses a departure from traditional forms of 
written communication. 
In ‘The psyche is the map, locative interpretations of the symptom’ I propose a new 
methodological gesture towards multimedia presentation of data. By drawing inspiration 
from existing (and emerging) creative communities related to the development of locative 
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projects, I set up a collaborative poetic project called ‘Pokémon poetry go’. The resulting 
project was created by using the smartphone application Echoes, developed by Josh 
Kopeček a sound artist and programmer based in the UK. One of Kopeček’s main 
ambitions was to create a free tool for artists, activists and academics who are interested 
in developing site-specific, sound-based interventions. Echoes allows the creation of 
augmented reality environments by delivering specific media depending on the location 
of the user. Echoes is part of group of media applications that are often described in 
bibliography as locative media. One of the innovations of locative media comes from the 
mixing of real world and virtual elements. The possibilities offered by the application vary 
widely with projects that involve narratives, interviews, music or sound art. The different 
locations become contested spaces for memory and poetry, antagonistic voices and 
sounds: polyphonic spaces of disputed origins. 
In the following section I reflect on my research methods by investigating both their 
epistemological genealogies and their methodological tools. While the methodology of 
this research project can be called eclectic there are particular principles that organise 
both my thought and praxis. My insistence on the different strategies to disrupt normative 
regimes, for example, is informed by my strong belief that theory cannot be separated 
from taking a political stance. In that sense, I do not aim at making pure theoretical 
arguments but rather produce knowledge that is somehow linked to the possibility of 
political action and social change. 
Research objectives 
The main aim of my research is to explore the interrelation between new media cultures 
and subjectivity. I focus on moments where new technologies allow or facilitate the 
disruption of normative regimes of power. My three case studies operate as different 
responses to the initial question. I take a paradoxical stance as I look for moments of 
disruption and resistance within the framework of commercial enterprises and 
applications. Nevertheless my theoretical reflections allow me to re-think of the possibility 
of resistance even within the limitations of that context. What I define as normative 
regimes here are the different modalities of oppression as identified by intersectional 
feminist and anti-authoritarian thought and activism. In the case of ‘Beyond the selfie 
principle’ I discuss the work of Amalia Ulman’s as a feminist response to the male gaze in 
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new media. In ‘Gay Spatialisation’ I investigate the ways that cruising and dating 
applications disrupt the heteronormativity of public space. In ‘Psyche is the Map’ I expand 
the discussion on space by proposing a new poetics of self that blurs the boundaries 
between the private and the public. 
The starting point for my explorations is the investigation of selfhood. In my analysis both 
selfhood and narcissism are concepts that acquire a different definition than their 
common-sense usage. Central in my theorisation is the expansion of notions of self in 
order to better capture the fundamental intersubjectivity that I see as inherent in these 
notions. In that sense, selfhood is not approached as a closed and fixed identity but 
rather as an open-ended schema, always oriented and organised by the Other. In order 
to substantiate this, I combine theoretical reflections coming from psychoanalytic theory 
with the data I draw from my case studies.  
An important focus point throughout my work is the exploration of a psychoanalytically 
informed qualitative methodology. There have been numerous attempts to establish a 
meaningful connection between psychoanalytic epistemology and empirical research and 
I aspire to build on that practice by bringing psychoanalytic theoretical concepts and 
observations from the field into a creative dialogue.  Psychoanalytic ethos will inform both 
the ways I structure my research questions and research plan and also will help me when 
formulating my conclusions and theoretical analyses.  
Furthermore, I aim to establish a methodological understanding of poetic discourse and 
the potential use of creative means as research. In order to achieve that I aspire to utilise 
a series of creative practices including writing, performance and recording of spoken 
word poetry in conjunction with using a locative media application in order to geo-locate 
words in space. I consider poetic discourse as a useful tool when attempting to capture 
the affective, emotional and extra-discursive elements of everyday experiences. My work 
is explicitly and intentionally hybridic. I mix methods and theoretical approaches, self-
observations and ethnography, qualitative means and creativity. I consider the 
phenomena I investigate nascent and under-researched and I am confident that in order 
to understand and represent them I need multi-media, trans-disciplinary and potentially 
explorative methodological leaps. 
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Epistemological questions 
Writing on method for digital humanities presents a series of epistemological questions 
(Gold and Klein, 2016). What kinds of knowledge can one produce in the context of 
emerging technologies? What is tangible and/or measurable in this new environment? It 
seems that the object of observation is often neither fully configured nor specific. In this 
case we can only establish a playful exploration; a creative experimentation. How can we 
then define an epistemology of this playful experimentation? Thinking of scientific 
methods, we usually derive definitions from ‘hard sciences’ developed within the realm of 
positivist ontologies. Positivist science has a specific understanding of knowledge, 
forming a framework that informs the quantitative paradigm in social sciences. On a 
different track we have qualitative approaches that attempt a different way of producing 
knowledge following an inductive methodology (Ritchie, 2014). Starting with ethnography, 
qualitative methodologies focus on the observation of the subjects in their ‘natural setting’ 
(tracing back to the anthropological observation of the colonised other and expanding the 
methodology to the urbanized subject of sociology). Following a long string of internal 
criticism we reach to a point where certain theoretical bodies of work such as feminism, 
queer and post-colonial theories and generally post-structuralism have called for the 
dismantling of certain positivist dualisms such as that between the subject and object of 
observation, rational and emotional analysis, concrete and abstract approaches (Sprague 
and Zimmerman, 2004). Digital humanities emerge at this exact moment of the 
dismantling of existing epistemological presumptions.  
Philosophy of science has engaged in long discussions on the problems of establishing a 
methodology in social sciences that can provide a reasonably consistent quality of 
results. Paul Feyerabend, in his seminal Against Method (2010) offers a stellar critique of 
the idea of methodology as such. For him there is no way to construct a proper method, 
as all methodological rules always derive from cosmological assumptions in order to 
justify their founding assumptions. Methodology for Feyerabend does not offer a magic 
wand that can solve problems, even before his book, systematically processing data as 
part of a study had been a dramatic problem for quite some time. Feyerabend adds to the 
equation the usual failure of science to produce actual solutions. And if things can get 
epistemologically foggy in hard science, social sciences offer a series of new challenges 
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perplexing the methodological process even more fundamentally.  
Charles Mills attempts a positive (but not positivist) definition of a sociologically 
meaningful research. In his Sociological Imagination (2001) it is the ‘capacity to shift from 
one perspective to another—from the political to the psychological; from the examination 
of a single family to a comparative assessment of the national budgets of the world; from 
the theological school to the military establishments; from considerations of an oil 
industry to studies of contemporary poetry’ (Mills, 2001, p. 7). It is exactly this creative 
potential of humanity that gives a methodological hope: the possibility of understanding 
through transcription, empathy and the power of metaphor. The ‘sociological imagination’ 
requires the ability to pull oneself from a position and think of another, acquiring different 
points of view and being able to understand the mechanisms that allow that process. At 
its core sociological imagination requires a deep understanding of the social fabric as a 
constantly shifting force that defines our lives and the same time is changes into different 
iterations of itself. In a way this exact imagination is what makes the social fabric change 
as we collectively imagine it into something else.  
With a similar emphasis on social change, Charles Taylor (1983) builds his argument 
around social theory as practice. He thinks social theory can make invisible social 
structures and practices as well as everyday common sense into explicit theoretical 
frameworks. The motivation behind theory production, according to Taylor, is not just to 
identify these social structures and practices but to critique, extend and challenge them. 
The ways we theorise structures affects our dealing with them, shape the policies we 
produce and the social relations we can envision. Theory defines our practice and 
shapes our self-understanding. Current positivist approaches resist the idea of a theory 
that can change its object of observation. For Taylor, it is only action and practice that 
can measure the validity of a theory; you can only fashion a theory by engaging with its 
material implications. A pragmatist epistemology would elevate objects of knowledge on 
the level of active operations. If we define knowledge as an operating modality, the 
question of practice versus theory becomes obsolete. There is no primacy of theory over 
action and we need to rethink theory as an active field of practices. Knowledge becomes 
something that arises out of human action.  
Taking into account the importance of imagination and practice as theory, I would also 
  19 
like to discuss a third element, namely creativity. In the context of my research, use of 
locative media technologies produces meaning and enables social encounters but at the 
same time operates on an aesthetic level. In this context, drawing upon creative intuition 
allows for multiple understandings without the restrictive mediation of theoretical 
discourse. Affective elements are included in the discourse, strengthening the 
experiential aspect of the project. As Patricia Leavy writes: ‘art-based researchers are not 
‘discovering new research tools, they are carving them’ (Leavy, 2015, p. 1). By 
introducing those tools to a wider community of people they share a new methodological 
insight that can shift research cultures and theoretical contexts. Instead of hiding our 
emotional relationship to our work, we expose it, all the while aspiring for the production 
of knowledge based on resonance and empathy; instead of trying to fix problems with our 
points of view, we pose the questions in ways that incorporate this problematic in their 
articulation.  This expanded comprehension of experience and how we pursue it may be 
more helpful than simply stating our position in an attempt to be self-reflexive. As with 
strict scientific methods the validity of the findings of a creative approach is ultimately 
determined by the community of ‘believers’ ‘who experience first-hand what creativity can 
do to further human understanding’ (McNiff, 2013). 
Research methods  
As described earlier, in my research design I attempt a combination of different methods. 
I wanted to create a hybridic horizon where combined data from ethnographic 
observations, case-study examinations, interviews and creative cartography co-exist 
bringing together a fleshed-out overview of new media cultures. I aspire to offer not just 
an aggregation of different data sets but rather have each methodological input inform 
and transform the others; different approaches working together, co-producing meaning. 
It is important that the data extracted by different processes allows for a multifaceted 
understanding of a specific phenomenon. Research questions can very often operate on 
different levels, as we see in this extract by Axinn and Pearce:  
[M]ixed methods are particularly useful when a research problem calls for  more than one 
of the key attributes characterising individual methods. When a problem calls for the 
combination of questioning and observation by an interviewer, mixed methods are 
particularly appropriate (Axinn and Pearce, 2012, p. 24) 
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Cultural analysis 
My research operates within a cultural analytical framework. In this context, all case-
studies are considered as assemblages of ‘cultural objects’ and are analysed as parts of 
larger cultural contexts. It is hard to define the specific tools of the cultural analytical 
methodological framework, but as sociologist Jim McGuigan suggests, cultural analysis is 
an approach to culture informed by social and cultural anthropology, sociology, and 
literary studies. In terms of theoretical references cultural analysis is mainly influenced by 
British cultural studies and European critical theory (McGuigan, 2010). Cultural analysis 
tries to transgress traditional disciplinary limitations and comes from a European 
philosophical tradition that critiques positivism in social sciences.   
 Dutch cultural theorist Mieke Bal in her Practice of Cultural Analysis (2006) offers some 
methodological insights with regards to cultural analysis. According to Bal ‘the distance 
between the object of analysis and a statement about it is that makes culture possible 
and at the same time makes cultural analysis a self-reflexive process’ (Bal, 2006, p. 6). 
Between the object and the statement that describes it, Bal tells us, there exists an 
irreconcilable discrepancy that can only be bridged by a process of narrativization, a 
mythology as meaning making process. This narrativization connects the objects and 
their signs into a semiotic field. In order to better understand this semiotic field, we utilise 
a series of discursive tools but the reality of the immediate experience still maintains a 
unique explanatory field itself. By resisting the absolute distinction between those two 
fields Bal invites us into rethinking the analytical possibilities that emerge in the dialectic 
between them.  
In order to explore this possible merger between the aural the visual and the linguistic, 
Bal deploys the category of space/place. She identifies this territory by bringing forward a 
bodily understanding: an embodied consciousness in relation to an object. This 
embodiment far from being reduced to an ‘innate’ or even biological nature, it is a 
psychoanalytically defined spatiality where drives and the unconscious intersect with a 
symbolically defined world. It is sensorial territory that can never be stripped from 
meaning but also presents some meaning that is inaccessible, hidden, affective. In that 
sense Mieke Bal moves away from an archaeology of the object and brings the 
encounter with the object into the potent present. It is this present, the present of the 
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bodily materiality, that will allow an analysis that claims to provide a history of the 
contemporary. In this movement between the strict semiotics of social representation and 
absolute materiality the opportunity to politicise the aesthetic and grasp the affect in 
language opens up before us.  
 In order to proceed with this investigation, cultural analysis deploys the methodological 
triangle of object, concept and research question. In this articulation the concept 
becomes a lens through which the researcher is gazing upon the object. The research 
question operates as a compass that organises the process and theory emerges through 
the shift between the different positions of this triangular schema. Theory is developed in 
a specific cultural context and remains grounded. The position of the researcher is not 
assumed to be neutral but is called constantly into question. This process can only get 
going through a rigorous self-reflection and understanding of the different possibilities as 
they emerge in the analytical process. 
Case study research  
Case study in the context of my research refers to the ‘investigation of a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context’ (Yin, 2015, p. 13). Case studies are suitable for 
the exploratory aspect of a research planning as they offer the opportunity to investigate 
a specific phenomenon in depth. Yin suggests that case study design is preferable when 
discussing contemporary or emerging issues. As described earlier, that is a key problem 
in the design of this research as locative media, do not present many mainstream 
applications.  
For the needs of this research I examined a series of mobile media phenomena as case 
studies. My three main case studies are: Amalia Ulman’s project ‘Excellences and 
Perfections’, the gay dating application Grindr and the augmented reality game Pokémon 
GO. I attempted investigating them within their context and reflecting on their potential 
uses and functions. My experimentations with the mobile applications become central in 
my understanding of their interface and how it relates to my research questions. This is 
not just an auto-ethnography of me using the application but it also includes a methodical 
examination of their contextual performance within space and time. This will allow for a 
better understanding of the accounts of other users and will allow for a better theorisation 
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of the results.  
Creative Analytical Practice (CAP) ethnography 
Ethnographic research in the rise of post-structuralist critique had to respond to certain 
epistemological questions raised from feminist, post-colonial and queer theories. 
Richardson and Pierre name this shift towards a narrativised and self-reflexive research: 
Creative Analytical Practice (CAP) Ethnography (Richardson and St. Pierre, 2018). What 
distinguishes those ethnographic approaches is that they combine the creative and the 
analytical aspect. Richardson and St. Pierre group under this term a series of creative 
practices including poetry, autobiography, performance and visual art. These different 
forms of expression allow for different types of reflection on ethnographic observation; 
they capture different affective elements and they reflect on different aspects of the issue. 
In this methodological approach, initial observation, analysing and creative reflection on 
the issue become intertwined as they inform and shape each other. Drawing from the 
‘sociological imagination’ as described earlier, CAP ethnographers challenge their 
audiences by providing them with diverse metaphors, different ways of understanding 
and different ways of accessing social theoretical knowledge. Openness of form and 
inclusion of creative expression in the research, allow for a certain shift from the centrality 
of objective validity and a questioning of authorship. But if validity is not a quality to be 
valued in the CAP ethnographic projects, how can we really assess the quality of the 
resulted work? Richardson and St. Pierre present in their conceptualisation four 
alternative criteria:  
1. Substantive Contribution. This is always the first question when it comes to social 
research: how can research further extend social understanding. Grounded 
contribution takes events and situations from everyday life and provides an 
explanatory field of meaning that tackles certain aspects of the problem.  
2. Aesthetic Merit. Unlike more classical ethnographic work in the case of creative 
ethnography the aesthetics play a central and defining role as the message is 
pretty much defined through the particularity of the medium. The specifics of a 
medium are full of content and convey a series of extra discursive elements.  
3. Reflexivity. An important element of effective CAP ethnography is the element of 
self-reflectivity. It is crucial that the final result shows the development, giving an 
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overview of the conceptual framework and the positionality of the researcher within 
the process.   
4. Impact. A piece that is though provoking and brings up emotions is a piece that 
achieved produced some resonance, it generated questions it provoked further 
discussion. A creative practice with an impact activated new prospects for further 
methodological explorations and showcased an alternative way of producing 
knowledge.  
Locative interventions 
In chapter three I argue that the emergence of augmented reality gaming – in the form of 
Pokémon Go – presents an opportunity to re-assess poetic engagement with the city and 
the potential transformation of public space through mobile media.  
Conventional cultural geographies emphasize the phenomenology of ‘place’ – the lived 
experience of a particular environment. While valid, this approach struggles to account 
for the specificities of augmented reality applications insofar as these introduce 
something that is in a place, but not of the place. While drawing on phenomenological 
and psychogeographical principles, I wanted to find a way to move beyond these, to 
engage with the nascent realities created through new media cultures. My work thus 
centralises practice, particularly the practice of creating and exploring the augmented 
city. To achieve this, I appropriated the experience of playing Pokémon Go – of 
wandering the city and encountering it and its inhabitants, both virtual and real. Using the 
Echoes application, I created a site-specific poetry project in which contributors were 
asked to write a poem and to nominate a site for its consumption; tagged on a map, 
these constitute a new way of exploring and cohabiting the city.  
This approach finds its origins in the work of the local art group Akoo-o collective, a 
network of sound artists, musicians, anthropologists and urban theorists whose work 
explores new ways to experience the city. In their workshops, I learnt how to use Echoes 
an application that is explicitly developed to create site-specific mobile media 
experiences. During one of their interventions in Athens, Akoo-o produced a virtually 
enhanced walk around Monastiraki square, a central location in downtown Athens. One 
could experience that soundwalk by downloading it from their blog and experience an 
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unusual mixture of sounds from different cities on top of the typical sounds of the busy 
square. This inspired me to investigate further how this creative community has 
incorporated the location-based function into their creative, anthropological and self-
reflexive work. Following Akoo-o’s example I organised workshops where I educated 
people on how to use Echoes leading to the creations of Pokémon Poetry Go, an open 
platform for site-specific poetry.  
The final project includes autobiographical elements, free associations, poetic attempts 
and spoken word recordings besides images of Pokémon characters. In a sense I invited 
the participants to think along me, work with me, and self-reflect in order to identify new 
possibilities around locative auto-topographical technologies. It could be described as an 
invitation to a community of people to help me process, analyse and rethink the main 
research questions of this project. I then examined, the collectively produced material as 
cultural object, by analysing the texts and their relation to space. In order to better 
understand the final result I invited a participant to walk along me and visit all the different 
poems in the city. By inviting this participant and by observing her reaction to the final 
result, I was able to reflect on embodied experience of the project. My ethnographic 
observations throughout the development of the locative project also play central role in 
the theorisation of the project.  
The methodological intervention of my research is the introduction of the ‘auto-
topographical’ process as an active component of the research itself. Auto-topography is 
the process of a person relating to space using auto-biographical narratives. For the 
purpose of this research this was achieved with the mediation of relative software and 
smartphones with GPS capacities. The main application I intend to deploy is as 
mentioned earlier ‘Echoes’. Echoes allows its users to attach sound files, images and text 
onto specific locations on the map. Then, either the same user or another can navigate in 
the area and listen stream these media on their phones. This creates a three-dimensional 
experiential field for expression. The memories and creative expressions are being 
exteriorised and projected onto space. 
Pokémon Poetry Go is the final result of this research project and is publicly available for 
download through the Echoes online platform. Most of the poems that one can find in the 
PPG are autobiographical. The poets produced personal stories that relate to the 
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locations that these memories are exhibited/attached. The second category is more 
focused on the site-specificity and the participants produce poems in response to 
particular locations without necessarily unveiling much about their inner selves and 
memories. These responses are often more abstract or descriptive (historical events, 
fictional narratives, descriptions of the area etc.). The combination of the two different 
narratives creates emotional and poetic maps that reflect specific memories and 
associations of the participants. We co-created a series of augmented environments that 
haunt public spaces and then invited the audience to visit the public space and see it 
through the poetic lens of PPG.  
Stuart Moulthrop (2005) proposes the idea of setting up an “intervention” in order to study 
emerging phenomena in media studies. According to Moulthrop, emerging media 
phenomena tend to be difficult to grasp in other methodological domains as larger 
audiences are not aware of their characteristics and niche audiences are too involved in 
their production. So, in order to create an in vivo experimentation with them he suggests 
setting up a hybridic design where people are introduced to a simulated media 
phenomenon in a setting that resembles real world interaction and is facilitated by the 
researcher. He described that as ‘a practical contribution to a media system’. The 
characteristics of an intervention according to Moulthrop are: 
1. It should belong somewhere in the domain of cybertext, constituted as an 
interface to a database and including a feedback structure and generative logic to 
accommodate active engagement. 
2. It should be a work of production crafted with commonly available media and 
tools.  
3. It should depart discernibly from previous practice and be informed by some overt 
critical stance, satirical impulse, or polemical commitment, possibly laid out in an 
argument or manifesto. 
4. It should have provocative, pedagogic, or exemplary value, and be freely or 
widely distributed through some channel that maximizes this value, such as the 
Creative Commons or open source licensing. Ideally, the infrastructure of the work 
should either be available to the receiver or documented in sufficient detail to permit 
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productive imitation. (Moulthrop, 2005, pp. 5–6) 
By these four standards, I believe that Pokémon Poetry Go can be seen as an 
intervention, in Moulthrop’s sense. First, the poems are themselves a cybertext, existing 
silently and virtually until the reader (the walker) encounters them. Second, the DIY 
aesthetic of the project can be considered a form of ‘craft’, a bricolage of widely-available 
and freely accessible tools. Third, in blurring the boundaries between public, private and 
subjective spheres, the project takes a critical stance to these divisions; further in its 
hijacking of Pokémon Go it plays with, even parodies, its model. Finally, as I argue in this 
thesis, the process of creating and following the urban geography of Pokémon Poetry Go 
exemplifies something of the radical possibilities of augmented reality and its 
consumption.  
Creative geographies (auto-cartography) 
One methodological innovation is the adoption of a series of creative cartographic 
methods noted by Deirdre Heddon as autotopography (2008). Autotopography is a 
spatialised examination of one’s personal history. It is essentially an emotional 
cartography of subjectivity. Heddon focuses on performances and art projects that 
combine personal narratives with walking in space, those autobiographical explorations 
of space are produced through the interaction of subjectivity and physical space and 
hence are relevant to this research’s main objective. If autotopography signifies an 
expansion of one’s memories into space, then through them we can make more tangible 
the dialectic between personal identity and geography. While Heddon concentrates on 
the biographical aspect of one’s reflection, the poetics and free associations, in addition 
to the interaction with a potential audience, open up the possibilities for more complex 
articulations of one’s relation to space. Experience and memory are often a starting point 
but the potentiality for something new emerges through the intersection of a multifactor 
cluster of stimuli and means of expression. In a way, as Heddon points out, 
autotopography is writing space through self, and at the same time, writing self through 
space; it is a cartography of oneself. 
In a similar way I aspire to open up the process and explore not only the results but also 
the function of autotopography in relation to creativity and self-expression. What I would 
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like to see is the process of autotopography, writing oneself on a specific place through 
new media technologies.  This autotopography through new technological means 
suggest a new relation to the city where personal stories, narratives and reflection 
acquire new material traces and they occupy a semi-public sphere; a space created in-
between real commonly apprehended as public and intimate, thinly separated personal 
spaces.  
Stitching sounds on the map is an embodied gesture towards a new material relation to 
space. A new possibility for détournement of dominant normative narratives that define 
urban environments. The hybridic experiences that come out of this can only be explored 
through a playful experimentation with the medium itself. Creative methods in cultural 
geographical studies have been instrumentalised lately due to discipline’s on-going 
interest in embodiment. The embodied turn of geography focuses on the sensory 
experience of space, the emotions, and the affective elements (Longhurst, 1997). For 
Harriet Hawkins, engagement with creative methods offers a grasp of the messy, always 
unfinished and contingent spatial imaginaries (Hawkins, 2015). Besides that, creativity 
offers a different relation to geographical knowledge for a non-specialist audience, 
allowing the researchers to explore participatory and communicative potential by 
generating collaborative communities. Art practices, specifically, are valued for their 
interventionary possibilities. Most of the cases analysed by Hawkins did not aim to 
produce some creative output but rather evolved as collaborative practices between 
artists and her. 
In a way, the aesthetic element has been always potent in the history of geographical 
research as image making and writing practices has always been present in geographical 
representation. Tension between mimetic representations and more expressive, 
impressionist and generally creative ones defined the history of cartography and we can 
trace the history of this tension both in the pre-enlightenment and enlightenment concern 
with visual sources of information about place. Today mimesis of reality is no longer a 
driving force in our understanding of place with alternative approaches that include 
subjective understanding and encompass visual art methods defining our understanding 
of space (Hawkins, 2015).  
Following that logic, I aspire to encompass new forms of representation of space that 
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deal with the sensorial, embodied and poetic understanding of spatial realities. I intend to 
break methodologically into new territory in terms of producing, gathering and assessing 
qualitative data. The poetics of space are captured and represented in their material 
actuality as part of the subjective narrative. The discursive walks are representing a 
potentiality for a dialectic analysis between embodied movement and language. This 
process does not aim to offer a more objective account of space, on the contrary, it is 
inviting both the researcher and the spectator/reader into a phenomenological enactment 
where multiplicity is endemic, discourse goes back into movement and getting 
contextualised in immersive space turns into its raw poetic, idiosyncratic and temporary 
dimension. 
Poetry and qualitative research 
The poetic function as identified by Julia Kristeva (2006) offers a point of conjunction 
between psychic structures and a spatialised understanding of the unconscious. The idea 
of poetry and poetics organises many of my theoretical arguments as it draws together 
concepts such as the unconscious and creativity along with the idea of an embodied form 
of expression. Schouten and Sherry argue that poetry could and should have an active 
role in qualitative consumer research. They argue that poetry is re-emerging as a literary 
genre mainly because it offers a different relation to discourse. Poetry in their analysis 
offers a linguistic way of capturing what always slips discourse. This happens as poetic 
language is physiognomic and synthetic, is a language structured like a dream, it is 
formed by pre-words and non-words (Sherry and Schouten, 2002).  
The emotional truths that can be communicated through poetic discourse shake the 
foundation of what kinds of truth language can convey. Following a post-structuralist 
critique, Sherry and Schouten identify a potential space for new forms of knowledge 
produced out of new linguistic articulations; articulations that will allow for affective 
explorations of language. They want to move away from a realist view of ethnographic 
writing that due to its obsessive pre-occupation with listing observable facts moves away 
from actually capturing emotional realities of everyday phenomena. They focus on the 
ways consumer experiences tend to be reduced into one-dimensional phenomena even 
when the aspiration of the researches is strongly aligned with qualitative methodology.  
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Similarly, Robin Canniford (2012) suggests that poetic discourse can represent the 
complexity in terms of emotions and multisensory experiences that other modes of 
ethnographic representation fail to capture.  
It could be argued, for instance, that intense experiences of pleasure, pain, desire, 
joy or fear require spaces for expression and inquiry beyond regular modes of 
representation. Depth interview transcripts in particular, tend to elicit highly reflexive 
and self-conscious accounts of consumers’ identity and meaning-making 
procedures. Poetry, on the other hand, offers a means to present emotional 
experiences in a more emotive manner. (Canniford, 2012, p. 393) 
For Canniford, poetic discourse could be use not only in the presentation of results of a 
research project but rather as an intrinsic part the research. He suggests a methodology 
of poetic field notes and poetic transcription of interviews in attempt to capture in 
language extra-linguistic elements. Poetry is an attempt to deal with intuition, 
introspection, and through its aesthetic form to induce emotional resonance to the reader. 
Poetic discourse can be figurative and imagistic destabilising the meaning making 
process through its polyvocality. 
Data analysis 
People are able to produce meaning out of arbitrary situations. It seems as if patterns 
emerge even in the most chaotic circumstances. Small repetitions, bold contradictions or 
subtle similarities seem to define the ways we navigate through a disorderly world of 
countless stimuli. Social scientific methods that focus on qualitative data seem to take on 
this human capacity with the aspiration of providing results that will not only indicate 
emerging patterns but will also be able to produce theory, insight into the reasons, and 
predictions for the future (Miles and Huberman, 2014).  
Patterns tend to appear in different articulations, like ‘gestalts’ that entail different 
elements, they cannot always properly be broken down into their components. Qualitative 
research bibliography provides us with techniques that can ease the process of 
identifying ‘useful’ patterns or at least identifying patterns that allow for a certain kind of 
contemplation on the research topic. Clustering and categorising data is always the first 
step towards understanding potential connections (Miles and Huberman, 2014). 
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Clustering requires a rigorous abstraction from rich narratives to defined topics and 
themes. In a sense this process allows for an easily accessible volume of data; it is a 
rough indexing that comes out of an initial selection. Although this process requires a fair 
amount of critical overviewing it is more oriented towards organising data rather than 
understanding their connections. On a second level comparisons and contrasts can allow 
for more comprehensive conclusions regarding the research questions. Tensions and 
differences between answers can draw attention on the complexities of one issue. Miles 
and Huberman draw attention on another element of thematic analysis that has to do with 
metaphor. The centrality of metaphors in the social theorising has been stressed on the 
epistemological segment of this chapter and it is a topic that keeps re-emerging as it 
comes hand in hand with my pre-occupation with psychoanalytic thought and the 
unconscious. But even on purely methodological level, metaphor’s importance cannot be 
downplayed.  
Metaphors offer an analytic tool that unifies different experiences and phenomena. 
Metaphor can make visible structures of analogy and similarity in ways that plain factual 
logic fails to capture. Important for the rigor of the research is to have a self-reflective 
understanding of the limitations of metaphor as method (namely its lack of restraint or 
consistency). Nevertheless, as Miles and Huberman note (2014), metaphors are very 
useful as they allow us to produce theory out of observations. New words, new 
categories, new nodal points organise clusters of data and allow the exploration of 
certain intuitive assumptions. It is important as noted before to remember that our 
concepts are in the very literal sense intricate metaphors as they organise meaning 
according to their own metaphysics. This knowledge should not cripple our scientific 
imagination, on the contrary it should inspire us to find the suitable metaphors and utilise 
them in order to produce meaningful results. After all, as Jacques Lacan suggests, 
metaphors open up to the possibility of misunderstanding, the foundation of all 
communication. 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis  
In order to examine the patterns emerging from the thematic assortment I intend to use a 
series of interpretative approaches. Firstly, I draw from phenomenological traditions as 
processed by Smith et al. in their constitution of Interpretative Phenomenological 
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Analysis (IPA) (2013). In their formulation of qualitative methodology they examine the 
ways people make sense of their life experiences. Phenomenology tends to examine the 
different ways people experience the world and more specifically the ways they reflect 
and shape an understanding of those ways. To put it simply, phenomenology is a 
philosophical tradition that focuses on understanding human experience. 
Phenomenology to its very essence is an inquiry of what experience is, and how it comes 
into being. Philosophers such as Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty have 
contributed a series of philosophical concepts that explicate on the nature of human 
experience (Smith et al., 2013). 
In IPA the research participant is the one that is assumed to makes sense of what is 
happening and the researcher attempts to get some access to that information. For 
phenomenology people are meaning making creatures and in that sense the researcher 
is trying to make sense of how the participant makes sense of the world. We have here a 
double hermeneutic, the researcher occupies a double role as they are expected to 
produce their own personal meaning and at the same time engage with the meaning 
production of the research participant. The participant always has to grant the access to 
those experiences. IPA studies are usually conducted on small sample sizes, as the 
importance of those accounts is valued for their internal explanatory power. IPA focuses 
on the particular and brings forward ‘detailed and nuanced analysis of particular 
instances of lived experiences’ (Smith et al., 2013). In a way, the researcher tries to find 
their way from the particular into the bigger over-arching themes and form a connective 
thread that does not reduce different experiences into each other. This process values all 
experiential claims and operates first and most importantly on the individual level.  
Psychoanalysis and qualitative research 
One of the most challenging aspects of this research project comes from my desire to 
bridge abstract psychoanalytic concepts and qualitative research; my ambition to develop 
a psychoanalytically informed, research project that would be playful yet engaging with 
core questions around subjectivity. 
One of my first reference points in this pursuit was Claudia Lapping’s index of social 
scientific projects that manage to incorporate psychoanalytic concepts in their analyses 
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(Lapping, 2011). Lapping advocates for some kind of reconciliation between 
psychoanalysis and social research as she recognises there is mutual suspicion and 
tension between those two bodies of theory and practice. She suggests that such 
reconciliation might offer new insights towards the understanding of social reality and the 
subjectification processes. In the research projects that Lapping presents, the main 
methodological framework includes both qualitative interviews and the development of 
certain psychoanalytic concepts. In this methodological articulation the theorists draw 
parallel lines between psychoanalytic ideas and their correspondence to social 
phenomena.  
Another reference point that helped me to develop my initial interview plan came from 
Jefferson and Hollway’s account of the free association narrative interview (Hollway and 
Jefferson, 2011). I decided to present my informants’ narratives in their dialectic 
openness rather than reducing them into examples of my theoretical framework. 
Qualitative research lives in the tension between, on the one hand, a deconstructionist 
framework in which the human subject is understood as positioned in and through 
competing discourses and, on the other, a humanistic framework in which the integrity of 
the subject is taken to be both a starting- and end-point of analysis (Frosh, 2007).  
Psychoanalysis can offer some relief from this tension as it offers a new understanding of 
subjectivity: The subject is still in the centre but this time her unconscious is also taken 
into consideration; the socio-symbolic conditions are questioned without omitting the 
entangled embodied experience. Producing narratives have in the psychoanalytic context 
two side effects: One is the slippages, disruptions and discontinuities, moments when 
unconscious thoughts emerge. The other is the function of the transference facilitated by 
the presence of the interviewer; the one who sets the expectation and promises a 
potential interpretation. As Peter Brooks puts it, ‘[someone listening] drags the narrator 
into the special semiotic and interpretive space of transference’ (Brooks, 1997). 
Therefore, a narrative is not just something waiting to be discovered but it is shaped in 
this inter-subjective process. The interview becomes a space of meaning and resistance, 
repression and creativity. 
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Ethical considerations 
There are three axes that organise my ethical considerations regarding this research 
plan. Firstly, I suggest the overall concern to avoid causing harm. That includes providing 
a safe environment for all participants, explaining extensively the purpose and general 
direction of research and at the same time respecting their boundaries at all time. In 
avoidance of harm I could add avoiding certain emotionally difficult topics and physical 
precautions when the project requires strolling around the city.  
The second axis has to do with anonymity. As I will assure all participants that their 
names (or personal details that could give away their identities) will at no point be used in 
my dissertation or any publication that might come out of it. In order to assure total 
confidentiality I will code ethnographic notes and recordings with pseudonyms and make 
sure that are encrypted for further security.  
Finally I will make sure that the resulting locative artworks will only be used in the context 
of this research and will not have any commercial or publicised exposure. In order to 
make sure I communicate those principles to all participants I will provide a written 
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Literature Review 
Locative media 
The starting point for my research project is my interest in the relationship between 
space, subjectivity and technology. Applications which allow consumption of media in 
specific geographical locations are often called ‘locative media’. Following a stream of 
research that identifies consumption as immersion into new experiences –a multi-sensory 
and embodied phenomenon – I have tried interpreting locative media as a field of new 
consumer experiences. Sherry and Joy (2003) discuss marketing’s ‘experiential turn’ 
focusing on the materiality of consumer’s body. Instead of pursuing a purely discursive 
analysis of people’s opinions, they analyze sensorial data stemming from what is 
ostensibly material: the body. In their account, it is not the conscious understanding of 
one’s identity and body image that are central in the process of embodiment but rather 
unconscious impulses, tensions and even contradictions. They use Merleau-Ponty’s 
definition of embodied experience to critically engage with the consumption of art within 
museum space. In their analysis paintings are not considered as objects presented in 
empty space; they rather examine the ways spatial, architectural and other environmental 
stimuli affect the consumption of art and define aesthetic experience as such. Moving 
away from a purely formalist analysis of art they attempt a relational analysis where art 
objects activate spaces, facilitate relations and produce meaning. Sherry and Joy pay 
attention to museums’ auditory environments focusing on how audio-guides dictate the 
experience and activate the mise-en-scène of the museum. Visitors experience a certain 
narrative; pace their view and understanding, get immersed into a parallel temporality.  
But what if museum audio guides were more self-reflexive and claimed an independency 
from their utilitarian modality? What if an audio-guide was ambitious enough to compete 
with the paintings in artistry, timelessness and affective impact? Artist Janet Cardiff 
entertains this possibility in her seminal piece The Missing Voice (Case Study B). This 
artwork starts as a conventional historical audio-guide of Whitechapel Library. Soon, the 
listener understands that the voice descriptions follow a bizarre trajectory. At a certain 
point the voice suggests that the listener should leave the space of the library: ‘Try to 
follow the sound of my footsteps, she says, so that we can stay together’. Then, she 
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takes the listener to a 40 minutes tour around east London. During the walk she 
describes a crime scene and slowly gives hints constructing a mysterious narrative 
(Pinder, 2007). The narrative forms a complex emotional map of the surrounding space. 
The art-piece in this case only becomes an art piece through the body of the listener 
moving through space. The listener has to combine information coming from the 
environment, a recorded narrative and their personal experience of space. Different 
memories of the city can activate different aspects of the narrative, familiar streets 
become strange, and new places are introduced into memory through an interactive 
story. David Pinder (2007) connects The Missing Voice with earlier experiential drifts 
facilitated by the commercial success of the Sony Walkman, connecting it to Iain 
Chambers’ (2005) analysis of the aural walk . Chambers discusses the phenomenon of 
urban soundscaping and the new temporalities and spatialities introduced by the 
widespread use of Walkman music players. The Walkman fills empty times with sensorial 
stimuli; when waiting for someone, or standing in public transport, it creates a private 
listening space everywhere.  
The listener curates a soundscape, an extra layer of meaning upon every day urban 
experiences. Chambers  is looking at this development as intertwined with late capitalist 
realities: new need for personalisation of time and at the same time expanded urban 
landscapes. It is the figure of the nomad: the ones who spend their lives in movement 
and re-establish loose histories through a series of poetically connected floating signifiers 
(Chambers, 2005). A nomad’s traces are never actually tracing back to their starting 
point, the traces have only one function: providing a genealogy of nomads’ desire to 
move forward. From the immediacy of physical sounds, or somehow existing 
environmental sounds (urban noise) we move to an everyday reality of personally 
curated sounds. From the transparency of sound and voice in public space to the semi-
private, virtual auditory chamber that accompanies the listener. Mizuko Ito develops a 
similar argument regarding listening devices of today (namely smartphones, iPods and 
other portable mp3 players). Ito theorises the way listening devices create what she calls 
perceptive coocons: micro-spaces that separate us from the others within public space. 
The phenomenology of space is in this example shaped by the introduction of a 
mediating layer. Headphones are building an in-between, which has certain temporal 
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features. For Ito, that space is intrinsically connected with time as it emerges in the 
presumed as ‘dead’ time in transitional spaces and/or in public transport (Ito, 2007). The 
idea of a cocoon, an imaginary spatial separation from the external world, will come back 
later in the discussion of screen in relation to narcissism. What is persistent in those 
analyses is the idea of fragmentation. What seems to be obvious is that those smaller 
handheld devices introduce a different relation to media consumption. It is not a big 
screen and a pair of loud speakers that organise space and time. The way you are 
supposed to consume media, the directorial intention loses its strong imperative and gets 
personalised to the maximum. 
Hito Steyerl (2012) in her poetic account of The Wretched Screen describes this shift with 
a focus on new approaches to the cinematic image. Her analysis focuses on video art 
and the shift from a big central screen to video installations with multiple and bizarre 
screen surfaces, which prioritise embodied relationality to art-works. Instead of just sitting 
in a silent dark screening room you wander around, you experience the artwork from 
different perspectives, you deal with the rest of the walking audience around you. The 
directorial position is according to Steyerl much more centralised in the instance of 
cinema screen in which the viewer is almost assumed to act as a form of disembodied 
gaze. In this new era, multiple relations to the screen are introduced. Cinema, Steyerl 
tells us, has exploded and the fragments are everywhere, you can access them from 
different entry points and different points of view and you can never see the whole 
picture. Fragments are always hiding behind other fragments. Taking this metaphor 
further we can see how screen-based media has moved from certain spaces to 
everywhere. It is not only the cinematic screen that has exploded. Television and 
computer screens have had similar fates. Those little mirrors, those little fragments are 
everywhere: activated, potent and demanding. Steyerl talks about a gaze that is no 
longer collective but it is still common, a common image, a common map, a moment of 
parallel multiplicity of meaning that manages to activate subjective desires. What is 
missing for Steyerl is the screen as exit, the end of the video projection, a real exit that 
allows the subject to take a critical distance. The end credits never come, the map turns 
into a dynamic relationality, scrolling down never reaches bottom. Even when one small 
screen crashes, another appears in the horizon. This fragmented media environment 
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gets entangled in the construction of selfhood. Our image, similarly to the fragmented 
mirrors that allow us to comprehend it, becomes dispersed within time and space. 
Ourselves become traces on the map, spatialised memories. 
Locative media is both the starting point and the culmination of this research 
methodology. The space around us is not a big atlas with well-defined edges and certain 
authorship; it is on the contrary the myriad moments of mapping, the relentless 
cartography of our quotidian lives. Locative media colonise this territory, they offer an 
audio guide for a not yet become space; a soundscape, images and fictional narratives 
that show up in order to fill in the gaps of a fractured cartography. In the case of locative 
media a product of artistic intention mediates our experience. Mediation is yet again the 
message.  
In order to create a genealogy of locative media we need to bring together a series of 
different stories. First of all, we need to investigate the emergence of smartphones with 
GPS capabilities. According to Adriana de Souza e Silva and Jordan Frith (2010) location 
aware technologies have changed the function of mobile phones turning them from 
devices to connect to each other to form what she theorises as ‘locative mobile social 
networks’. That is a significant point of departure as this has indeed changed once more 
the way we embody space and the way we consume space. Our relation to the Other has 
increasingly incorporated geographic information. Inclusion of GPS capacities in 
commercial phones enabled a series of every-day use of location aware applications. 
According to Rowan Wilken and Gerard Goggin (2017) ‘location-based services comprise 
the fastest growing sector in web technology businesses’. This shift seems to start 
happening around 2005, with de Souza e Silva and Sutko (2009) identifying two main 
factors responsible. Firstly, Google’s adoption of geolocation services as central to their 
package of services. Google Maps launched in 2005 made a highly sophisticated map 
interface available for every user to access. Secondly the launch of affordable 
smartphones that incorporated location-based applications with most prominent example 
the extremely popular first iPhone.  
Farman (2012) attempted a historical overview on the emergency of locative media that 
went far beyond GPS and iPhone. He traced the history of several gadgets trough 
history, which defined how humanity understands time and space. Starting from written 
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inscriptions and discussing the impact of pocket watches, Farman concludes with an 
extensive analysis of the function of telephones (initially as landline-bound machines and 
more recently as handheld mobile devices). He insists that ‘the way we represent space 
has to do with how we embody space’ and in this representation there are certain 
technologies, which play defining role. The body cycles, sleep and waking up, 
understanding where each member of your body lies, finding our way.  And this is an 
element of locative media that keeps defining the experience of their consumption 
(Farman, 2012). 
For Wilken (2010), mobile media could facilitate an encounter with the Other, the 
stranger. It is a new possibility among the media production, an extra effective element.  
Space becomes more open to the possibilities of encounter and the potential 
impermanent communities are generating new socio-cultural geographies. Wilken is 
building a post-structuralist argument in order to describe a new type of community, 
which becomes possible through technology; a community which escape traditional 
limitations of group dynamics and allows the possibility of difference and fluidity. For 
Salmond (2010) this discussion could include the potential formation of political 
communities. In his argument, aspects of locative media could allow the organisation of 
momentary communities of resistance. Using the example of flash mob he is speculating 
on a potential reclaim of the public space through location aware technology. For Dodge 
et al. (2009) new social spaces are governed by different attributes as they are produced 
in radically different ways. Pervasive internet shapes the experience of space, or more 
accurately produces space in new ways that allow for the interaction between software, 
people and their environments.  
Space can be transformed into an assemblage of material and virtual elements, which 
interact and co-create each other. Critical software studies have discussed the 
relationship between phenomenology of space and augmented reality (Manovich, 2006). 
Augmented reality unlike older iterations of virtual environments (where the distinction 
between the virtual and the actual is easily distinguishable) becomes more prevalent in 
the instance of mobile media. Handheld devices with geolocating capacities enable the 
production of new environments where virtual objects co-exist with real world ones. Once 
again, our perception of space is changing, and our experiences within virtual spaces 
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shape our understanding of conventional environments (Liao and Humphreys, 2015).  
Lapenta (2011) discusses the intersection of location and image, in a world saturated by 
digital images that circulate and create complex semiotic networks. I aspire to build on 
that analysis and investigate the function of those semiotic networks in relation to the 
process of subjectification. I am interested in analysing how the subject navigates those 
semiotic networks and how they are affected by this navigation. In order to answer those 
questions I have to reframe the discussions within a psychosocial context where social 
and psychic phenomena co-exist in an intricate dialogue. In order to ground this 
discussion I aspire to focus on the intersection between narrative and space. I am 
interested not only in the idea of historical narratives but moreover personal and 
subjective narratives, narratives that bind autobiographical associations with 
understanding of one’s location.  
Locative narratives  
Before I go into specifics of my understanding of ‘spatial narrative’ I would like to present 
some locative projects deal with more socio-historical narrativization of space. In 2003, a 
project named Murmur, introduced this idea of oral history by placing a series of site-
specific installations, in Toronto. Murmur has expanded since then to eight more cities 
around the world. The central idea remains the same: placing recordings of local people’s 
histories in certain locations in the city. In that way, the murmur team attempts suturing 
certain oral histories literally onto the urban fabric (Wilken, 2012). They promote a 
localised understanding of history that does not only focus on a centralised refined 
historicity but is rather interested in the fragmented and personal, in what is essential 
native. Unlike an online oral history archive in the murmur project the audience has a 
chance to interact with the actual environment of the story. Interestingly, the geolocated 
data are not affected by the changes on site; a regeneration plan, a natural catastrophe, 
or even the natural decay coming with time affect the environment but those stories 
remain the same haunting a GPS position, a specific location that might be completely 
stripped from all other characteristics that gave birth to the original narrative_.  
The ghostly effect of this immaterial form of geo-tagged information has allowed for some 
artworks to comment on that exact phenomenon. Stories of those displaced while cities 
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has changed, stories that one could not access or even imagine while walking in 
restructured environments could also find a way to re-emerge through locative media. 
Such is the case of Memoryscape Audiowalks by Toby Butler. In those sound walks 
recording of stories of people that used to live by Thames River offer a glimpse into the 
narratives of those displaced. One can listen to the recording while walking by the river 
getting a different perspective of space (Butler, 2006). Murmur and Memoryscape 
Audiowalks are locative arts project that do not use GPS technologies but follow a more 
conventional combination of a map and an audio file. In that sense they precede 
thematically similar attempts that utilise smartphones as their main platform and 
demonstrate the potentiality of developing site-specific work without relying on certain 
geo-location services. That is an important note as part of the critique of locative projects 
is targeting their seemingly inevitable entanglement with certain centralised technologies. 
For the needs of this discussion I assume that the development of easy to access geo-
locating technologies allows for a popularisation of locative narratives; once this new 
medium is established as a possibility in order to retain a critical stand I might then re-
consider the ways that those practices could be practiced outside what we might 
understand as a potentially problematic context.  
In many cases of locative applications we see a combination of historical narratives and 
real navigation with a focus on the augmentation of perception in space. They bring an 
older or lost version of the city into being; they bring up all the images sounds and voices 
of what is effectively silenced, destroyed or decayed. The ‘Women in Map’ project, for 
example utilises the Google Field Trip platform in order to notify users every time they 
pass by a location where a ‘woman made history’. The project focuses on prominent 
women that achieved recognition and attempts a feminist re-inscription of history with an 
empowering aspiration for the users. What history-focused locative projects fail to capture 
though is the potential interaction of the user with space and the inevitably idiosyncratic 
element of strolling down the city centre. Although parallelism between contemporary city 
and memories from the past offer an interesting canvas for exploring tensions, 
discontinuities and contradictions it still does not allow for a true self-reflective and 
creative encounter with the city as it ascribes yet another prescribed narrative.  
Taking a distance from that model and offering the potentiality of contingency in the 
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narrativization of space Jason Farman (2015) examines this exact possibility in an almost 
literal sense as in his analysis space is always narrativised one way or another. 
According to Farman, there are certain narratives that are silencing others and certain 
histories that define space. Those narratives are determined by certain power dynamics. 
But how can you manipulate the narratives of a location? In order to answer that question 
Farman distances himself from early studies of digital media that proclaimed the end of 
materiality. He identifies, on the contrary, a re-emergence of what is undeniably material 
and he claims new digital reality to be firmly geo-located and embodied.  
Mobile media are less about producing digital simulations that replace the material world 
and are instead more interested in producing ways that the virtual and the material 
interact in meaningful, embodied ways. (Farman 2015) 
The potential political use of those new technologies emerges again. Who can really 
inscribe place with meaning? Who can control the narrative that seems to be embedded 
on physical spaces? How do antagonistic voices paint their views on the streets, walls 
and representations of the city? From graffiti artists to oral historians, from state 
interventions to new media applications, the answers to those questions seem to entail a 
complex network of possibilities. Farman developed an application called ‘approach’ as 
part of his research. With ‘approach’ he aspires to bring forward counter-narratives and 
narratives of marginalised groups. ‘Approach’ offers the opportunity to its users to 
develop audio-walks with their personal stories. Farman gives the example of a 
wheelchair user who gives an audio walk around a largely inaccessible campus. You 
listen to their voice as you walk around; you follow their struggle and get an embodied 
experience of their point of view. In this example invisible structures become observable.  
Textopia is a project that follows closely the intentions of approach. Textopia utilises a 
smartphone application in order to “attach” poems in specific locations. Anders Sundnes 
Løvlie (2009) gives us an account of an experiment, where a literary workshop produces 
works of fiction with the intention to attach them in specific areas. Løvlie used the 
application in order to develop a series of interventions inviting participants to develop 
their own site-specific poems. This is the closest methodological example to the research 
plan I intend to develop and therefore it offers useful methodological and theoretical 
input. Løvlie classified the resulted interventions in three sub-categories: 
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1. Placetexts: Poetic place descriptions, or stories that are placed in certain city 
locations, but which do not otherwise seem to engage with the specific qualities of 
the system and could apparently have been written without a locative system in 
mind. 
 2. Voice sculptures: Poetic texts which usually address the reader directly in the 
second person, and in which the poetic voice/narrator appears to be aware that it 
is speaking as a recording to a reader/user present in the same location, but at a 
later time, and uses this situation as a poetic or rhetorical tool.  
3. Stray voices: Series of texts which form stories that move from place to place, 
requiring the user to physically traverse the landscape of the story in order to 
traverse the text of the story (though not necessarily in linear sequence).  (Løvlie, 
2009) 
Psychogeography 
Many of the projects presented here (like Approach and Textopia) belong to a generation 
of smartphone applications whose genealogies trace back to the psychogeographic 
tradition. Psychogeography is a central concept in my research as it brings together 
political critique, urban exploration, and creative practice.  Psychogeography, as 
Coverley puts it, is a term that resists definition. Deriving from a political movement but 
also developed as an art practice, Psychogeography combines the early twentieth 
century’s perceptions of urban space, political aspiration to resist capitalism and a sense 
of artistic avant-garde. Psychogeography can be a practice, a literary expression, a 
political strategy even a new set of metaphysical believes (Coverley, 2010). The origins 
of psychogeography trace back to the 1950s group, the Lettrists, precursors of 
Situationist International. According to one of the most prominent members of the group, 
Guy Debord, psychogeography was a practical attempt into “transforming urban life”.  
Debord, held that psychogeography could be an effective study of geographical 
environments in relation to the emotions and/or behaviour of individuals: ‘The secrets of 
the city are, at a certain level decipherable, but the personal meaning they have for us is 
incommunicable.’ (Debord, 1967)  
The Situationist International attempted a critique of contemporary urban environment 
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presenting it as space of social control. Their analysis of cities take in account the 
psychic impact of architectural structures and urban planning and the emotional imprints 
of material infrastructure. The political and the psychic become interwoven as the city 
turns into a metaphor for the turbulent mental life of the subject. Situationist practices 
include getting lost in the city; exploring space becomes an art practice, and thus maps 
and territories turn into a synesthetic terrain for introspection and political action. Inspired 
by that, a series of Locative art projects focus on producing alternative mappings, 
creative cartographies of personal stories, open-ended explorations, and distracted 
navigation. The city remains the scenery for the artwork and the ‘spectator’ activates or 
even produces the artwork through a series of interactive practices. 
Central in the Psychogeographic oeuvre is the figure of the flâneur, the romantic figure of 
an urban explorer, a connoisseur of the streets. The figure of the flâneur comes from 
Walter Benjamin’s take on Baudelaire’s poetry, and is the image of a modern man 
walking around the city, finding himself in the reflections of the streets and the openness 
of possibilities coming from the developments in the emerging metropolises (Coverley, 
2010). 
The flâneur is an individual stroller who gets lost and explores the city by himself. The 
figure of the flâneur does not only play a role in understanding the city but becomes 
himself a part of the modern city, he becomes a figure that represents urban life. Drawing 
parallels with that figure, a contemporary urban figure would stroll around clutching a 
mobile device that can mediate their navigation. Getting lost might be an impossibility 
until battery dies.  
Another key concept in psychogeographic practice is that of the dérive: the idea of an 
unplanned journey. A dérive take place while you let your unconscious guide you, when 
you find a way to navigate space using an unconscious stream of thoughts and desires 
(Coverley, 2010). It is essentially a disruption of the late capitalism’s everyday routines 
and an exploration of a potentially creative encounter with one’s urban environment. 
Bringing new technologies in that equation changes the parameters of the discussion. As 
we saw before, getting lost is a tough business when you carry GPS enabled 
smartphone.  Certain smartphone applications play with the prospect of a guided dérive, 
a technologically enhanced psychogeographic exploration. As contradictory as it sounds, 
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Serendipitor is an application that aspires opening up the possibility of getting lost within 
a specific area by providing a randomised walk between two points on the map. The user 
has to enter beginning and ending points and then a random route is generated. The 
application boasts that ‘it helps you find something by looking for something else’. A more 
developed concept and more straightforwardly influenced by psychogeography is the 
Dérive app.  According to the developer’s description of the project: 
The active engagement of communities in their urban spaces unleashes in them new 
understanding of their urban surroundings, to open up channels of dialogue between 
individuals and groups through a device that makes the unpacking of urban space part of 
a game. 
Dérive app offers a series of ‘decks’, packages with cards suggesting specific actions 
that users have to follow. The suggestions vary from physical actions to moments of 
introspection, suggested interactions with the environment or the people around you. The 
game extends to different locations and the developers invite its users to develop their 
own decks that reflect on specific conditions of specific places. The experiences 
generated by those applications allow us to rethink the potentiality of new media in 
enabling creative understandings of urban environments.  
Locative games 
As we have seen, psychogeographic projects incorporate the city in a creative interactive 
exchange. Wondering in the city acquires the status of an art practice and the material 
city becomes an active element for a series of explorative games. When it comes to 
smartphone applications, not surprisingly, the most developed areas of Locative Media 
have to do with gaming. Location-aware games are usually mixed reality games where 
elements from the real world are combined with augmented reality narratives mixing 
virtual and physical space.  
Drakopoulou (2010) examines how location-based games change the way the world is 
being materialized. She reviews a series of locative games that have been developed the 
past decade. Some of those projects have managed to introduce recreational locative 
technologies into bigger audiences. Drakopoulou focuses on games developed by Blast 
Theory, a group of artists working on interactive media, based in Brighton. One of the first 
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attempts by Blast Theory into developing locative games was ‘Can you see me now?’, a 
virtual hide and seek where two groups of people where competing. In this game two 
cities where layered one upon each other. On one level it was the map of the actual 
physical city, on a second level the map of a virtual city. Online players could ‘wonder 
around’ in the virtual city using their keyboard and they would lose if they got close to one 
of the ‘runners’ who were running in the actual city. A concept simple yet confusing to 
describe allowed for a questioning of space and embodiment. The co-existence of a 
virtual and a real space, the thrill of ‘hunting’ someone who is far away in front of a 
computer screen and the encounter of real city places and scenes you would not 
normally see in your everyday life allowed for a rich reflection upon the ways we 
understand and experience space. Blast Theory has since produced a series of 
applications that utilise GPS as part of their gameplay such as ‘Uncle Roy Is All around 
you’ and ‘I Like Frank in Adelaide’ (Drakopoulou, 2010). 
Blast Theory has operated as a locative avant-garde in Europe but there certain example 
of locative projects that got more mainstream attention. One of those cases is Mogi, a 
Japanese popular Locative Game that had commercial success and was played 
throughout Japan from 2003 to 2006. In their analysis of the phenomenon Licoppe and 
Inada (2009) examine the ways this location-based game created a ‘location-sensitive’ 
culture with certain shifts in collective behaviour. In their virtual ethnography they 
managed to identify a series of issues primarily focusing on the danger of stalking, a 
negative side effect of virtual cultures. They use specific case studies that manifest 
location sensitivity spilling into real life. Web cultures offer a sense of safe distance 
(although we have seen cases of cyber stalking and bullying) with a certain level of 
anonymity and relative ease of disengagement. In the context of collective locative 
gaming the aspect of anonymity remains but takes a different turn as the possibility of a 
real, material encounter appears. Merging the ‘real’ with the ‘virtual’ brings forward new 
questions regarding privacy. 
Last May, Harvard’s student Aran Khanna launched an application that took advantage of 
Facebook messenger’s security flaw. His application used the geo-location feature that is 
activated by default on Facebook messenger in order to track other users’ positions. By 
installing this extension to your browser you could see on a map the location of all the 
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people you have ever talked on Facebook. The security issue was later fixed and the 
application was withdrawn but the fact that a programmer could easily have access to 
users’ personal data was indicative of new media’s problems when it comes to privacy 
and control of personal information. Khannas project was an application that played with 
locative data. The map becomes here a metaphor for privacy, being able to trace the 
movement of fellow Facebook users has an unsettling effect as you realise what location 
tracing actually looks like. Those lines on the map (usually) uncovering no more than the 
usual banality of everyday routines once publicly available bring forward the uncanny 
effect of the ubiquitous surveillance of our era. 
Contrary to those examples of locative games, Ingress is an application that has 
managed to gain large mainstream attention: Google developed Ingress and it is 
essentially an augmented reality massively multiplayer game for smartphones. All 
previous examples have more or less of a niche target audience but Ingress has 
managed to create a global community of loyal players. According to Ingress’s main 
storyline the world around us has been invaded by an unknown substance named exotic 
matter. As a response to this discovery two large fractions have been formed: One fights 
for the total spread of the exotic matter, and one fights against the spread. The innovative 
aspect of Ingress though is not the storyline but indeed the gameplay.  
The map of the game coincides with the real map; the energy portals are actual physical 
locations and in order for a user to interact with them they have to really go near them. 
The game uses GPS technology in order to make sure the payers are interacting with 
space and quite often the portals are placed near existing urban landmarks such us 
monuments, churches, parks etc. Ingress has been praised for its unique interactivity and 
has gathered a community of players who extended the main narrative and formed 
relationships that go beyond the game. The popularity of the game is due to both its 
innovative gameplay and because Google has backed it up with resources and a 
successful marketing campaign. What is also noted though is that ‘Ingress is one of the 
most seductive and prolific data-mining tools to be introduced in the last decade’ (Hulsey 
and Reeves, 2014). Hulsey and Reeves in their critical account of Ingress present a 
series of concerns regarding the new hybridic spaces that emerge in augmented reality 
games such as Ingress. According to their analyses those games rely on the close 
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interconnectivity between users’ personal information such as his/her location in order to 
progress into the game’s narrative.  
Ingress thrive on the surveillance and redirection of player mobility through targeted 
commercial and non-commercial spaces. Through its embedded game mechanics, 
Ingress encourages players to actively participate in a surveillance community while also 
normalizing data mining and surveillance as a valid exchange for the privilege of play. 
(Hulsey and Reeves, 2014) 
Similarly, Ingress was deemed a ‘gold mine for augmented reality’ games by media 
theorist Hal Hodson (2012), who claims that the location-based game allows for the 
production of richer data for both Niantic and Google. Ingress was able to mobilise a 
large audience that was able to form communities, who could meet and interact in the 
public space. But more importantly the users would feed to the game information with 
regards to certain landmarks from the perspective of the locals. This information was later 
used in the development of Pokemon GO.  
And the importance of Ingress is explicitly underlined by its successor game Pokemon 
GO. Pokemon GO is important in my theorisation as I use it as a case study in my final 
chapter. Pokemon GO is location-based augmented reality game. The main imperative of 
the game is for the user to collect as many different Pokémon as possible. The 
innovation of Pokemon GO comes from the fact that the Pokémon are spread within the 
actual city rather than in a virtual world of the video-game. The player, accesses this 
augmented map through their mobile phone and they experience a narrativised version 
of the city. Most of the theoretical reflections on Pokemon GO focus on the aspect of 
physical activity (Althoff et al., 2016; Serino et al., 2016). These theorists, coming from 
medical and public health perspectives are comparing the bad influence ‘traditional’ 
video-games have on children exercise patterns and see an indisputable change. On the 
other hand, research projects such as that by LeBlanc et al. (2017) focus on the danger 
of injuries coming from players walking in the public place while focusing on their 
screens. Despite the fact that the most bibliography on Pokemon GO focuses on the 
socio-medical aspect of the phenomenon, my analysis take a more explicitly political 
angle.  
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The Politics of mediation 
The example of Pokemon GO opens up the discussion to include locative media 
examples that went beyond fringe framework of artistic practices and entered the 
mainstream. My approach to locative media and my overall methodology focuses on the 
possibility of political disruption of normative regimes of power. Nevertheless I have to 
acknowledge the many critical voices coming from media studies. It is important not to 
forget, that even when virtual potentials allow for new forms of resistance, there are 
material bedrocks that keep in place certain power structures. When grounding the 
discussion of locative media into their specific historical context we face certain realities 
we need to note. Tracing for example the history of Global Positioning System (GPS), 
one of the main pre-conditions for most cases in locative art, we see that it started as 
American military project. GPS was developed and is sustained as part of the military 
industrial complex and this still influences its current uses. 
Despite the potential locative media have in creating site-specific experiences, facilitating 
the formation of location-based communities and changing the experience of space, a 
series of theorists have expressed certain concerns considering the political 
repercussions of the latent mainstreamisation of those applications. Andreas 
Broeckmann accused locative media artists for being the avant-garde of society of 
control (Tuters and Varnelis, 2006). For Broeckmann it seems that locative media can 
only signify the appropriation of technologies of surveillance and control and this should 
be explicitly addressed and dealt by all locative art practitioners. He is also stressing that 
GPS technologies could not exist outside the military industrial complex and thus any 
idea of ‘connectedness’ or ‘locative community’ would be inevitably mediated on an 
infrastructural level by military technology. Bleecker and Knowlton (2006) also express 
their concern regarding the military entanglement with GPS technologies. They comment 
on the fact that locative media could not exist without the military research and the 400 
million dollars annual cost to maintain the Global Positioning System. They also present 
connections in terms of funding and material support between specific locative arts 
projects and military expenditures (Bleecker & Knowlton 2006). It is worth mentioning, 
that the Internet was also a US military project that was further developed and acquired 
an autonomous status. However, the discussion of infrastructure is still crucial as very 
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often, digital cultures are promoting a form of ‘invisible’ design obfuscating the material 
preconditions for digital technologies to exist (Arnall, n.d.). Timo Arnall suggests that 
designers, software developers and engineers should insist on making infrastructure 
visible, thematise who builds those infrastructures and essentially who controls them.  
Pinder discusses how locating oneself through technology creates a technological 
unconscious as the invisible infrastructure that allows for the process is being disavowed. 
The mechanisms remain unseen and thus it becomes naturalised (Pinder, 2007). 
Galloway (2010) avoids making yet another prediction about the future of locative media 
and mobile media in general and instead, she presents a sociology of already existing 
predictions, showing the potential political implications of prediction making. She ends up 
with a series of questions, articulating a critique regarding who has the power to offer 
predictions for the future, what kind of narratives are silenced when locative media are 
assumed to be the next big thing and how does predicting the future in a specific way, 
allows or forecloses possibilities of political alliances and strategies in the presence. 
Another thought-provoking critique of locative media comes from Mary Flanagan who 
warns that blurring into physical can cause a form of “entertainment colonization”, in 
which the players unwillingly commoditise unaware bystanders (Farman, 2014). The 
world is turning into a hybridic spectacle; a dirty alley becomes the scenery for a horror 
story and passers-by become a spectacle of an audioguide documentary regarding the 
violent dispossession of urban re-generation. Entertainment expands in public space but 
can be accessed only by those who have the cultural capital. The rest remain actors that 
involuntary play the role of the ‘real world’; their presence has been augmented but they 
have no idea.   
Pinder as I mentioned earlier, wonders how we can rethink locative media in the rise of 
surveillance and constant obsession with being ‘located’, a constant sense of being on 
the map, of always being geo-centred (Pinder, 2013). He argues for new dis-locative 
projects that will allow us to critically posit ourselves within the sea of geo-specific 
functions. For Pinder, many artists engage with GPS without dealing with the political 
problems that stem from the medium. He nevertheless identifies certain practitioners who 
reflect critically on their GPS enabled work. Paula Levine developed one of the pieces he 
discusses, titled Shadows from Another Place. For this piece Levine overlaid two 
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different maps, of San Francisco and of Bagdad. She identified several points where 
bombs have been dropped in Bagdad and then noted those points on the San Francisco 
map. With the help of a GPS navigator located those spots on the actual city of San 
Francisco and hided a series of capsules containing information about the Bagdad areas 
that were bombed. Different layers of geographic information allowed for an embodied 
unsettling of space. An arbitrary distribution of points that where produced when placing 
a map over another map (a practice echoing Situationist ethos) opens up the possibility 
for a different understanding of social reality. As Pinder (2013) notices, Levine blurs the 
lines between the domestic and the foreign, what is deemed outside returns to haunt 
familiar temporalities. 
Representing location, mapping realities and locating oneself on the map are central in 
every discussion around locative media. The map becomes fundamental part of everyday 
lives, changing local environments (and the sense of locality). Discussing the politics of 
mediation opens up space to also reflect on the process of cartography as such. History 
provides us of countless examples on how mapping is not only an objective 
representation of geographic realities but it is rather influenced if not determined by 
certain systems of power and knowledge (Harvey, 1976). It becomes obvious that maps 
and navigation instruments shape our perception of our world. The devices and 
technologies we use are creating a double image of our body in space and our position in 
a cartographic simulation. As we saw earlier military institutions and we largely control 
GPS technology as users have little knowledge or control in relation to this system.  
Certain theorists and practitioners have suggested we should extend our critiques and 
form alternative infrastructures that would, if not antagonise GPS, at least de-naturalise it. 
One example is the Open Positioning System (OPS) by German artist Philipp 
Ronnenberg, an alternative positioning system that works by triangulating seismic 
frequencies produced by generators in power plants, water turbines, pumping stations, or 
large machines in factories. If the sensor, held in contact with a wall or the ground, can 
detect seismic frequencies from three known sources, its location can be established. 
Ronnenber attempts to show that we can think of location outside the narrow GPS-
centric model and avoid becoming part of a highly centralised and regulated technology 
(Pinder, 2013). 
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At the same time, we cannot ignore the fact that through the mass use of GPS-enabled 
devices, maps have increasingly become much more accessible and open to user-
generated interventions. In order to discuss this development, Gazzard (2011) examines 
the Foursquare community along with augmented reality services such as Layer. The 
opening of maps to idiosyncratic and subjective alterations from users is an issue that 
links to the psychogeographic methods I presented earlier and at the same time opens 
up space for a discussion regarding the presence and future of mapping as an open 
ended subjective process. In that sense the boundaries between corporate and 
grassroots, normative and disruptive, and critical and market oriented are once again 
blurred and disputed.  
Subjectivity in the post-human era 
At that point a theoretical question emerges: can we critically reflect on mobile media 
without reducing them into their constitutive preconditions? Without losing an eye on the 
political implications we need to extend our arguments by also exploring the potential 
moments of rupture and the potentiality for social change. Donna Haraway in her seminal 
cyborg manifesto (1999) attempted to engage with questions of technological progress 
without subscribing to an inevitable techno-utopian future. In her account of the cyborg 
she is describing a new type of subjectivity that emerges in the intersection between 
technology and the body. Unlike the science-fiction cyborgian representations, Haraway’s 
cyborg is not only a hybridic creation that combines synthetic and biological parts; it is 
also an assemblage of narratives, information, virtual elements; its body, its own flesh 
has been inscribed with multiple genealogies and has been open to processes of re-
signification becoming able to depart from the preconditions of its creation. This is the 
cyborgian figure that continues to inspire us to think outside the logic of the techno-
capitalism in the postmodern context because cyborgs are the children of capitalist 
production and patriarchal economy, but nevertheless, they are capable of starting a new 
era without carrying their ancestral sins. The strategy to achieve that might appear vague 
or idealistic but it offers a model that can organise our theoretical arguments; it allows us 
to not give up on the idea that a cyborgian body, an augmented body, a post-human 
body can still be the locus of resistance. In order to identify those issues, we need to first 
give an account of this specific body; the body that is marked by signifying systems, 
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social apparatuses and psychic drives; the material body. This might seem a paradoxical 
starting point when thinking of a digital media project, however this is how I ground my 
main arguments: the body becomes actualised through mediation and the only 
meaningful comment on mediation comes through a certain reflection on the process of 
embodiment.  
We should not limit our discussion of extended digital self into structural elements that 
allow for this new form of subjectivity into being. In addition to that we should give space 
for what appears as the direct experience, the affective and phenomenological 
understanding of technological phenomena. Technological mediation is essentially a 
productive condition for everyday experiences and technology shapes experience as 
such. As mentioned earlier locative media can elucidate this exact function. Their 
experiential output is bound to the users’ embodiment. Vanderbeeken (2011) discusses 
the phenomenology of technology by focusing on the multiple functions of screens. He 
argues that screens are not to be understood as ‘windows’ to a world of pre-given data 
but rather as an in-between that can be a mediator and generator of reality at the same 
time. On a similar note, Van Den Eede (2011) extends the discussion to new transparent 
technological designs where mediation is being obscured by the structural ‘invisibility’ of 
pervasive technologies. He objects this development as he connects it to a new form of 
governmentality where power structures remain invisible and further naturalised. Van 
Den Eede manages to convey his phenomenological argument into a political critique 
that echoes ideas of mediation and infrastructures I discussed earlier. 
But how can those immaterial forms of mediation affect the core of us? How are we 
changing within the realm of possibility opened up by new gadgets and applications? 
Critical software studies have studied in length the new perception opened up by virtual 
and augmented realities (Manovich, 2006). On the domain of consumption following 
Belk’s conceptualisation of the ‘extended self’, we are talking for a ‘self’ that is actualised 
through a series of consumer choices, but we enter a new era where the notion of 
extended self becomes increasingly performative and immaterial rather than referring to 
specific material, acquired objects. Materiality seems contested as it only emerges 
through the performative enactment of the consumer. The limits of identity formation are 
exponentially expanded to include unreal impossibilities. Bodies and cognitive functions 
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shift and even get outsourced to commercialised institutions. Memory, for example, gets 
digitalised on the cloud exporting the process of recollection. Navigation through space is 
almost completely coupled with mobile devices and increasingly so is navigation through 
social relations too.  
In this context, the discussion linking new technologies with subjectivity employs 
concepts such as that of the post-human. The post-human consumer is not confined 
within her body’s capacities but she is rather a cyborgian entity whose identity, body and 
brain are all bound to certain technological developments. The idea of the post-human 
will keep re-emerging throughout my research as it signifies a breaking point in the ways 
we theorise humanity, technology and politics. My preoccupation with ‘post-humanist’ 
discourses focuses on the idea of enhanced humanity and on the potentialities of new 
technologies that shift our perception affecting our embodied consciousness. Preester 
(2011) offers in her work a fascinating account of such an entanglement between 
subjectivity and technology. She does not only showcase the current shift in the ways we 
understand our world through certain cognitive mechanisms but most importantly she 
describes the shift in subjectivity as such. Subjectivity here refers to notions of 
consciousness, agency and truth rather than placing a computer-like cognitive model in 
the centre of analysis. The idea of a changing consciousness allows us to reflect on the 
ways technology impacts the intimate psychic elements.  
 A significant tension in the post-human discourses since their early conceptualisation 
lies in the different political alliances within the discipline. On one hand there was a 
dominant techno-futurist tendency that saw technological developments as necessarily 
helpful for humankind. On the other hand a more critical tension aspired to deconstruct 
certain humanist ideals and maintain a critical distance from an metaphysical obsession 
with progress. This exact debate presented by Broderick (2013) is captured in the 
distinction between trans-humanism and post-humanism. In the first grouping he includes 
examples of optimistic futurism that focuses on the technical potential of enhanced 
bodies and in the second category the more critical and philosophical texts that focus on 
the domain of subjectification. Flieger (2010) articulates the distinction between trans-
humanism and post-humanism in accordance to the four Lacanian discourses and aligns 
the trans-humanist utopian tendency with the Discourse of the University while the critical 
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post-humanist with the discourse of the Analyst.  
Flieger and a number of other theorists have worked on the idea of bridging of 
psychoanalysis and post-humanist theories, aiming to the building of a hybridic 
discourse. The two discourses share similarities as they both insisted on the 
incompleteness as fundamental for what we conceptualise as human condition. On one 
hand post-humanism insists on what is added, and on the other, psychoanalysis 
emphasises what is cut, hidden or disavowed. Veronique Voruz (2010) insists on 
identifying post-human discourse as a symptom of our time, opening up the discussion 
towards what she theorises as the ‘radical outside’ that organises our actions. In order to 
develop her argument, she draws from Lacan’s Seminar 17 and the idea of lathouses 
presented there, to describe the complex relationship between scientific knowledge, 
technology and subjective truth. In this seminar, Lacan focuses on the concept of 
‘alethosphere’, a concept that will play a central role in my analysis of media cultures, as 
it offers an analysis of what we perceive as real, how we access it and how that shapes 
our understanding of ourselves. In this seminar Lacan also introduces the metaphor of 
‘gadgets’ that plug into desire. Lacan borrows the English word ‘gadget’ as it offers a 
suitable metaphor for the modality and artificiality of desiring process. Playing with the 
double connotation of these gadgets, I will attempt to draw parallels between the 
Lacanian gadgets and the actual technological gadgets of our times and discuss the 
potential correspondences. Tomšič (2012) drawing from the same Lacanian seminar_ 
discusses the concept of lathouses, which is deployed in order to describe the function of 
jouissance and the relation of the later to technology.  Both inquiries informed my 
understanding of technology as a process in relation to the process of subjectification 
opening up the possibility of theorising the radical negativity of the Lacanian Real within 
the realm of technology studies. On the same strand Bryant (2012) presents an argument 
of post-human technologies within the psychoanalytic ontological framework. This 
particular segment comes with a heavy load of psychoanalytic jargon. Before I attempt to 
justify the use, define the content and contextualise those concepts I need to attest that 
psychoanalysis will provide my main analytical scope throughout this project. In the next 
segment I will attempt mapping my psychoanalytic readings and focus on specific set of 
ideas and concepts that organise my thought.  
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Psychoanalytic theory 
As stated earlier, psychoanalysis is a discipline that informs most of my theoretical 
readings and plays a central role in the way I organise my analyses. Concepts such as 
the unconscious, drive, fantasy, jouissance, repression and disavowal, along with their 
contextual meanings, will keep on returning throughout my work. Before I get into specific 
theoretical issues I would like to present my basic bibliographical starting points in 
relation to psychoanalytic discourse.  
My attempt to map a psychoanalytic bibliography faces certain dangers and limitations. 
Psychoanalysis is an ambiguous if not controversial subject with a long and contradictory 
history. Inevitably, every attempt to use ‘psychoanalysis’ in the context of social sciences 
evokes a certain fear. Is the researcher trying to ‘psychoanalyse’ society? Can social 
issues be reduced into psychic phenomena; can a clinical discourse give an adequate 
account of society? So, before we discuss the epistemological qualities and political 
implications of psychoanalysis we are facing an even more fundamental methodological 
issue regarding the suitability of psychoanalysis in studies of the social.  
Historically speaking, Freud himself was not indifferent to analysing cultural and social 
phenomena. Early on in his writings he raised philosophical questions regarding the 
nature of society drawing from his newfound psychic structures (REF Freud 1913, 1921, 
1930). In those works, Freud contemplates issues of group psychology, kinship, 
interpersonal relations, religion and others. What makes those works important though is 
that they break away from a strict sociology and link psychological phenomena with 
social realities without reducing neither of the two into the other.   
However, psychoanalysis is primarily a field of knowledge developed to function on 
clinical level. Stavrakakis discusses the tension between psychoanalytic clinical 
discourse and psychoanalytically informed political analysis in his work Lacan and the 
Political (2005). He identifies a long tradition of psychoanalytic literature that builds on the 
Freudian legacy, treating society as a patient and theorisations of social problems as 
some sort of psychopathology. Stavrakakis suggests a more nuanced psycho-social 
approach which focuses on the perplexed interconnections between the social and 
psychic field instead of simply psychologising the social.  
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Concepts such as the unconscious, narcissism, defence mechanisms of the ego, life and 
death drives and structures of the psychic organ have indeed a long presence within the 
domains of critical theory (from Frankfurt School to post-structuralism) sometimes 
diverging from the original Freudian conceptualisation but retaining an inevitable 
referentiality. Psychoanalytic concepts surface throughout my work with their definitions 
mainly informed by the Freudian texts themselves (REF Freud 1895, 1889, 1999, 1920, 
1923). Taking in account that this work aspires to be read by an audience that is not 
necessarily accustomed to the psychoanalytic jargon, I intend to provide definitions to all 
psychoanalytic concepts and I will attempt contextualising said concepts within their 
historical and epistemic framework.  In certain cases, French psychoanalytic tradition and 
the work of Jacques Lacan explicitly informs my understanding of those concepts. Lacan 
attempted a radical reading of Freud influenced by contemporary theoretical tendencies 
such as phenomenology and structuralism offering new perspectives on psychoanalytic 
epistemology (Rabaté, 2010). Two essential resources that function as a compass in my 
journey within psychoanalytic theories are the works of Laplanche and Pontalis (1973) 
and Dylan Evans (1996), which catalogue Freudian and Lacanian terms with conceptual 
definitions and references within the original texts. 
The particular reading of Freud by Lacan has been influential in social theoretical circles 
for the past decades with major theorists such as Alain Badiou, Slavoj Žižek, Ernesto 
Laclau, Judith Butler and others appropriating certain aspects of Lacanian theory in order 
to advance their arguments. One of the most notorious members of the heterogeneous 
group, Slavoj Žižek has contributed in the theorisation of ideology in the context of late 
capitalism and offers an ‘orthodox Lacanian’ reading of cultural representations and 
contemporary political phenomena. For my work I draw from his analysis of ideological 
phenomena and his focus on jouissance (Žižek, 2004, 1989).  
Central in my understanding of psychoanalytic discourse is the eclectic appropriation of 
Lacan’s work from feminist and queer theory scholars. Psychoanalysis has a long history 
of gender/sexuality related controversies. Starting from the Freudian ‘penis envy’ and the 
patriarchal focus on the ‘lacking’ women and reaching psychiatric pathologisation of 
‘deviant’ sexualities, psychoanalysis has been used to substantiate a series of 
reactionary gender and sexuality related discourses. Feminist scholars, however, were 
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able to define those moments where the Freudian project was more subversive than the 
people who partake in it and re-appropriate some of its core concepts in order to develop 
an antagonistic feminist ontology. Juliet Mitchell (2001) is one of the first feminist theories 
to engage with psychoanalytic theory, identifying in those theories the potential to subvert 
gender essentialism. Her readings of Lacan along with those of Jacqueline Rose (2001), 
Jane Gallop (1996) and Elizabeth Grosz (1990) have shaped the way I read and 
approach Lacanian theory. In the same political tradition, a series of queer theorists have 
used in their work psychoanalytic accounts of the relationship between embodiment, 
sexual difference and discourse (Bersani, 1995; Dean, 2000; Edelman, 2007). Judith 
Butler’s idea of performativity, for example, examines this relationship critically engaging 
with feminist Lacanian discourses (Butler, 1993, 1990).  
In addition to those another major influence on my analysis of smartphone screens 
comes from psychoanalytically informed cinema studies. Laura Mulvey’s work, drawing 
from a diverse body of sources including Louis Althusser, Jacques Lacan and Michel 
Foucault, problematizes the gaze of the Other and politicises the visual field 
denaturalising the phenomenology of visual perception (Mulvey, 1999). Another 
important figure from feminist film studies with an exceptional position in my writing is 
Joan Copjec (Copjec, 2015b, 2004), whose critique of biopolitics have informed my 
current political analysis of surveillance. Closing this brief mapping of psychoanalytic 
references, I should include Zupančič’s work on ethics. In her book Ethics of the Real 
(2012) she poses a series of questions regarding the relation between ethics and the 
Lacanian Real that has inspired me to attempt an exploration of what I call ‘geographies 
of the real’. 
In order to formulate an argument that unites poetics and psychoanalytic conceptions 
such as the symbolic order and the unconscious, I follow Julia Kristeva’s theorisation of 
the ‘Semiotic Chora’ as presented in the Revolution in Poetic Language (Kristeva, 2006). 
Kristeva argues that what is missing in the Lacanian theory of signification (according to 
which the subject completely gives up on the boundless pre-linguistic enjoyment in order 
to acquire the paternal law) is a whole new field of affective processes: what she calls the 
‘semiotic’. The semiotic is, according to Kristeva, a prerequisite for the acquisition of 
language and it encompasses in its realm all the bodily tensions, fluctuations and 
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circulations of psychic energy, which allow the infant’s pre-linguistic relations to the world. 
Kristeva insists that the semiotic, after its repression and subsequent incorporation into 
the unconscious, could become a destabilising force as it re-emerges through the poetic 
function. Without committing to Kristeva’s political stratification with modernist avant-
garde writing, I would like to retain the analytical rigour of her argument in order to 
advance my understanding of contemporary modes of signification and their subversive 
potential. Kristeva’s work is extremely important as it links poetics and the aesthetic 
understanding of creativity with discourse analysis and semiotics. In a way, she offers a 
bridge between a more creative approach and theory. Kristeva offers a combination of 
semiotics and psychoanalysis using Mikhail Bakhtin’s formalism, a theoretical 
intervention that allowed for the analysis of intertextuality as part of symbolic social 
structures. In her analysis the word is essentially spatialised as its mediating function 
incorporates three dimensions (subject-addressee-context). She offers an analysis of the 
drives, theorised as charges, as well as psychical marks that organise the Semiotic 
Chora; a non-expressive totality formed by the drives and their stases. The Semiotic 
Chora cannot be represented and you can only access it through poetic discourse and 
creative methodologies. Chora comes into being through a process of displacement and 
condensation and relates to different zones of the fragmented body to each of the 
external objects (Kristeva, 2006).  
Narcissism  
Central in my work is the psychoanalytic understanding of selfhood and subjectivity. In 
order to approach this thematic in relation to media I often employ theorisations of 
narcissism. In the past decade, especially in the rise of mobile media and social 
networks, narcissism has re-emerged as concern in the social sphere. These critiques of 
narcissistic modernity echo Christopher Lasch’s claims made in his seminal book The 
Culture of Narcissism (Lasch, 1991). Lasch focuses on the US which he considers the 
paradigmatic example of modern narcissist culture. Heavily influenced by psychoanalytic 
discourses of his time, Lasch makes a conservative argument according to which the 
best response to narcissist culture is a return to traditional family structures.  
Elizabeth Lunbeck (2014) revisits Lasch’s argument in the era of social media in order to 
further develop her critique of narcissistic American culture. In her analysis she examines 
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psychological accounts of narcissistic personality disorder. Otto Kernberg was one of the 
pioneers in the study of narcissism as a pathology and his work was heavily influenced 
by psychoanalytic theories of his time (2004). Most relevant bibliography in consumer 
culture studies relies on similar accounts of narcissistic personality as pathology 
(Andreassen et al., 2017; Cagle, 1994; Lambert and Desmond, 2013). Marketing 
research around narcissism has certainly increased in the era of social media (Cisek et 
al., 2014; Halpern et al., 2016; Sheldon and Bryant, 2016). John Desmond in his book 
Psychoanalytic Accounts of Consuming Desire: Hearts of Darkness (2013) is the theorist 
from consumer studies that engages with the theoretical implications of psychoanalytic 
theory.  
Following his example I expand my readings and theoretical arguments further from a 
model of psychological pathologisation. Following the work of writers who subscribe to a 
Lacanian psychoanalytic framework I had the opportunity to re-approach narcissism not 
as a pathological condition but rather as a precondition of for the emergence of the ego. 
Crucial in this reading was the theorisations of narcissism developed by psychoanalyst 
Jean Laplanche (2013) who expands on Lacanian theorisations of the subject and the 
work by Raul Moncayo (2008) who focuses on the Lacanian conceptualisation of 
narcissism and its relation to the ego formation. Following a similar theoretical approach, 
art theorist Amelia Jones developed her account of radical narcissism which plays a 
central role in my analysis of selfie culture. Jones coined the term radical narcissism in 
order to describe feminist body art from the seventies. The artworks Jones discusses 
centralise the image of the artists who made them. Women avant-garde artists in the 
seventies intentionally portrayed their own bodies in their work in an attempt to disrupt 
the normative circulation of female images used as models in artworks made by male 
artists (Jones, 2007; Jones and Stephenson, 2005). Joan Copjec attempts an analysis of 
Cindy Sherman’s Untitled Film Stills, a series of stylised self-portraits. For Copjec, 
narcissism is function that heavily relies on the Other and as such is imbued by love 
(Copjec, 2004).  
While the feminist critique of the seventies had an undeniably emancipatory aim, the 
case studies I examine vis-à-vis narcissism do not necessarily serve an emancipatory 
political project but in their own ways disrupt certain political normative regimes. In order 
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to trace the possibility of non-emancipatory and non-humanist political strategies I 
embraced the theorisation of ‘over-identification’ a political strategy in art coming from 
Slavoj Žižek’s (2014) analysis of Slovenian rock band/avant garde collective, Laibach. 
The art duo BAVO has written a lot on over-identification in art, taking the work of Žižek 
as a starting point and focusing on certain examples of what they describe as anti-
humanist art.  
My psychoanalytic readings of narcissism also include certain queer readings of Freud’s 
theory of homosexuality. Leo Bersani, in his close reading of the Freudian theory, re-
claims the accusation according to which male homosexuals are trapped in their 
narcissistic desire in order to substantiate a new ontology. According to Bersani, 
homosexual desire is not constructed around identity but around sameness which opens 
up the possibility of a social co-existence that does not require the extermination of 
difference (Bersani, 2002). Following Bersani’s argument on cruising and Tom Roach’s 
adaptation of the argument in order to discuss gay dating applications, I develop an 
account of Grindr in relation to psychoanalytic theories of subjectivity (Roach, 2015a).  
Roach’s analysis links Grindr and other gay dating applications to certain Lacanian 
theories that go beyond the traditional oedipal narratives. The concept of the Sinthome 
as developed by Jacques Lacan in his twenty-third seminar (1976) is central in my 
arguments around human subjectivity. Sinthome comes after Gilles Deleuze, a French 
philosopher, and Félix Guattari, a French psychiatrist co-authored their book Anti-
Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1972) which presented a fierce critique against 
psychoanalysis. Deleuze and Guattari criticised psychoanalysis for claiming that the only 
way to exist is by being submitted to the law of castration. I discuss the problematic of 
castration and the post-oedipal theories in the fourth chapter. Sinthome was a term used 
by Lacan to signify a new way of constructing subjectivity that goes beyond castration. 
Lacan in his theorisation of the sinthome combines ideas of topology and his reading of 
James Joyce. For Lacan, Joyce is the archetypal sinthomatic subject which constructed 
his own relation to the symbolic order. In order to understand and use the argument of 
the sinthome I followed relevant readings by Bristow (2017), Harari (2002) and Moncayo 
(2017). In order to better understand the connections between the work of James Joyce 
and the new relationality to language that Lacan describes, I followed the theorisation of 
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Thurston (2010) and MacCannell (2008).  
Psychoanalysis and space 
Cultural geographical readings of Freud have allowed for a new understanding of social 
space as both material and phenomenological. Space is where psyche operates, and 
psyche is analysed through spatial metaphors. The borders between metaphor and 
materiality blur as we encounter new schemata of internalised spaces and fantasies 
projected onto material environments.  
Kingbury and Pile in the collective volume Psychoanalytic Geographies (2014) suggest a 
series of new possibilities opened up by the adoption of psychoanalytic notions in 
geographic enquiries. Kingsbury in his earlier account of psychoanalysis as a ‘gay spatial 
science’ (2003) suggested we should include fantasy and desire in analyses of social 
space; fantasy and desire should not be confined within the domain of the individual but 
should be radically understood as both internal and open-ended structures. Kingsbury 
suggests a new articulation of the body, space and subjectivity, concepts that as I 
mentioned earlier are central to my theoretical reflections. In an attempt to bridge 
Lefebvre’s theories of space with Lacanian psychoanalysis, Kingsbury produces new 
conceptions of space where identity, fantasy and desire are implicated in the production 
of both meaning and space. Kingsbury’s work, drawing from the long tradition of 
psychoanalytic spatial metaphors, focuses on the idea of ‘extimacy’ which he claims to 
be an interesting instance where geography could borrow psychoanalytic spatial 
metaphors in order to describe certain attributes of material space. He focuses on the 
concept of ‘extimacy’ (a translation of the French éxtimité), a concept that Lacan 
developed in order to describe the paradoxical structure of the human psyche where the 
‘deepest’ internal function is shaped by the external world; an impossible, in conventional 
geometry, structure, where the inside becomes external and vice versa (Kingsbury, 2007) 
Pile, in his monograph The Body and the City (2006), attempts an extensive explication 
of psychoanalysis and cultural geography. His focus on the body as the locus of 
signification and the contested territory between internal psychic life and external reality 
opens the discussion on the potentiality and limitations of psychoanalytic theory in 
cultural geography. Pile is also interested in the ways Freud theorises geography of 
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dreams and attempts to show how such a creative account can be useful in 
understanding the real-world human geographies (Pile, 2006).  Similarly, Grosz and 
Eisenman combine psychoanalytic ideas with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology in order 
to describe the body as a Mobius strip where interior shifts into exterior and vice versa 
(Grosz and Eisenman, 2001).  
Psychoanalysis in consumer culture 
Management and marketing studies have themselves a long and turbulent relationship 
with psychoanalysis with a history tracing back to the beginning of marketing as a 
discipline. This historical overview could start with the work of Austrian-American 
psychologist and marketer, Ernest Dichter. Lately, there has been a revived interest on 
his work and legacy in marketing scholarship (Cluley and Desmond, 2015). Dichter is a 
figure that epitomises the negative representations of marketing, creating needs ex nihilo, 
manipulating consumer desires and generally operating in dark and mysterious ways. 
Contemporary marketing scholarship has resisted this image, pursuing scientific 
evidence-based research and trying to distance itself from the idea of a manipulative 
metaphysical enterprise. Dichter, and as a result psychoanalytic theories in marketing, 
has been deemed unscientific, metaphysical and ethically questionable (Holbrook, 2015). 
But if we give up on the idea that psychoanalysis can offer an easy way in consumer 
manipulation what could be the role of psychoanalytic theories in contemporary 
consumer research? Contemporary consumer research scholars, especially those who 
are interested in understanding the cultural context of consumption could benefit from an 
analytic framework that does not just aim to manipulate consumer’s desire but rather 
understand the structures which allow the emergence of desire. In order to better locate 
my work within the field of psychoanalytic marketing scholarship, I will present here a 
number of theorists that have already attempted such an endeavour. John Desmond in 
his book Hearts of Darkness introduces psychoanalytic conceptions of the unconscious, 
mourning and narcissism in relation to consumer behaviours (Desmond, 2013). In a 
similar way Dunne and Cluley (Cluley and Dunne, 2012) introduce a Marxist-Freudian 
reading of consumption processes . 
Oswald (2010) draws from Lacan in order to define the voyeuristic male gaze in 
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consumption culture. The Lacanian concept of the gaze allows us a novice 
understanding of visual cultures in relation to ideology and politics. In Oswald’s work, 
psychoanalytic framework offers a complex articulation of consumption, gender relations 
and desire.  The centrality of visuality and desire in consumption makes the Lacanian 
conceptualisation of the Other’s gaze very relevant to the interest of consumer culture 
theory. Reyes et al. (2015) also incorporate into their analysis the Lacanian idea of the 
Other’s gaze in order to speak about smartphones. Their work re-positions current 
discussion around the sociability of mobile phones and the complex ways the Other 
defines the experience of electronic devices. In their article they attempt an intriguing 
combination of empirical research and psychoanalytic theory that influenced my 
methodological approach. Due to the proximity to my subject, I will come back more 
attentively to this article later on in my discussion of the smartphone screen and how 
technological innovations could potentially facilitate ontological shifts. 
At this point I would like to mention those readings that are not parts of marketing and 
consumption bibliography, but they still operate within the locus of the business school. 
Cederström and Hoedemakers (2010) introduce Lacanian theory to organisational 
studies, aspiring to bring new critical reflections on the ways psychic phenomena affect 
and intersect with organizational structures, processes, and practices. In their 
introductory chapter, they insist that the appropriation of psychoanalytic theoretical tools 
in their discipline should go hand in hand with a political and ethical understanding that 
takes into account psychic and cultural parameters but most importantly aspires to 
facilitate social change. They, furthermore, insist that Lacan could be used for the 
cultivation of more effective organisations and more productive capitalist enterprises, but 
that would strip psychoanalysis from a certain ethics. Hoedemaekers suggests that we, 
critical scholars within business schools, should acquire the Lacanian position of the 
hysteric patient: the one that always questions the master’s knowledge and position of 
power, the one that is embedded in certain positionality but who nevertheless, never 
stops questioning the process of interpellation into a certain subject position. This is a 
premise I would identify with. Hysterisizing, upsetting and unsettling discourses of 
productivity and success, blurring certainties and ruining naturalised truths that would be 
a truly ethical psychoanalytic position within marketing scholarship. 
  64 
 
  
  65 
Beyond the selfie principle 
At the beginning of this chapter we review the different conceptions of narcissism within 
the Freudian corpus. This brief overview of the Freudian theorisation of narcissism will 
help us organise the coming chapters. Following the narcissism-as-function argument as 
appearing in Freud’s work, we will discuss the ego in relation to the mobile screen, 
addressing questions of ideology and surveillance in relation to subjectivity. By critically 
engaging with various Freudian connections between narcissism and homosexuality we 
will attempt a queer examination of mobile media and sexuality. Finally, by considering 
narcissism as a complete disconnection from the world and a total withdrawal from 
objects and a full-on pre-occupation with one’s self, we will discuss the recent interest of 
contemporary psychoanalytic thought in ordinary psychosis, ostensibly a psychic 
phenomenon of our times where technology facilitates structural shifts in sociability and 
subjectivity.  
This chapter takes us into the heart of the complexities of the concept of narcissism, 
which has been deployed by psychoanalysts, film theorists and cultural critics to various 
and often contradictory ends. I begin by considering the use of narcissism as a diagnostic 
category used to examine the ills of modern society, especially in the work of writers like 
Christopher Lasch. This discussions leads me to the theorisation of narcissism in the 
work of Sigmund Freud, and I suggest that the concept is much more contradictory and 
complex in Freud’s work, which makes its usage an act of interpretation—an 
interpretation, I will suggest, with crucial consequences for how we conceptualise the 
modern subject’s relationship to new media technologies, as well as the politics of 
representation. 
The Lacanian concept of the ‘mirror phase’ is an important intervention in the theorisation 
of narcissism and is discussed in this chapter in order to understand the smartphone 
screen as a field of representation and identification. By extending the problematic of the 
mirror to the screen, and by taking into account Joan Copjec’s critique of psychoanalytic 
readings of the cinematic screen, we will examine the specificities of the mobile screen in 
relation to ego formation. This account makes a break with Foucauldian theories of the 
subject, and I offer a psychoanalytic critique of panopticonist theories of subjectivity, 
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which I suggest, lead to an impasse in how we think about the screen—whether in the 
cinema or as the surface of a modern day mobile phone. 
In order to ground these theoretical ideas, we will go on to examine Amalia Ulman’s 
Instagram durational performance called ‘Excellences and Perfections.’ During the 
performance, which lasted five months, Ulman assumed the role of an aspiring model 
that has just moved to LA. Ulman followed a scripted narrative 
incorporating various clichés she identified as central in the construction of social media 
femininities. In this chapter Ulman’s performance is read within the domain of what art 
theorist Amelia Jones calls ‘radical narcissism’, a re-appropriation of narcissism by 
feminist artists who use their own bodies in order to criticise current gender norms. This 
links to the initial discussion regarding the multiple function of narcissism and allows for a 
further theorisation of the mobile screen, social media and their relation to the ego. 
Finally, I conclude this chapter with an account of ‘over identification’ as an artistic 
strategy that tries to negotiate the difficulties of formulating a critical and creative 
response to contemporary politics. 
Narcissism and society 
While reviewing newspaper articles on narcissism, one encounters a paradox: we live in 
a capitalist society where personal gain, private growth and vulgar individualist 
competition are core values, and yet narcissism is seen through a lens at once moralistic 
and dismissive. It seems as if the subject in our times is a contemporary Daedalus: you 
are allowed to use your magnificent egoic wings in order to achieve personal growth and 
success but do not fly too high and love yourself too much, because then you will follow 
another Greek mythological figure’s demise and drown into your own reflection. Indeed, 
looking at contemporary readings on the topic, it seems that narcissism is presumed to 
be the nemesis of modern societies.  
In order to understand how that which was initially understood as an individual pathology 
came to describe a social problem, we need to examine the genealogy and different 
trajectories of the term ‘narcissism’. This will allow us to see how narcissism became a 
social issue and what the discourses were that defined its conceptual emergence. It was 
in the 1970s that narcissism entered everyday vocabulary, departing from its clinical and 
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largely psychoanalytic context, with theorists and writers popularising aspects of what 
was previously a technical concept. A series of writers of the time thematised narcissism 
as a dominant social trend of the new capitalist era and problematized what they 
identified as a narcissist turn of our society. Post-war consumerist joy was challenged by 
a series of historical shifts and transformations that marked a new period of moral doubt 
and introspection; self-indulgence and the unhinged search for pleasure were identified 
as the cause of emerging social problems. 
The narcissist as described by Lasch (1991) and Kernberg (2004) was a moral wreck, the 
personification of lack of empathy and social conscience, the agent of societal decay. 
These writers identified the United States of America as the land of narcissism, the native 
habitat of this new character, ‘the narcissist’. The New York Times offered an exposé of 
what they presented as ‘the age of narcissism’, further popularising the term (Lunbeck, 
2014). It was a critique attractive to both the left and the right. The American left was 
searching for a nuanced criticism of consumer culture, in an attempt to move away from a 
traditional Marxist focus on the means of production. The right, on the other hand, was 
concerned with the emergence and rise of youth cultures that undermined traditional 
values and aesthetics (Ibid).  
Christopher Lasch, a conservative social commentator, was particularly concerned about 
new ‘individual-based social movements’ such as feminism, the black and gay rights 
movements, and what he conceived of as anti-American struggles such as anti-Vietnam 
war activism of the time. In these struggles Lasch saw an insistence of individual 
pleasure over social coherence and prosperity. As we will see later in this chapter, 
accusing women and homosexuals of being anti-socially narcissistic is neither Lasch’s 
innovation nor does it end with his writing.  
Central to Lasch’s analysis is authority: once authority loses its strength, men degenerate 
into narcissistic, self-indulgent creatures. Authority should be internalised, in order for the 
individual to be functional and socially minded. According to Steven Frosh, Lasch outlines 
modern man as a hollow shell, unable to participate in intimacy and connectivity, trapped 
in his own image, his superficiality and depthless existence (Frosh, 1991). 
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Lasch offers remarkable cultural insights that might help us understand his ‘era of 
narcissism’. In his discussion of modern art, for example, he identifies a shift in what art is 
supposed to do. In contrast to traditional art, which would offer a meaningful encounter 
with reality – an attempt to transform reality and deal with its traumatic nature – in 
modern times, he claims, art only expresses a certain kind of nostalgia for the lost 
omnipotent feeling people experienced as infants. Modern art would thus recall ‘oceanic 
experiences and trance inducing imagery, more of a hypnosis and less of “working 
through”’ (Frosh, 1991). For Lasch, the narcissist artists of our times deny authority and 
by not accepting the prohibition that authority represents, they seek to return to the 
primary narcissism of their infancy when reality and fantasy were inseparable and hence 
everything was possible. In this account, modern artists cannot produce sublime pieces 
of work that can be enjoyed by a larger community; the work a narcissist artist produces 
is incoherent and masturbatory, pleasing only to its creator.  
Lasch takes his analysis of the narcissist ‘oceanic experience’ of omnipotence from the 
psychoanalytic discussion of infants’ psychic life. In the Freudian paradigm, every child 
experiences the world as unified field of stimuli. That period of omnipotence and 
fragmentation comes to an end when children start understanding the limits of their own 
bodies and the fact that they are separate from the maternal/feeding body. In 
psychoanalytic ontology, infants upon their birth are not yet capable of understanding the 
boundaries of their bodies and environments and this realisation only comes later when 
certain experiences of displeasure insert a first iteration of an external reality, an imposed 
reality principle. Modern art, instead of helping people cope with the reality principle is not 
re-conciliatory as its fragmentation and non-coherence is reminiscent of infantile 
narcissism.  
In Lasch’s work, the absence of a strong paternal figure is identified as the cause of 
narcissism. When no authority is there to stop the infant’s fantasy of merging with the 
mother, to put a limit to his or her pleasure, then the infant does not internalise the 
aforementioned reality principle. This analysis is indeed compatible with Freud’s first 
conception of narcissism, but, as we will see, the Freudian position on narcissism 
undertook significant shifts during Freud’s lifetime.  
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Lasch sets the tone for all future critiques of narcissism as a social problem. The 
narcissist takes different forms: he is the ruthless banker, the CEO, the Wall Street 
sociopath, the lying politician, the selfie maniac teenager, the attention seeking YouTube 
celebrity, the Instagram beauty queen etc. Instead of further examining commonplace 
understandings of narcissism we could examine narcissism as a function of the ego, 
narcissism as a way to experience pleasure, narcissism as a way to relate to the world. In 
the end of this structural analysis of narcissism we will be able to re-approach the 
mythical figure of Narcissus himself and consider his differences or similarities to the rest 
of the ‘normal’ people.  
Narcissism in Freud 
Psychoanalysis defines narcissism as a structural element of the human psyche, and 
thus it is worth focusing on Freudian approaches to the issue. Freud drew the term from 
Havelock Ellis’ catalogue of pathologies. For Havelock Ellis, ‘Narcissus-like’ is an 
attribute of a person who takes their own self as a sexual object; the person who gets 
sexual gratification from their own spectral image. Freud adapted it for his own purposes. 
Freud was a prolific writer and his writing presents the reader with ideas in different 
stages of development. He provides contradictory definitions, exposes his self-doubts 
and engages with exploratory concepts that by his own admission are obscure and 
inchoate. Due to his influential position, concepts he developed at specific moments in 
his work acquire a life of their own. Even when particular positions have been later 
abandoned or significantly altered by Freud himself, they retain a certain appeal and they 
are used in other theorists’ work in their earlier iteration. Narcissism is a good example of 
this, as Freud provides several contradictory definitions over the years with most of them 
operating as starting points for different future theorisations. 
Freud first uses the metaphor of Narcissus in his early theorisation of homosexuality 
(Pontalis and Laplanche 1973). In 1910 Freud suggested that the homosexual ‘chooses’ 
as sexual object his own self-image.  
The boy represses his love for his mother: he puts himself in her place, identifies himself 
with her, and takes his own person as a model in whose likeness he chooses the new 
objects of his love. In this way he has become a homosexual. What he has in fact done is 
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to slip back to auto-erotism: for the boys whom he now loves as he grows up are after all 
only substitutive figures and revivals of himself in childhood—boys whom he loves in the 
way in which his mother loved him when he was a child. He finds the objects of his love 
along the path of narcissism, as we say; for Narcissus, according to the Greek legend, 
was a youth who preferred his own reflection to everything else and who was changed 
into the lovely flower of that name. (Freud 1910, p.100) 
It is noteworthy that while in the later Freud we encounter more sophisticated accounts of 
homosexual desire, this initial theorisation remains potent and influential, with countless 
derivative analyses ever since. We shall return to the discussion of homosexuality and 
narcissism in the following chapter where we will examine Leo Bersani’s argument on 
homosexual desire and its relation to the ego formation.  
In 1911, in his discussion of the autobiographical writings of Daniel Paul Schreber, Freud 
identifies a pathological complex he names ‘narcissistic neurosis.’ This new pathology is 
characterised by a lack of interest in objects that lie outside oneself: ‘The patient has 
withdrawn from the people in his environment and from the external world generally the 
libidinal cathexis which he has hitherto directed on to them. Thus everything has become 
indifferent and irrelevant to him…’ (Freud 1911, p.70). In Freudian terminology, libido is 
not invested in objects of the real world but remains trapped within the person’s own ego. 
This is linked to Schreber’s suppressed homosexuality and it leads to fantasies of 
grandiosity and most importantly delusional ideas and hallucinations: 
But in paranoia the clinical evidence goes to show that the libido, after it has been 
withdrawn from the object, is put to a special use. It will be remembered that the majority 
of cases of paranoia exhibit traces of megalomania, and that megalomania can by itself 
constitute a paranoia. From this it may be concluded that in paranoia the liberated libido 
becomes attached to the ego and is used for the aggrandizement of the ego. A return is 
thus made to the stage of narcissism (known to us from the development of the libido), in 
which a person's only sexual object is his own ego. On the basis of this clinical evidence 
we can suppose that paranoiacs have brought along with them a fixation at the stage of 
narcissism, and we can assert that the length of the step back from sublimated 
homosexuality to narcissism is a measure of the amount of regression characteristic of 
paranoia. 
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The withdrawal from outside reality comes with a proliferation of internal, imaginary 
objects. As the terminology advances, this structural lack of investment in the outside 
world is assumed to consist of a whole different conceptual territory that is referred to as 
psychosis.  
Narcissism becomes a distinct analytic entity in Freud’s seminal work ‘On Narcissism’ 
(1914) where he suggests that narcissism is a much more prevalent phenomenon than 
he thought previously (‘an allocation of the libido such as deserved to be described as 
narcissism might be present far more extensively, and that it might claim a place in the 
regular course of human sexual development.’ (Freud 1914, p.73). It is not an anomaly 
but a developmental stage, a passage from autoeroticism to object love. As we have 
seen earlier, in psychoanalytic theory, the infant comes into the world without a pre-
defined sense of self (‘a unity comparable to the ego cannot exist in the individual from 
the start; the ego has to be developed.’ (Freud 1914, p.76). The ego, in Freud’s theory, 
emerges through the process of primary narcissism, a function that is described as self-
instinct; a force for self-preservation that produces the self as such. In this articulation of 
theory, primary narcissism is a stage destined to diminish once the subject starts 
investing libidinally in outside-of-self objects. In a way, primary narcissism signifies a 
passage from an initial helpless state of the infant to a prioritisation of self-preservation; 
the first loosely organised expression of the subjects’ biological needs (Adams 2014). 
The first auto-erotic sexual satisfactions are experienced in connection with vital functions 
which serve the purpose of self-preservation. The sexual instincts are at the outset 
attached to the satisfaction of the ego-instincts; only later do they become independent of 
these, and even then we have an indication of that original attachment in the fact that the 
persons who are concerned with a child's feeding, care, and protection become his 
earliest sexual objects: that is to say, in the first instance his mother or a substitute for her. 
[…] We say that a human being has originally two sexual objects—himself and the woman 
who nurses him—and in doing so we are postulating a primary narcissism in everyone, 
which may in some cases manifest itself in a dominating fashion in his object-choice. 
(Freud 1914, p87–88) 
Secondary narcissism appears then as a form of regression. Later in one’s life, due to 
specific circumstances, there might be a retraction of libidinal investments from outside 
objects and back onto the self-image. In this account, secondary narcissism, where it 
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results in a cathexis of external objects in favour of an ego cathexis, may lead to a fragile 
grasp of reality and megalomania. What was initially a survival instinct would now hinder 
the social life of the individual. We have to notice that Freud does not offer at this point a 
proper analytic distinction between object-love and narcissistic love, and neither can he 
conceptualise the process that allows this shift (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973). In Peter 
Gay’s words, ‘according to his traditional theory, the ego drives are not in any way erotic 
and the libidinal drives are not egotistic. But if the ego can be charged with libido – as it 
became clearer and clearer to Freud that it can be – this sharp division must collapse.’  
Freud overcomes this tension with the third explication of narcissism in his ‘Ego and the 
Id.’ In this work, published in 1923, Freud proposes a different topographical model of the 
psychic apparatus, moving from his early conception of Preconscious-Conscious-
Unconscious (Cns-Prc-Unc) to the dynamic model of Ego-Superego-Id. According to 
Laplanche and Pontalis, this shift in Freud’s conception of the psyche has to do with a 
better understanding of the role identifications play in the ‘formation of the personality 
and of the permanent structures which they leave within it (ideals, critical agencies, self-
images)’. Freud, at this point, realises that the ego is not a fully conscious agent 
operating in opposition to the unconscious: ‘A part of the ego, too—and Heaven knows 
how important a part—may be Ucs., undoubtedly is Ucs. And this Ucs. belonging to the 
ego is not latent like the Pcs.’ (Freud 1923, p.18). But what is the Freudian Ego if not a 
conscious agent, and how does it relate to the unconscious? 
[The ego] is like a man on horseback, who has to hold in check the superior strength of 
the horse; with this difference, that the rider tries to do so with his own strength while the 
ego uses borrowed forces. The analogy may be carried a little further. Often a rider, if he 
is not to be parted from his horse, is obliged to guide it where it wants to go; so in the 
same way the ego is in the habit of transforming the id's will into action as if it were its 
own. (Freud 1923, p.25) 
In this elaborate metaphor we see how the ego is a helpless rider that sometimes tries to 
control his horse and other times is simply driven by it. Another significant shift we 
observe in ‘Ego and the Id’ is Freud’s account of narcissism. Here, narcissism changes 
from a developmental stage to a structural precondition for the ego formation. 
Understandably, since we talk about a period where the ego is not yet well formed, the 
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difference between ‘subject’ and ‘object’ are not clearly defined. These two entities 
emerge at the same time and this is the reason narcissistic love cannot be conceptually 
separated from object love (Moncayo, 2008). So instead of seeing a passage from 
narcissistic love to object-oriented love, we see a reconfiguration of our understanding of 
libidinal investment.  
If this displaceable energy is desexualized libido, it may also be described as sublimated 
energy; for it would still retain the main purpose of Eros—that of uniting and binding—in 
so far as it helps towards establishing the unity, or tendency to unity, which is particularly 
characteristic of the ego. If thought-processes in the wider sense are to be included 
among these displacements, then the activity of thinking is also supplied from the 
sublimation of erotic motive forces. […] At the very beginning, all the libido is accumulated 
in the id, while the ego is still in process of formation or is still feeble. The id sends part of 
this libido out into erotic object-cathexes, whereupon the ego, now grown stronger, tries to 
get hold of this object-libido and to force itself on the id as a love-object. The narcissism of 
the ego is thus a secondary one, which has been withdrawn from objects. (Freud 1923, 
p45-46) 
In the new ‘economic model’, there is a finite amount of libido and once the ‘object libido’ 
increases the ‘ego libido’ gets depleted. Laplanche and Pontalis offer the metaphor of a 
libido reservoir in order to explain the function of Ego in this process. From this reservoir, 
libido will be sent out to the objects and this is the location where libido coming from 
outside objects will be stored. Narcissism puts up a dam to the libido, a limit that no other 
object-cathexis can completely overcome (Laplanche et Pontalis 1973). As the Lacanian 
psychoanalyst Raul Moncayo observes, Freud’s ‘economic model’ of the psychic organ 
significantly changes the focus of psychoanalysis. In the earlier period, psychoanalysts 
wanted to elucidate the deep secrets of the unconscious and to figure out what the 
unconscious conflicts and forgotten memories that cause psychological disturbances are. 
In this new era, the ego becomes the focus point: how was it constructed, how is it 
shaped, how does it reflect previous conflicts and experiences. In a way, the ego comes 
to represent the precipitate of all libidinal cathexes, a complex configuration of all 
neuroses. 
But we have still not tackled the important question: how is narcissism related to object 
libido and how is this ‘dam’ of psychic excitation related to inter-subjective relations? It 
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appears from the theorisations we presented so far that narcissism could be no more 
than a barrier, a separating construction. Laplanche and Pontalis offer an alternative 
understanding of this function through the Lacanian concept of the mirror phase. 
According to this theorisation, the ego is formed when the subject starts understanding 
their bodily boundaries. Going back to Freud: ‘The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego; 
it is not merely a surface entity, but is itself the projection of a surface.’ (Freud 1923, 
p26).  
Ego and the mirror 
Following upon our discussion of Freud, the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan's 
influential theorisation of the mirror phase provides a valuable tool for understanding the 
relation between the body and ego. In this account, the ego emerges when the child 
encounters their spectral image in the mirror. The ego is shaped in accordance to the 
image of the body, and the process is facilitated by a third person (usually the mother) 
that guides the infant through, and helps it recognise itself as a coherent entity. This 
‘mythological’ scene detailed by Lacan shows how narcissism is distinguished from a 
genetic, quasi-biological force of instinctive ego-creation (such as the initial Freudian 
primary narcissism) in that, while it occurs automatically/instinctively, it is nonetheless a 
phenomenon that relies on specific environmental and social interactions. We can thus 
deduce that narcissism is not essentially a separating function aiming to a solipsistic self-
interest for the whole process implies the presence of another person. I will elaborate on 
the mirror stage as described by Lacan later in the discussion, as I believe it offers key 
insight in the understanding of self-image. 
In this section we will follow the Lacanian analysis of ego formation which provides a 
series of metaphors that can help us link the function of media representation and the 
visual field with certain psychic modalities. Lacan conceptualises the birth of ego as an 
immediate effect of what he calls the mirror phase. In developing his mirror phase Lacan 
incorporated theoretical elements from contemporary developmental psychologists (who 
were interested in the question of when the child starts understanding themselves in the 
mirror) and animal ethologists (who ask whether other animals besides humans are able 
to identify themselves in the mirror) alongside source material from the Freudian corpus. 
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The mirror phase can be observed when the infant first realises the mirror’s function, 
when they are able to identify with their spectral image for the first time. This takes place 
between the sixth and the eighteenth month and according to Lacan has certain 
repercussions in the constitution of subjectivity. In front of the mirror we construct our first 
loose yet coherent image of ourselves. 
There are two elements of the mirror phase whose importance we shall underline. First, 
the gestalt of a complete image of ourselves comes from the outside. Children encounter 
a coherent image that surpasses in completeness the experience they have of their own 
bodies. The human infant has poor motor-coordination skills during the first years of its 
life. Due to this poor motor-coordination, young infants can only have a disorganised 
sense of their own body. Their spectral image on the other side appears to have a well-
defined shape and form, offering a promise of control and bodily sovereignty. To re-
iterate, the body as depicted on the mirror is much more complete and coherent than the 
experienced body, the body that the child carries and inhabits.  
[T]he total form of his body, by which the subject anticipates the maturation of his power in 
a mirage, is given to him only as a gestalt, that is, in an exteriority in which, to be sure, 
this form is more constitutive than constituted, but in which, above all, it appears to him as 
the contour of his stature that freezes it and in a symmetry that reverses it, in opposition to 
the turbulent movements with which the subject feels he animates it. (Lacan, 1966) 
This image will become the vessel which will carry a phantasmatic completeness. As the 
identification with the body comes from an identification with an initially foreign, external 
image of a body, there is, subsequently, an inevitable surplus; something is necessarily 
‘missing out’: If I can only see my body as an object where does my gaze emanate from? 
If I can only observe myself as an object, how can I ever be whole? On top of that, when 
we watch ourselves in the mirror we can only observe a certain aspect of our body; we 
can never have a complete overview of the body-object. Again, a sense that ‘something 
must be missing’. This fundamental incompleteness, so central in this initial moment of 
identification, is crucial for subjectification, as we will see later in our discussion. 
The second important aspect of this process is the validation of the identification with the 
spectral image through a third person. When we talk about the mirror phase we need to 
take into account that the whole process does not take place in vacuum. Usually it is the 
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mother (or the primary caretaker) who is facilitating the process. She looks into the mirror 
beside her child, pointing at the child’s reflection and telling him: “yes, that’s you!”.  
A child, who is being held in the arms of an adult, is expressly confronted with his image 
[in front of the mirror]. We must give full weight to the movement of the child’s head when 
the child … turns around toward the adult who is holding him, without our being able to 
say, naturally, what he expects from the adult, whether it is some sort of agreement or 
attesting. Referring to the Other nevertheless clearly comes to play an essential role here. 
(Lacan 2015, p.353) 
The ego presents itself and sustains itself qua problematic only on the basis of the Other’s 
gaze. (Ibid., p.354) 
At the same time, she operates as a visual reference point, her real self and her spectral 
double offering an explanatory framework for how the mirror works. If we extend mirror 
phase beyond the literal mirror, the mother is also supposed to mirror the child’s voice 
and facial expressions in her attempt to develop pre-linguistic communicational gestures.  
Thus, we should not understand the mirror phase as a cognitive process within the 
individual, but rather as a psychosocial, intersubjective function involving at least a 
second person (Laplanche and Pontalis 1973). This notion sets the basis for 
understanding narcissism as an essentially social experience, despite its seeming 
antisocial, introverted tendency. Narcissism can only be achieved when a third actor 
(actual or internalised) witnesses our self-realisation.  As Laplanche and Pontalis point 
out, narcissism is not only identification with the other (the spectral image, the image of 
the mother) but also internalisation of a relationship with the other.  
The mirror phase emerges during the time when another psychoanalytic foundational 
process takes place: the birth of desire. According to Lacanian theorist Dylan Evans, 
desire is a concept that lies in the centre of the Lacanian project as Lacan, following 
Spinoza, proclaims desire to be the ‘essence of the man.’ It is not conscious desire that 
psychoanalysis is preoccupied with, but unconscious desire—hidden and elusive, and 
constitutive of intersubjectivity. Desire is the ‘beyond’ to articulated demands, or that 
which cannot be put into a specific request (Lacan, 1966).  
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Evans defines desire as the remainder you get when you subtract need from demand. In 
order to better understand that, let’s return to the child and its biological needs. Very soon 
in its life the child will start expressing its need through its cries—a series of amorphous 
yet intense demands. Demand is something expressed towards the Other; even though 
selfhood is not yet configured there is an outward motion, the child is asking for 
something from the outside world.  As it becomes obvious by observing a young infant’s 
behaviour its demands are not always geared towards covering biological needs (hunger, 
protection from environmental conditions) but often are cries for attention, love or more 
for the Other’s presence.  
For Lacan, “desire to be the desire of the Other” and desire is indeed formulated and first 
articulated in the domain of the Other. Lacan introduced the idea of the ‘big Other’ 
(‘Other’ with a capital ‘O’) – in 1955, as a distinct entity from the ‘little other’ (‘other’ with a 
lowercase ‘o’).   
1.The little other is the other who is not really other, but a reflection and projection 
of the ego […]. He is simultaneously the counterpart and the specular image. The 
little other is thus entirely inscribed in the imaginary order. 
2. The big Other designates radical alterity, an other-ness which transcends the 
illusory otherness of the imaginary because it cannot be assimilated through 
identification. Lacan equates this radical alterity with language and the law, and 
hence the big Other is inscribed in the order of the symbolic. Indeed, the big Other 
is the symbolic insofar as it is particularised for each subject. The Other is thus 
both another subject, in his radical alterity and unassimilable uniqueness, and also 
the symbolic order which mediates the relationship with that other subject. (Evans 
1996) 
  
Desire emerges in the field of the Other; it occurs when the subject encounters this 
radical alterity.  
[I]f desire is an effect in the subject of the condition — which is imposed on him by the 
existence of discourse — that his need pass through the defiles of the signifier; and if, as I 
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intimated above, by opening up the dialectic of transference, we must establish the notion 
of the Other with a capital O as being the locus of speech's deployment […] then it must 
be posited that, as a characteristic of an animal at the mercy of language, man's desire is 
the Other's desire. (Lacan, 1966, p. 526) 
It is thus formed by the ambiguity of the Other’s intentions, by the Other’s presence or 
absence, what is presumed as the Other’s love (caring presence) and hate 
(absence/withdrawal). A biological need can be satisfied (i.e. satiating hunger) but desire 
can never be satisfied; its object is always unattainable. In the mirror we internalise the 
big Other’s distance and ultimate unapproachability and at the same time we construct a 
small other, an image we can approach and understand as whole. From this 
psychoanalytic theorisation of the phenomenon, we can conclude that narcissism is not 
just the fetishisation of our own image/self but also the precondition in order to form our 
image/self. As a cognitive function, self-realisation emerges neither as a genetic destiny 
nor as a disjoined fascination with specular image; it is in fact shaped by the birth of a 
nascent social bond. 
In order to properly contextualise the mirror phase within Lacanian ontology we need to 
present here a brief overview of the three distinct yet interconnected domains of reality 
according to Lacan: the symbolic, the imaginary and the real. Lacan presents his 
infamous triptych in 1953 and despite the fact that all terms have appeared in his earlier 
work individually this is the first time he presents them as complementary and 
interconnected. The symbolic is identified with the law and social structures and as those 
rely heavily on language, the symbolic is essentially conceived as a linguistic field. The 
symbolic order is the domain of the Other and very often the Lacanian big Other stands 
for the same things as the symbolic.  
The imaginary is closely linked to the mirror phase and is essentially the order of surface 
appearance and observable phenomena. Images are assumed to hide the underlying 
structures; images give the illusion of completeness and coherence but carry empty 
promises, according to Lacan. The imaginary domain is the domain that emerges through 
the mirror phase, hence is the primary domain for identification, ego relations and 
narcissism (Evans, 1996). As we saw earlier, the mirror phase does not happen in a pre-
social setting, but is rather mediated through the presence of the Other. In that sense, the 
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imaginary is always structured through the symbolic. In order to comprehend the world 
through our senses we need to have built cognitive schemata and categories.  
The Lacanian real is probably the most difficult of the three domains to comprehend and 
describe, as it stands for what is completely inaccessible, that which lies outside 
language and resists symbolisation. According to Evans, ‘[w]hereas the symbolic is a set 
of differentiated, discrete elements called signifiers, the real is, in itself, undifferentiated’ 
(…) It is the symbolic which introduces “a cut in the real” in the process of signification 
(Evans, 1996, p. 162).’ We can infer the unsymbolised force of the real in the experience 
of anxiety and in traumatic moments. Those experiences cannot be properly expressed 
through signifiers in their raw immediacy.  
An essential element of the triad is the interconnectivity of those domains as each one 
links to the others and each one allows for the others to emerge. In that sense, there is 
no such thing as pure imaginary since even the first sensory experiences are mediated 
through an intersubjective (proto-social) environment; there are no symbolic signifiers 
without the signified equivalents in the imaginary; and both the imaginary and symbolic 
rely on the existence and threat of the unsymbolizable real. In the next chapter we will 
return on these domains and we will see how Lacan moved from the primacy of the 
symbolic to a prioritisation of the imaginary and the real in his later teaching. The 
imaginary, as the domain of the visuality and the ego, plays a central role in our analysis. 
The primordial ego, formed through the mirror phase is a form of an ‘ideal ego’ and 
functions as a baseline for all future identifications (Laplanche and Pontalis 1973). Since 
the primordial ego is constructed through and is defined by the imaginary domain, this 
also shapes all future interpersonal relationships.  
Our relationships will always carry the burden of the mirror, the mark of this initial 
fascination with the image. And most importantly, this initial alienation from our self-image 
will lead to aggression towards the ego. The same ambivalence will also define our 
relations with other people who are treated as alter-egos (small others, reflections of 
ourselves). This insistence of imaginary identification both in the early formation of the 
ego but also later in our lives, compels us to talk about a mirror phase rather than a 
mirror stage. The latter would imply a unique moment in developmental history, whereas 
the former suggests an insistence of the mirror function in adult life. 
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Screen as mirror 
The mirror as an object has fascinated humans with its reflective, almost mystical, 
properties since the beginning of history. The mirror as a metaphor has appeared in 
philosophical explorations of reality and its representation since antiquity – for example, 
Plato used the example of mirroring to discuss the nature of perceptual truth. Mirror(ing) 
is central both in the original myth of Narcissus and in the Lacanian mirror phase. ‘Mirror’ 
as a metaphor/function will be the starting point for our theorisation of the screen in 
relation to narcissism.  
As we saw in the previous section, the mirror phase signifies the internalisation of the 
Other’s gaze and is a constitutive moment in the very conception of ourselves. The 
psychoanalytic implication of the Other (the symbolic/social dimension) in the foundation 
and shaping of our selfhood allows for a political critique of what is often presumed to be 
merely psychological. Psychoanalysis enables us to theorise ‘internal’ psychic life as 
interconnected with external, social conditions and the other way around. Lacan develops 
his account of the gaze in his eleventh seminar ‘The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis.’  
I was in my early twenties…and at the time, of course, being a young intellectual, I wanted 
desperately to get away, see something different, throw myself into something practical…. 
One day, I was on a small boat with a few people from a family of fishermen….as we were 
waiting for the moment to pull in the nets, an individual known as Petit-Jean… pointed out 
to me something floating on the surface of the waves. It was a small can, a sardine can… 
It glittered in the sun. And Petit-Jean said to me – You see that can? Do you see it? Well it 
doesn’t see you (Lacan, 1964, p. 95) 
Cultural theorist Henry Krips (2010) offers useful insights in his explication of this small 
anecdote that Lacan uses in order to introduce the problematic of the gaze. According to 
Krips, the sardine can itself is an insignificant object and only acquires significance 
through the annoyance it poses to young Lacan’s vision. The discomfort Lacan feels is 
not physiological but rather he feels some sort of anxiety as he is reminded of his class 
privilege in relation to the fisherman in the boat. According to Krips, the anxiety and 
shame that Lacan experiences relate to the Freudian ‘“unrealistic anxiety” – an anxiety 
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that is in excess of what its apparent object merits’ (Krips, 2010, p. 93). The moment of 
the light reflection Lacan asks himself who he is and what he is doing there being 
overwhelmed by unpleasant feelings; suddenly, he goes from scrutinising the 
environment to scrutinising himself.  
In Freud’s terms, we may say that the scrutiny that the young Lacan directs outwardly at 
his surroundings encounters resistance from the blinding light reflected by the tin can; and 
as a result the scrutiny “turns around”, that is, reflexively turns back upon Lacan, at the 
same time as it switches from active to passive voice – from “I look” to “I am looked at”. 
(Krips, 2010, p. 93) 
The Lacanian gaze is thus not a literal seeing point of view; it emanates from a blind spot 
of the subject itself. Lacan, not being able to see due to the sun’s reflection on the 
sardine can becomes introspective and anxious. The obstruction of his view causes 
anxiety, as if he was being seen by someone else. It is not only an obstruction in the 
visual field that can cause this ‘irrational anxiety’; it can also be an aural stimulus (“the 
sound of rustling leaves heard while out hunting…a footstep heard in a corridor…”), 
proving in a way that the gaze exists as a psychic function, even outside visuality. In 
Krips’ words ‘the subject is brought to recognise that there is a hole, a lack, in his visual 
field – a something that, because it is present but cannot be seen, functions as a point of 
failure of the visual field’ (Krips, 2010, p. 94)  
Feminist film theorist Laura Mulvey combines the Lacanian metaphor of the mirror with 
Lacan’s analysis of the Other’s gaze, in order to discuss the political repercussions of the 
cinematic screen (Mulvey, 1999). In her critical reading of French psychoanalysis, she 
identifies new, radical ways of understanding the social implications of subjective 
experiences, including ‘natural’ processes such as the act of seeing. For Mulvey, the 
world of representations is a world of multiple directionalities where the subject and the 
object of observation can exchange positions. In a psychoanalytic sense, the subject 
becomes the object as the game of identification unfolds through successive and 
alternating projections and introjections: the subject projects parts of itself and his/her 
identity on the screen and introjects images and ideas from the screen in front of them. 
According to Mulvey, the Other’s gaze operates in three levels when it comes to cinema. 
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First, there is the gaze of the camera as it is filming and this, following Metz, is always a 
voyeuristic gaze. Second, there are the looks intrinsic to the film narrative and these are 
usually the looks of male protagonists, as they position women characters within the 
narrative itself. Finally, there is the gaze of the spectator, and, as this gaze is facilitated 
by the previous two positions – of the camera and of the protagonists within the film – it is 
an inherently male position to adopt. (Homer 2005) 
As it is noticeable straight away, the gaze appears in Mulvey’s account as a much more 
literal term than in the Lacanian anecdote. Unlike the sardine tin, the three functions of 
the cinematic gaze in Mulvey’s work require an actual scopic agency. It is not a failure in 
the visual field that facilitates the Other’s gaze towards the subject but rather an actual 
voyeuristic intentionality. Before we go further into our analysis of the gaze, we need to 
examine the context within which Mulvey develops her theory, namely Marxist feminism 
of the 70s, and consider how that affected her reading of Lacan. 
It is worth mentioning that psychoanalysis was not very appealing to feminist theorists of 
the time as it was viewed as phallocentric and essentially patriarchal. The attitude 
towards psychoanalysis changed due to Lacan’s theorisation of the subject and most 
importantly due to Louis Althusser’s analysis of ideology. These theoretical developments 
made psychoanalysis more compatible with a semiotic-materialist approach, prevalent in 
the ‘new left’ theorists of the time (Hollows, 2010; Mitchell and Rose, 2001). 
Mulvey, in her influential work ‘Visual pleasure in narrative cinema’, discusses 
mainstream cinema as an ideological apparatus. By extending the Althusserian idea of 
the apparatus into the visual field she attempts a semiotic understanding of the moving 
image, a politicisation of the sensory, radical at the time. According to Louis Althusser, 
the ruling classes do not only subordinate the masses through repressive state apparatus 
(such as the police); they also use extended networks of ideological indoctrination, what 
Althusser defines as ‘ideological apparatuses’. The screen, in this context, is another field 
of ideology and another field of signification. 
For Mulvey, cinema operates as an ideological mechanism of male domination, and 
through film we can see the operation of a new kind of disciplinary ideological 
construction: what she defines as the male gaze. Within the cinematic apparatus, the 
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female body is objectified and the female spectator can only exist by acquiring a male 
position; she otherwise remains abjectified. According to this analysis, the vast majority of 
mass-produced cinema effectively operates as patriarchal propaganda. 
In a world ordered by sexual imbalance, pleasure in looking has been split between 
active/male and passive/female. The determining male gaze projects its phantasy onto 
the female figure, which is styled accordingly. In their traditional exhibitionist role women 
are simultaneously looked at and displayed, with their appearance coded for strong visual 
and erotic impact so that they can be said to connote to-be-looked-at-ness. (Mulvey, 
1999) 
According to Joan Copjec, Mulvey and other Marxist film theorists of the 1970s (such as 
Jean Louis Baudry, Christian Metz, Jean Louis Comolli, Stephen Heath) err in conflating 
the Foucauldian conception of the Panopticon and Lacan’s theorisation of the gaze of the 
Other in order to construct a theory of the cinematic screen as an ideological apparatus. 
In this conflation the cinematic screen operates as a mirror: the viewer looks at the 
projected image and then accept it as their own, they identify with what they see. The 
characters on the screen operate as a version of the viewer’s ideal ego. In this way, 
viewers are indoctrinated into hegemonic roles and values. When you watch a film there 
is a big Other, a social reality that also ‘observes’ you; a normalising gaze that requires 
your obedience. Even if you cannot identify with the projected ideal ego, the big Other will 
convince you to internalise it as true.  This theorisation, according to Copjec creates a 
‘Foucauldianised Lacan’ and misses certain nuances of the psychoanalytic ontology.  
In Discipline and Punish (1995), Foucault develops a theory of surveillance around the 
metaphor of the Panopticon, Jeremy Bentham’s eighteenth-century prison design. In 
Bentham’s Panopticon, the prison guard stands in the middle of a cylindrical building at 
the centre of the prison; he is able to observe any prisoner at all times whereas they are 
not able to see if they are being observed. Unable to know when the guard is actually 
looking at them, the prisoners feel themselves to be constantly surveilled, resulting to 
their internalisation of the guard’s presence and ensuring their subsequent obedience. 
According to Foucault this process shapes modern societies of control in which each and 
every member of contemporary societies takes the role of both prisoner and prison guard 
for both themselves and those around them. A new social reality of surveillance is 
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formed. What Foucault names ‘Panopticism’ shapes his understanding of power 
relations: each member of society internalises and reproduces ideological systems of 
power. For Foucault there is no such thing as the unconscious or rather the unconscious 
is an effect of normative discursive regimes such as psychoanalysis and philosophy. This 
is an important first distinction between the panopticist and the Lacanian argument. 
The subject shaped by the panoptic modality of surveillance internalises discursive 
regimes and then reproduces them. Power in the modern era is not enforced through 
physical/immediate violence (the repressive hypothesis – in the prison metaphor: 
obedience through use of violent suppression) but rather through the internalisation of 
normative technologies of knowledge. Foucault claims that the modern subject is being 
constantly asked to give an account of themselves (another metaphor used besides the 
panopticon is the Catholic confessional). The modern subject, in responding to this 
request, adopts the language of the interrogator. We only become legible when we adopt 
the vocabulary of the existing power regimes. If the subject manages to articulate an 
alternative position that does not conform to those regimes, Foucault claims that the 
systems of power will scrutinise it, categorise it and either pathologise and abjectify it or 
find a way to make it less threatening to by normalising it. This leads to Foucault’s ‘non-
repressive hypothesis’, according to which law operates in a productive rather than 
repressive way.  
In Copjec’s view, the problem with this conception is in the way we can then articulate 
resistance towards the law: Foucault's definition of the law as positive and non-repressive 
implies both that the law is (1) unconditional, that it must be obeyed, since only that which 
it allows can come into existence – being is, by definition, obedience – and that it is (2) 
unconditioned, since nothing, that is, no desire, precedes the law; there is no cause of 
the law and we must not therefore seek behind the law for its reasons (Copjec, 2015b). 
The panopticon offers an analysis that seems very relevant in a discussion about the 
screen and new media realities. In surveillance studies we often see analyses that see 
the rise of mobile screen as the ultimate expansion of the Panopticon: the ideological 
apparatus has become portable, resourceful and literally omnipresent. While the merging 
of the Panopticon and the Other’s gaze into one analytical superstructure seems to offer 
a compelling theorisation of power in relation to visuality, it misses out nuances of 
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Lacan’s position, especially when it comes to the constitutive incompleteness of the 
subjectification process and most importantly the topic of resistance to power. In order to 
discuss this further we shall follow Joan Copjec’s critique of 70s film studies scholars 
presented in her book Read my Desire: Lacan Against the Historicists (2015b).  
Copjec makes a radical departure from the Panopticon argument by employing a close 
reading of the Lacanian conception of the big Other. Copjec suggests that Mulvey and 
her contemporaries conflate the gaze of the Other with the Panopticon, leading to a 
series of historicist reductions and omissions regarding the complexities of psychic 
life. As we have seen, the Panopticon argument allows us to understand subjectivity in 
relation to discourse and power by employing the disciplinary effects of surveillance. 
According to the theory of panopticism, every attempt to decipher our selfhood is 
expressed as an iteration of power within us. Our self-understanding is an illusion as 
selfhood itself is a construction. As power regimes define our position within social reality, 
our sense of selfhood is yet another iteration of power. Women especially, in this context, 
can only find the words to describe their inner realities after acquiring a place in 
patriarchal symbolic order. They can only speak with the words of their oppressors, 
otherwise they are not only stigmatised but also expelled from the symbolic order. In 
Mulvey’s theorisation of cinema, women can only be represented as objects for the male 
gaze to consume. Resistance to the gaze is not possible without a radical break-through, 
a leap that goes beyond the current order of things. 
For Mulvey that kind of transgression is impossible without a re-structuration of the visual 
field as such, and she suggests that truly subversive cinema can only occur through a 
restructuring of the medium itself, something attempted by the avant-garde filmmakers of 
her time. Similarly, feminist philosophers such as Hélène Cixous suggest the idea of 
feminine writing (écriture féminine) as an alternative to phallocentric art. The main idea in 
those theorisations is that language itself is imbued with phallocentrism on a structural 
level. The writing/speaking subject of the western canon is categorically male and in 
order to overcome that women have to invent another language (Cixous, 1976). The idea 
of feminine writing has since been criticised for essentialising sexual difference but 
nevertheless offers a useful critique of the male literary canon. We will return to the issue 
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of feminine writing in our last chapter when we discuss Julia Kristeva’s account of what 
she defines as the semiotic chora. 
Copjec is critical towards the totalising political critique of cinema, as she identifies in this 
polemic a certain kind of deterministic reductionism. In the Panopticon argument, women 
are always perfectly legible as subjects; their whole existence is constructed through 
power and even their deepest desires can be understood as side effects of the law. 
Historically defined conditions shape not only women’s social position but also their 
understanding of themselves and their inner worlds, presumably including their 
discontent about their position and their comprehension of inequality. The only chance for 
transgression within the Panopticon, according to Foucault, comes when the intersection 
of two (or more) regulatory systems produce unexpected outcomes. For example when 
religious and legal power bears contradictory incitements, then the solution of the tension 
can be novel and unexpected for the subject. 
But difference, claims Copjec, does not defy the Panopticon. On the contrary, once any 
difference gets articulated, it consequently helps the Panopticon expand by mapping a 
new discursive territory. New positions allow for a more pluralistic decoding of social 
reality; the intersection might create a short-lived tension but the resolution of this tension 
will produce what we can call an updated panopticon. These tensions work as ‘upgrade 
patches’ for the panopticon, rather than destabilising forces. If we follow this particular 
Foucauldian argument we sooner or later reach a limit regarding the potentiality for 
resistance to biopower and Panopticism. If the Panopticon constructs all positions and 
incorporates all exemptions, how does resistance operate? 
 As mentioned earlier, Foucault rejects psychoanalysis, seeing it as yet another tool of 
biopower that aims to make subjectivity more legible and essentially governable. In this 
schema, the psychoanalytic unconscious is no more than an ideological construction. 
Psychoanalysis constructs the unconscious by describing it within discourse. We can 
conclude then that in the Foucauldian paradigm, all knowledge we might have of 
ourselves essentially comes from the socially defined outside, an accepted assumption 
among social constructivists. In the Foucauldian paradigm, the screen (cinematic and 
beyond) is no more than another power regime; a spectatorial field that informs us of how 
the world and ourselves truly are. The screen offers an image of an ideal ego and the 
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spectators take that image as their own. Whoever does not comply with that specific 
image is judged, or worse, stigmatised and abjectified. People internalise the rules and 
become the ‘invisible’ guard of the panoptic tower. As appealing as this theorisation might 
appear, we will attempt to conceptually surpass its deterministic conclusion by revisiting 
the potency of the Lacanian introduction of the real. The Lacanian real, Copjec claims, is 
not yet another discursive construction. 
In Mulvey’s theorisation, the gaze shapes the way we watch and comprehend film. 
Filmmakers develop their work having in mind a certain type of subjectivity (white 
heterosexual male). The audience can only enjoy the film by assuming this position and 
by identifying with the gaze. Copjec intervenes here to remind us that if we follow this 
strand of film theory, the cinematic image will stand for the signifier and the spectator for 
the signified. The gaze in this articulation stands in front of the screen, identifying with the 
position of the viewer.  
On the contrary, the Lacanian gaze emanates from the point of failure of the visual. 
Copjec says ‘this point at which something appears to be invisible, this point at which 
something appears to be missing from representation, some meaning left unrevealed, is 
the point of the Lacanian gaze. It marks the absence of a signified; it is an un-occupiable 
point.’ Unlike the film theory gaze that coincides with the signified, the Lacanian gaze 
comes from a point of emptiness. Instead of being in front of the screen, the Lacanian 
gaze actually comes from behind the screen. Most importantly, it is unlike the panoptic 
gaze that is regulatory and disciplines the subject into a particular way of being. As 
Copjec writes: 
Lacan does not ask you to think of the gaze as belonging to an Other who  cares 
about what or where you are, who pries, keeps tabs on your  whereabouts, and 
takes note of all your steps and missteps, as the panoptic gaze is said to do. When you 
encounter the gaze of the Other, you meet not a seeing eye but a blind one. The gaze is 
not clear or penetrating, not filled with knowledge or recognition; it is clouded over and 
turned back on itself, absorbed in its own enjoyment. The horrible truth, revealed to Lacan 
by Petit-Jean [the fisherman], is that the gaze does not see you. So, if you are looking for 
confirmation of the truth of your being or the clarity of your vision, you are on your own; 
the gaze of the Other is not confirming; it will not validate you. (Copjec, 2015b, p. 36) 
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 The big Other is constantly looking towards us, or so we think, while the mirror/screen is 
obfuscating the painful reality: the Other is indeed blind, the Other is lacking content. This 
big Other is constructed as omnipresent and powerful but can only maintain this illusion 
by reproducing the opacity of what separates us from him (and it is language and its 
signifiers that play the role of the screen). The subject is incapable of identifying the exact 
location of the Other’s gaze within itself. According to Copjec, the gaze is 
unidentifiable/unocuppiable. So Copjec’s reading of Lacan suggests that behind the 
screen of signifiers there is actually nothing. But of course it is not an accident that we 
cannot anticipate or properly comprehend this nothingness. It is exactly this function of 
language that orients us towards the world. This is why we exist as desiring subjects. 
The narcissism of the mirror stage requires the subject to fall in love with their spectral 
image, their ideal self. Following that idea, Mulvey suggests that the audience of cinema 
should fall in love with the ideal image as presented on the cinematic apparatus and then 
accept it as an identifiable role. But as narcissism does not work in accordance to social 
norms, similarly the modality of narcissistic identification is much more complex and 
contradictory to what is anticipated. We have seen earlier in our overview of the mirror 
phase that there is always something missing from our reflection as the mirror shows a 
partial image of ourselves and as we understand our body as initially foreign to ourselves. 
Copjec suggests:  
[…] narcissism cannot consist in finding satisfaction in one’s visual image. It must, rather, 
consist in the belief that one’s own being exceeds the imperfections of its image. 
Narcissism, then, seeks the self beyond the self-image, with which the subject constantly 
finds fault and in which constantly fails to recognise itself. (Ibid. p.37) 
That should explain how narcissism in front of the screen is not a closed system of 
representation and indoctrination, but rather a complex and ambivalent encounter. 
Narcissism is far from a harmonious and passive process and as we saw earlier, Freud 
warns us about the aggression involved in the narcissistic libidinal investment: ‘setting 
itself up as sole love-object, and desexualizing or sublimating the libido of the id, the ego 
is working in opposition to the purposes of Eros and placing itself at the service of the 
opposing instinctual impulses’(Freud, 1923, p. 46). 
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In her conclusion, Copjec suggests an inversion of Mulvey’s argument: Instead of 
thinking of the screen as a mirror we should instead think of the mirror as a screen; a 
screen of signifiers the subject encounters, internalises and connects. To extend 
Copjec’s argument, we might say that the screen – whether cinematic or mobile – cannot 
be defined within the narrow context of a new panopticism. The very process of 
identification is flawed, broken and essentially incomplete. Narcissism is not a 
harmonious identification with an ideal image coming from the mirror/screen. The 
relationship with that ideal image is not necessarily loving and pleasant and more often 
than not involves anger, frustration and anxiety. 
In order to see the practical applications of these theoretical reflections we will examine a 
series of contemporary feminist and queer artists’ work that deals with identity, gender 
politics and the question of narcissism. While moving away from a panopticist approach 
and by adopting a psychoanalytic understanding of narcissism we will attempt to examine 
how certain artworks deal with the politics of capitalist iconoclastic media realities. The 
starting point in our discussion is Amalia Ulman’s durational Instagram performance 
called Excellences & Perfections. During her performance, Ulman developed a new 
Instagram persona combining a series of clichés in order to attract as many followers as 
possible and documented her ascendance to Instagram celebrity. Her work will allow us 
to reflect on Mulvey’s theorisation of the male gaze and see how Copjec’s intervention 
might lead us to more nuanced analyses of feminist representation in media cultures. 
Ulman’s exploration of new digital realities will be discussed in relation to earlier feminist 
artists who used the self-portrait as their main medium attempting to draw a genealogy of 
feminist ‘narcissist’ art.  
Excellency is in the eye of the beholder 
Amalia Ulman in her Excellences & Perfections, builds a coherent and realistic persona: 
An ambitious young woman arriving to Los Angeles wanting to become the new ‘it girl’. 
She starts her modelling career, makes money and generally enjoys a glamorous life. 
Her journey to fame is recorded in countless photos she shares with her Instagram 
followers. Her persona is full of recognisable Instagram clichés. Stylised pictures of 
avocado on toast, close ups of luxurious products and most importantly ‘spontaneous’ 
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selfies from her various every day activities. Amalia Ulman’s project offers an excellent 
starting point to problematize ‘selfie culture’ as it provides insightful reflections on digital 
media, new media representations of the self and narcissism as such. 
Ulman’s project was proclaimed in press as the ‘first Instagram masterpiece’ (Sooke, 
2016). Instagram was launched in October of 2010 and as its name suggests (instant 
telegram) was initially an attempt to combine a reconstruction of nostalgic and stylised 
version of the past with the fast processing and sharing functions of a modern 
smartphone. Instagram’s main innovation, at the beginning of its existence was applying 
‘retro’ filters on the photos users took through their phones. The retro-tendency of the 
hipster culture in the late 00s is exemplified in Instagram’s success, a smartphone 
application that makes pictures look like they were taken in the past through analogue 
means. That almost hauntological1 element of the application gradually receded as the 
social network aspect became the main selling point. Instagram evolved into the most 
popular picture sharing social network of the smartphone era. Filters still exist in the 
application but are not aiming at creating a retro effect but rather to accentuate colours or 
soften facial imperfections. 
Instagram is now conceived as a visual diary, where the user keeps track of time and 
space, selfie after selfie. Instagram, just like twitter, beyond a certain set of meta-data 
(such as location, date and username) also allows the users to add a series of hashtags 
that not only describe the picture they accompany but at the same time they also create a 
real-time complex network of signifiers that connect different users that do not share 
relations of social or geographical affinity. Hashtags allow for finding content outside 
one’s narrow social network and facilitate the creation of instantaneous virtual 
communities organised around keywords. 
It was April 2014 when Amalia Ulman posted on her personal Instagram account a plain 
frame with “Part 1” written on it. From then on, all of her posts would be part of a scripted 
performance, a three-part digital media docudrama where a fictionalised version of 
herself would try to make it in L.A. The first part of the series involved her posting 
motivational messages, photographs of expensive lingerie, luxurious brunches and 
                                               
1 Hauntology is a concept developed by Jacques Derrida but popularised by cultural theorist Mark Fischer. [expand] 
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generally bragging about her new exciting lifestyle. In the second part she introduced her 
ghetto period, using tropes of working class femininities (through the prism of white 
privileged girl appropriation) and she intensified the sexualisation of her image.  
More sexual pictures, more urban themes and the use of drugs helped her build the 
image of a bad girl. At that time, she presented to her audience a series of fake plastic 
surgeries, including facial corrections and breast augmentation. Then, she posted a 
couple of ‘intimate’ personal moments of introspection with a bit of crying and scripted 
confessions in order to introduce the last period of her experiment where she would 
repent her past vices and become obsessed with healthy lifestyle and positive thinking. 
The last instalment would demonstrate healthy food, post-exercise selfies, pastel colours 
and flowers. In the process of those five months, she gained about eighty thousand 
followers who fell for the persona she created.  
 
The artwork attracted media attention with some praise, but a fair bit of scepticism with 
regards to the project’s aims and results. Kyla Bills and Emily Friedland for example both 
doubt Ulman’s innovation as they see what she did as a standard practice among the 
millennials. This is what Instagram users do, both articles claim, they create and perform 
a persona; they painstakingly adapt to certain social trends and attempt to create an 
appealing image through building their own personal brand. For Friedland what is actually 
missing from Ulman’s persona is something very often central in the millennial new media 
routines: the need to hide that they try to maintain a persona and generally a tendency to 
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avoid showing their desire for attention. However, we could argue that the point of 
Ulman’s work is not to be original in that sense, on the contrary her main intention is to 
highlight the process through which new media personas are constructed. Ulman’s 
character may be careless about hiding her ambition, consumerism or the need for 
attention, yet this very character gained thousands of followers and made a project that 
got media attention and has been showcased in prestigious art institutes around the 
globe.  
Both of the aforementioned critics agree that Ulman is no less narcissistic than those who 
inspired her work. As we saw earlier, Lasch identifies modern art as an exceptional 
manifestation of narcissism of our era. According to Lasch, both making art out of 
consumerist imagery (like pop-art of his time) that elevates the banality of everyday life 
into beauty instead of focusing on the sublime, and the excessive pre-occupation with 
oneself (like in the selfie epidemic of our times) are signs of the narcissistic contemporary 
society. Besides that, he warns us of the dangers of art presenting reality as fictive; art 
that presents society as the result of ‘narratives.’ Narcissist artists who could never 
internalise the ‘reality principle’, according to Lasch, tend to prefer a worldview according 
to which reality is nothing more than fiction. In the use of narcissism as a condemnatory 
term in the aforementioned responses to Ulman’s work, we see certain echoes of Lasch’s 
conservative moralism. In all of these accounts, the fantasy of the artist as selfless is in 
operation. 
Ulman’s excellences do not offer an aesthetically reparative experience, and she does 
not produce a transcendental gesture towards the sublime, as a good artist, according to 
Lasch should do. On top of that her work is full of herself with self-portraits and pictures 
from her everyday life. Her body, the image of her body and the performative identity she 
creates occupy a central position in her work blurring the boundaries between parody and 
real, genuine and meta, embodied and virtual. Even when the target of Ulman’s satire 
(gender norms in new media) is indeed accepted as a real problem her choice of medium 
is challenged and often ridiculed. For us, it is the exact blurring between the intimate and 
the public, between the quotidian private and the reflective political that marks her work 
as an excellent case study for our analysis of narcissism and media. 
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Going back to the problematic of the mirror we can conceptualise Ulman’s selfies - and in 
fact any selfie - in relation to ego formation. As we saw earlier, selfies, just like mirrors 
can never offer a complete representation of oneself. Narcissism cannot find satisfaction 
in its own image. Joan Copjec reminds us that ‘(narcissism) must, rather, consist in the 
belief that one's own being exceeds the imperfections of its image. Narcissism, then, 
seeks the self beyond the self-image, with which the subject constantly finds fault and in 
which it constantly fails to recognise itself.’ Narcissism in that sense even when 
appearing to entrap the subject in a repetitive and solipsistic motion it facilitates reaching 
towards the Other, as the image of the self can never be complete.  
In Laura Mulvey’s understanding of the male gaze, Excellences and Perfections is a 
project that perfectly fits patriarchal modes of representation. Ulman presents her body in 
a similar way as the women in magazines and mainstream Hollywood films. It is 
objectified, sexualised, an image to be consumed by her thousands of male followers. 
We suggest that Ulman, by obscuring the subject/object dichotomy and by thematising 
her objectification, disrupts the normative patriarchal dynamic. In the Panopticon ontology 
a subject can either conform to the gaze of the Other or be exterminated, but in the 
psychoanalytic context there is more space for ambivalence and reflection.  
Lacan put forward a model of subjectivity that goes beyond dichotomies such as 
internal/external and social/psychical. The term extimacy was coined by Lacan to signify 
the paradoxical concepts of psychoanalysis as it combines ex- from exterior and -timacy 
from intimacy (in French extmité from exterieur and intimité). Extimacy is used to 
describe the unconscious, and as the term suggests, for Lacan, the unconscious is both 
intersubjective and deeply intimate. For psychoanalysis the Other can never fully 
comprehend the subject, the Other’s gaze can never fully grasp the subject’s 
identifications and unconscious thoughts just as the subject itself cannot do it either. That 
is why we argue that Amalia Ulman can at the same time be subjected to the male gaze 
and resistant to it.  
Reyes et al. in their paper ‘Disconnected/connected: On the ‘‘look’’ and the ‘‘gaze’’ of cell 
phones’ (2015) offer an analytic distinction useful for theorising social and mobile media. 
According to these writers, there is a fundamental difference between being seen and 
being subjected to the gaze. Following the Lacanian explication of the gaze, the authors 
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suggest that the social media are not facilitating the gaze but rather operate on the 
imaginary level of relationality. The screen is a veil of signifiers, the sliding, or shall we 
say scrolling, of signifiers is in place to conceal the gaze. The gaze emerges when the 
screen is off, when the users hold the phone in their hands but they are not looking at it. 
The user anticipates a notification that does not come; they are fidgety. That is the 
moment when the gaze of the Other forces the subject to deal with themselves, the 
moment of anxiety.  
The phone, unlike the Lacanian sardine tin, can in fact return the look as it opens up to a 
whole new field of communication and socialisation. In that sense, the mobile phone, 
according to Reyes et all, offers a circulation of anxiety and comfort, as it satisfies the 
need to be seen and recognised and at the same time produces anxiety, facilitating the 
gaze of the Other. The mobile phone with this double function becomes an appendage of 
subjectivity, and a perfect vessel of the drive that circulates from the subject to the object 
and back to the subject. In Ulman’s pictures, her phone features in the selfies she takes 
in front of the mirror and it becomes the quilting point between the persona she 
constructs and her real life. The same bedazzled phone she uses to portray the 
stereotypical character she builds for Excellences is the phone she uses to contact her 
friends and family. The subject in the new media era stands in front of the mirror holding 
their phones; the phone becomes part of the self, the self is stained by a hole: the 
smartphone camera. In one of her interviews, Ulman says that many of her friends were 
really disturbed with the change of her Instagram posts even though they knew it was an 
art-project. This presence of the upsetting in the ordinary, this anxiety provoking banality 
is one of the chief reason we have discussed this project here – like the sardine-tin, an 
otherwise typical Instagram profile becomes provocative and disturbing when it forces us 
to think of ourselves.  
Narcissistic feminist art 
Feminist art has a long history of problematizing body and gender representations and 
lived realities. Since the 70s several female artists disrupted the normative phallocentrism 
of the art world by putting forward work that reflected their embodied realities. They often 
achieved that by using their own bodies to express themselves and to establish a new 
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body politics that also reflected the political climate of the time (counter-cultures, sexual 
revolution, the emergence of identity politics). By turning their own bodies into their very 
medium, feminist artists attempted to disrupt a long history of objectification of the female 
body in art: this time it was women themselves that took control of the female image. 
Intriguingly, some art critics of the time labelled instances of body-centred female art as 
self-absorbed and narcissistic (in opposition to the universal interests of the male artist). 
We encounter here an old trope where psychoanalysis played its role: women are vain 
and narcissistic and they only care about (their) appearances. In psychoanalytic 
orthodoxy women are often portrayed as obsessed with their own image while men 
fixated to the other sex. Art theorist Amelia Jones (2007) examines in her work artists 
from what she identifies as feminist body art from the 70s and discusses the reception 
and legacy of it. For Jones the persistent characterisation of those art works as 
narcissistic is not defamatory or even misleading; it is indeed accurate, yet not in the way 
the critics intended. Amelia Jones takes into account psychoanalytic theorisations of 
narcissism (similar to the ones presented earlier in this chapter) in order to defend 
narcissist feminist art as such. In order to pursue this re-appropriation of narcissism 
Jones creates the new analytic category of radical narcissism [Amelia Jones, Body 
art/performing the subject]. In the case studies examined by Jones the body and its 
image are re-thematised: classic motifs are re-examined and the body acquires a radical 
re-signification.  
The artists themselves present their own bodies and they often expose them naked and 
sexually charged. The female nude carries a long history of objectification both in artistic 
representations and in media cultures. Feminist body art deals with this history in a 
seemingly paradoxical way, by re-appropriating the very same poses and gestures that 
patriarchal culture invented and circulated. Contrary to classical Odalisques and pin-up 
girls, the female and radically narcissistic artists present their own raw representation of 
their bodies. The artist in this case is not an invisible – transparent in his naturalised 
position as a subject of creation – man, but on the contrary the artist exposes her own 
body defying the distinction between the subject who creates and the object that is being 
presented.  
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Body art brings forward the intrinsic tension of narcissism as presented in the mirror 
phase theorisation. As Amelia Jones notices, the narcissist depends on the Other in 
order to exist. The ego is always dependent on the Other and always negotiates the 
boundaries of its selfhood. In the proclaimed articulation of narcissism in body art, the 
body image becomes a photograph, a video projection and a painting. The artist adores 
her body as foreign; she learns how to define its boundaries and invites the audience to 
be part of this process. Carolee Schneeman, one of the artists discussed by Jones, 
creates films of herself having sex with her partner.  She then scratches the film and 
plays with the celluloid chemicals developing an expressionist pornography.  
The body resists the dissolution of the film; the viewer gets glimpses of the sex scene 
between a kaleidoscopic assemblage of colours and cuts. Schneeman’s sexuality seems 
to literally attack the film as the bodies merge, faint and re-emerge. Freud suggests that 
society sublimates sexual energy into artistic and intellectual achievements; in 
Schneeman’s Fuses sexuality and art collapse into each other. The film dissolves, the 
body becomes transparent, and in Lasch’s terms the work gets lost in an oceanic feeling 
of primary narcissism. Narcissism portrayed as an oceanic feeling though, offers us a 
glimpse of a new conception of the ego, an ego that is not quite as closed and self-
contained as is usually conceived but, as we saw earlier, it is open-ended and dependent 
on the Other’s presence and recognition. 
In the example of Schneeman’s Fuses, what was perceived as a private moment turns 
into a public performance. Looking at your reflection in front of the mirror appears to be a 
private affair that could be shameful to practice in public. Tracing your ego’s boundaries, 
examining your bodily limits and understanding your desire should happen away from the 
public eye. Moments of displayed narcissism remind us of our initial encounter with the 
mirror; the mirror as a terrain of alienation, the mirror as in fact the very reason of our 
comprehension of selfhood as alterity. The narcissistic subject of body art, according to 
Jones takes a heroic position: she reclaims the body as the passionate territory of that 
exact constitutive alterity.  
Jennifer Linton (2010) in her discussion of Hannah Wilke’s nude self-portraits focuses on 
the paradox of feminist body art. The feminist artist (in this case Wilke) exposes her 
naked body to the male gaze. Wilke has produced during her prolific career hundreds of 
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artworks featuring her naked body. The political significance of the agency and 
intentionality of the artist is once again central; it is not a male photographer that offers 
Wilke’s body to the public (as a gift, as an object), it is in fact the artist herself who does 
it, and by doing so she disrupts the normative circulation of female images/bodies. As 
Linton points out, feminist art critics of Wilke’s time were not convinced about the 
radicality of this gesture. According to art theorists Judith Barry and Sandy Flitterman, 
who follow a line of thought similar to the Mulvey argument we discussed earlier, Wilke 
does nothing more than objectifying herself. 
Her critical position does not come through at first sight and therefore the subversion she 
claims to facilitate remains largely an intention rather than an actualised and effective 
gesture (Linton, 2010). In one of Wilke’s interviews presented by Linton the artist exposes 
her ambiguity towards the politics of her work. On one hand, she expresses her alliance 
with feminism and discusses the problematic of female objectification. On the other hand 
she wants to investigate her feelings in relation to that position, she wants to use her 
female narcissism in order to comment on the social reality she inhabits. Amelia Jones 
suggests that body art enacts narcissism as contingency. It is not the fixation to the body 
as an object but rather the return to the body as a broken promise of coherence. Wilke in 
her photos proudly wears her wounds. In her piece S.O.S Starification Object series, she 
presents a series of self-portraits where her half-naked body – in casual poses with 
several props – is covered with small vaginal sculptures made of chewing gum. For Wilke 
chewing gum is the perfect analogy to how society treats women and wears them proudly 
creating a bizarre iconography. The vaginas on her body, instead of signifying lack, as 
patriarchal society (and psychoanalysis) wants them to become an absolute sign of 
excess. As Jones writes: ‘(u)nveiling her flesh and forcing it to symbolise the 
externalisation of the (wounded) self, Wilke performs her body/self as radically 
excessive.’ In a similar, yet more subtle way, Ulman offers her follower images of her 
body after plastic surgery. In a move of radical transparency, she shows how much she 
has to suffer in order to conform to beauty standards.  
In another powerful discussion of narcissism in art, Joan Copjec turns her attention to 
Cindy Sherman’s self-portraits from the project Untitled Film Stills. Sherman, like Ulman 
and Wilke, focuses on gendered roles and uses her body and its representation as her 
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medium of expression. In Sherman’s Stills we see a series of self-portraits, which operate 
as parodies of several cinematic clichés. Sherman is always in the centre of the frame 
enacting familiar poses from imaginary films. Copjec suggests that the psychoanalytic 
conception of narcissism offers in fact an analysis of femininity that goes beyond the 
critique of the male gaze. In order to explicate that, she follows the concept of the Ego as 
developed in Leo Bersani’s close reading of the Freudian On Narcissism. For Bersani 
(Bersani, 2013), as for Freud himself, the conceptual distinction between narcissist libido 
and libido proper (or anaclitic libido) makes no sense. Bersani offers us an account on 
how the narcissistic libido that is initially objectless allows for the formation of the ego. 
Central in Bersani’s conception of narcissism is the sexual drive. According to Bersani, 
the drive can have no object, and assuming the drive taking as its object the ego is a 
false assumption.  
 The drive, according to Bersani, is essentially a force of destruction, a form of desire that 
cannot be satisfied, a violent circular motion from the subject to the world and back to the 
subject. Every outward blast of the drive creates an excitation through its self-shattering 
force, and as a result it brings a “masochistic disturbance of psychic equilibrium”. This 
self-shattering excitation effectively functions as the object of the drive or in Bersani’s 
words ‘a pleasurably shattered consciousness becomes aware of itself as the object of its 
desire.’ The ego as a result can be understood as a ‘passionate inference [...] 
necessitated by the anticipated pleasure of its own dismantling.’ 
This is Bersani’s take on the process of primary narcissism. The limitless infantile 
narcissism comes as an outcome of the subject’s capacity to be shattered; shattered into 
sexuality, shattered into the world. The subject becomes aware of its existence through 
the pleasure of attempting to dismantle that very existence. When the outside 
environment will introduce a new form of refined ego, a coherent image through the 
mirror phase, the subject will attach this primordial sense of selfhood into this external 
proposed ideal ego. 
As Copjec observes, Bersani’s objectless passion leaves little space for any 
conceptualisation of sociality or connectivity as it traces the existence of an almost 
autistic – yet passionate – subject.  Copjec agrees with the idea that the ‘I’ is no more 
than a ‘passionate inference’, but she does not discard the role of objects in primary 
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narcissism. For her, it is the objects that allow for such an ‘inference’ to take place. The 
ego like an amoeba takes its shape while reaching for the objects; the objects organise 
narcissistic love. Women, Copjec says, can only be narcissistic by loving, to love is to 
want to be loved and thus love is always narcissistic. We can only understand both the 
ego and in fact libido itself through examining the object cathexes, those points outside of 
us that effectively organise ourselves. In the jouissance we experience when loving 
things we find ‘a corporeal experience of the self.’ 
Taking into account these insights, let us return to Ulman and her Instagram selfies.2 In 
one of her interviews, Ulman notes that when her project began, the gallery that 
represented her got in touch in order to complain about her new media behaviour. The 
gallerist warned her that no one would take her seriously in the art-world if she kept 
posting pictures like that. The Instagram account Ulman used to develop this 
experiment/art project was actually her already existing personal Instagram account. The 
artwork begins with ‘part 1’ and ends with ‘the end’ but excellences and perfections are 
just an intermission in the middle of Ulman’s regular account’s stream of photos. This is a 
striking aspect of this project: Ulman did not stop posting photos from her everyday life 
after the end of the project, she still does as she did during excellences. Now, she shares 
her moments with the 80.000 fans she acquired during her excellences, as well as the 
arty crowd that came to know her after she publicised her project.  
As we noted, in Friedland’s critique, excellences as perfections is presented as a naïve, 
overstated version of what most normal millennials already do, but if we focus on the 
exact moment when the exaggerated persona turns into the normal Ulman, we come 
across a shocking moment of ambiguity and confusion. We can return then to the 
Panopticisism question as presented in the beginning of this discussion. Is there an exit 
point when it comes to new politics of surveillance? Is it possible that one can offer a truly 
critical account that might resist a recuperation and further expansion of the panopticon? 
                                               
2 While editing this chapter, Cindy Sherman published an Instagram account, with a series of surrealist portraits and 
pictures from her everyday life.  
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The art of over-identification 
The artist duo BAVO following an argument made by Slavoj Žižek suggest what they call 
‘over-identification’ as an effective strategy for political art in our time. Žižek uses over-
identification to defend the aesthetics and public performances of Slovenian art group 
and rock band Laibach. According to Žižek (2014), dissident art in communist countries 
of the early 80s was mainly trying to plead for more humanitarian and democratic reforms 
within the existing regimes. Laibach, on the contrary, in their performances requested for 
a more austere, strict and conformist communism by accusing the current Yugoslavian 
regime for being too soft. When following the strategy of over-identification, BAVO claim, 
you have to take the system you want to criticise more seriously than it takes itself, 
obliging the audience to reflect on their current state of affairs.  
Ιn The Art of Over-Identification (2007), BAVO discuss different strategies in producing 
antagonistic political discourse through art. In their critical evaluation of so-called political 
art from the sixties, BAVO assess different ways in which artists attempted criticism of the 
existing socio-cultural reality. One of the modes of critique they identify in late 60s 
political art is what they call ‘marginalism’. Marginalism is expressed through counter-
cultural productions and as the name suggests these productions are born in the margins 
of society. Rock and roll and later punk offer this kind of positioning. According to BAVO, 
‘marginalism’ is not as effective in our times, as communicative capitalism is extremely 
capable of assimilating and consuming counter-cultural movements almost in their very 
conception. Contemporary capitalism almost glamourizes subcultural production and 
turns its achievements into consumer products. 
A different approach, more common in our days, is the construction of a utopian vision 
through art. According to this strategy the artistic production aims at providing glimpses of 
political utopias: suggesting a new set of rules and modalities that exist completely 
outside of contemporary social reality. This reminds us of Mulvey’s suggestion of a new 
feminist avant-garde that completely destroys the conventions of patriarchal cinema. 
Nevertheless, BAVO seem sceptical of this exercise in utopianism too. Taking into 
account the fact that we already operate within the limitation of a certain political 
ontology, we can assume that utopian imagination is bound to utilise existing ideas 
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coming from the old ideological regime. Besides that, utopian visions are often prone to 
absolutism and authoritarianism. Finally, and above all, similarly to the ‘marginalist’ 
approach, capitalism’s ability to assimilate liberatory and utopian visions makes BAVO 
cautious towards these gestures. 
So at this point BAVO seem to reach a discursive deadlock: If you cannot fight against 
the system through new counter-cultural identities of resistance and if it is impossible to 
envisage a radically new utopian world within the current paradigm (and more so, a 
utopia that is not bound to absolutism and suppression of difference), is there any 
possibility of political resistance through art at all? BAVO suggest a political equivalence 
of homeopathy according to which we shall swallow all of the sweet poison of the current 
regime in order to drastically break away from our addiction to it; we should embrace 
wholeheartedly what troubles us most. The situations emerging from over-identification 
projects are never clear in their message as the artists oscillate between a critical 
position and a position of passionate embracing of what is assumed to be bad. Žižek 
suggests in his theorisation of over-identification, that when you deny the audience an 
answer to the question ‘where does the artist stand’ you compel them to decide upon 
their own desire. Over-identification seems to provide a psychoanalytic solution to the 
problem (and thus not a solution at all).  
Laibach for example, due to their militaristic aesthetic and lyrics are adored by fascists all 
over the world. Laibach do not just identify with the oppressor in order to ridicule them as 
for example a parody project would do (i.e. Charlie Chaplin in The Great Dictator). 
Laibach identify with the enjoyment of the oppressor and that makes them terrifying. 
Critics of Laibach will often attack that particular element of their work: if you dress like a 
fascist, sing like a fascist, and even being admired by fascists, how are you not one of 
them? There is not an easy way to reply to that, especially not while maintaining a 
politically clear-cut position. Art, unlike discourse, is more capable of occupying 
contradictory positions. The image, operating primarily in the domain of the imaginary is 
more prone to the ambivalence of the mirror stage, whereas words have to obey to the 
meaning-making laws of the symbolic.3 Ulman states at a blurb in her website: ‘When 
                                               
3 Although as we will see in the next chapter that is not necessarily true also for the signifier  
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narcissism becomes a stratagem we need mirrors to learn our poses, to attract and 
seduce.’ In her Excellences Ulman operates as the feminist critic of gendered 
conventions while she enjoys a version of femininity that is not deemed worthy in the 
high-culture context.  
As we saw earlier, Ulman’s gallerist was upset when she started the Instagram project; 
her friends were upset with her even though they knew it was an art intervention. Unlike a 
clear parody project (i.e. Ulman posing as if she takes selfies and then present the result 
in a gallery space), where the spectator feels the safety of distinction by the enjoyment of 
what is criticised, in Excellences the spectator can never fully comprehend what part of 
what they observe is real and what is fictional. It is Ulman’s enjoyment that is threatening 
as it was in Hanna Wilke’s and Cindy Sherman’s self-portraits. Their bodies being 
excessive, narcissistic, loving.  For Copjec, it is the celluloid that activates Sherman’s 
love about the world. The medium becomes the object of affectation. In Ulman’s case we 
identified with her mobile phone, as the object that puts the drive in motion. The 
smartphone becomes the two way mirror-machine, which allows Ulman to assert her 
open-ended ego. 
Conclusion 
My aim in this chapter was, as the title suggests, to go beyond commonplace 
understandings of the selfie as an ephemeral cultural production of limited scholarly 
interest, or as a symptom of a narcissism that is assumed to be a moral failing, whether 
at the individual or social level. There have been previous attempts to re-engage with the 
self-image and narcissism using psychoanalytic theory, notably in the feminist art 
theorists of the 1970s and 80s. But what has been missing in many of these discussions 
is a theoretical model that situates the ego image in relation to the Other, and therefore in 
the social field. In this chapter, I turned to Lacan to argue that the image of the self is 
inherently and inextricably linked to the Other whose gaze secures it. I have argued that it 
is inasmuch as the narcissistic image is situated in the social field that it is of potential 
interest to consumer studies, as well as highlighted questions where this new approach 
has relevance.  
  103 
My starting point was an examination of narcissism within psychoanalytic literature. In my 
attempt to develop a psychoanalytically-informed discussion of new media realities, the 
first and most challenging issue was to theorise the idea of selfhood and how it might be 
affected by technological advancements. As Freud is one of the first philosophers to 
extensively focus on the mythical figure of Narcissus and subsequently on the concept of 
narcissism, and as my work is explicitly informed by psychoanalytic theories, Freud offers 
the necessary backbone for my understanding of narcissism as a complex psychosocial 
phenomenon. 
A large part of this analytical desire to reframe and re-examine narcissism came out of 
my need to consider the phenomenon outside of a moralist point of view. Most 
contemporary criticisms of narcissism and of our supposedly narcissist cultures link to 
Christopher Lasch’s accounts and his seminal book The Culture of Narcissism. In closely 
reading Lasch, and by comparing his analysis of narcissism to that of Freud, I was able to 
identify how Lasch’s political agenda informed his theorisation of the phenomenon. My 
departure from Lasch’s analysis led me to question the moralising that pathologises 
contemporary media cultures as inherently narcissistic. If a preoccupation with oneself is 
for Lasch a sign of the decay of our society, we can draw different conclusions, provided 
that we question some of his fundamental assumptions. What is striking in Freud’s work, 
for example, is that instead of being presented as a psychological problem, narcissism is 
rather discussed as a necessary phenomenon in the process of ego formation, hence the 
starting point of all intersubjective relations.  
In order to better contextualise Freud’s theorisation of narcissism in relation to media and 
to introduce the problematic of the screen to my discussion, I employed Lacan’s theory of 
the mirror phase. In his theorisation of the mirror, Lacan suggests that the initial formation 
of the ego is shaped by the encounter of the subject with its specular image. This model 
of the ego allows us to understand the radical alterity of subjectivity, inasmuch as it is 
shaped in relation to an external imago. This theorisation, as presented in this chapter, 
allowed me to argue for an understanding of the mobile screen that functions like the 
mirror, in the formation of self-identity.  
Lacan’s theory of the mirror phase emphasises that all such ego identifications are 
inherently flawed and unstable: the image in the mirror is whole, a complete and 
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enclosed territory, in a way that the subject’s being is not. Yet even this completeness is 
illusory; looking into the mirror, the subject can never observe their whole body; there is 
always some part escaping their perception, and crucially, they can never observe where 
their gaze emanates from. By theorising the complex process of the mirror phase I show 
that the mirror phase is not a merely cognitive process that allows the subject to acquire 
a self-image. Rather, it is an essentially intersubjective and open ended process. This is 
crucial in order to better understand narcissism as a function rather than as a subjective 
pathology.  
The Lacanian account of the mirror phase became popular in the analysis of the 
cinematic screen in the 1970s, when feminist Marxist theorists identified the political 
significance of the modern visual cultures in shaping and affecting popular ideologies. In 
my critical reading of these theorisations, I identified a certain kind of reductionism. If the 
Lacanian mirror phase is an essentially flawed process, in feminist film studies very often 
the identification with the filmic ideal ego is presented as inevitable. By examining this 
argument through Joan Copjec’s deconstructive analysis, I conclude that this account of 
the cinematic screen as a deterministic and repressive apparatus is more reflective of the 
Foucauldian conception of the Panopticon rather than the Lacanian account of the 
Other’s gaze. This distinction and the disambiguation between the two theoretical 
schemas allowed me to envision a politics that is open to difference and resistance to the 
will of the Other, as the latter is not conceptualised an all-encompassing, all observing 
entity.  
Ιn my analysis, I refer to a mirror phase rather to a mirror stage, as this difference allows 
us to appreciate the relevance of the mirror beyond early childhood. Where the mirror 
stage refers merely to a developmental stage of the child, the mirror phase signifies a 
process that happens throughout one's life. By opening up this possibility, I was able to 
then discuss selfies in relation to the mirror and the formation of the ego, and suggest a 
theorisation of the mobile screen as a mirror, a device that allows the subject to construct 
their self-image and at the same time experience it as mediated by the social Other.  
Following the already established parallels between the cinematic screen to the Lacanian 
mirror, I then apply these to the mobile screen. While the cinematic screen shares certain 
qualities with the mobile screen, it certainly also has significant differences. Unlike the 
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cinema screen, the mobile phone screen is an interactive surface. The phone does not 
simply receive images, but enables images to be taken and shared. It is a portable 
screen, giving its user access to media wherever they happen to be. From the office to 
the bedroom, from public to intimate spaces, mobile screens are a constant in 
contemporary life.  
In their engagement with narcissism and the phenomenon of the selfie, theorists have 
frequently referenced Lacan’s mirror phase. However, their attention has been restricted, 
for the most part, to the mirror phase as articulated in Lacan’s earlier work, where the 
subject’s encounter with his specular other is unmediated by any third factor. As Lacan 
developed his theory of the mirror phase he gave greater weight to the role of a third 
position, that of the gaze of the Other, which secures the position of the subject in relation 
to its mirror other. The image of the self is, then, from the beginning one that is rooted in 
the social field, in the Symbolic. The subject is not lost in its identification with the 
specular image; there is always another position from which to see themselves and their 
semblable. This more nuanced understanding of the mirror phase is, I believe, essential 
in comprehending the function of narcissism as a phenomenon, yet is missing in many 
discussions of narcissism in cultural and consumer studies. The narcissism I end up 
talking about is not an anti-social psychopathology but rather narcissism as contingency, 
a radical dependency on the validation of the Other. As Lacan says, the ego presents 
itself and sustains itself qua problematic only on the basis of the Other’s gaze.  
One of the innovations of my research came from the incorporation of examples from 
feminist art history in order to better understand selfie culture. By analysing the so-called 
narcissistic practices of visual artists who use their own bodies in their artworks, I was 
able to better understand the mechanism of narcissism and its potential political 
significance in the context of patriarchal power regimes. Women throughout modern 
history were deemed narcissistic, too preoccupied with themselves, trapped in their own 
specular images. What radical narcissist artists from the 70s showed is how this 
preoccupation with oneself is not anti-social, insofar as the subject mediates the self-
making process through the gaze of an audience.  
The main case study of the chapter comes from Amalia Ulman’s work, which makes a 
bridge between the self-portrait and selfie culture. Excellences and Perfections is a 
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durational performance that Ullman creates on Instagram. The work is an experiment on 
how new media femininities are constructed and consumed. What is remarkable in both 
feminist body art from the 1970s and Ulman’s contemporary work is how they manage to 
both critique how femininity is constructed and at the same time celebrate and play with 
the artist’s own femininity. These artists, in a way, expose their own narcissism in its full 
glory. I was inspired by these artworks as they present nuanced positions on subjectivity, 
gender and desire, while maintaining a playful and self-reflexive attitude. The artists I 
discuss in this chapter question the lines between private and public, intimate and 
political, essence and representation, and I try to follow their example in my research 
method, drawing theoretical conclusions from an eclectic mix of sources and references 
while implicating lived experiences and embodied struggles, cartographies of subjective 
frustrations and false revelations.  
One of the main analytical tools I draw upon to demonstrate the politically subversive 
potential of narcissism is the concept of ‘overidentification’, a term taken from Žižek’s 
discussion of Laibach. Strategies of resistance here take another shape; in 
overidentification, one not only accepts the insignia of the normative regime but fully 
embodies fully. According to Žižek, by taking this role of the zealot and by exaggerating 
the effects of the regime it is possible to make a more effective criticism than by simply 
pointing to its shortcomings. One of the most effective aspects of overidentification as a 
strategy of critique is its refusal to offer a comfortable position to its audience: it is neither 
clear-cut parody nor a simple acceptance of the norm. Through this very ambiguity, 
overidentification creates anxiety in the audience, which is challenged to take an active 
position and answer where they truly stand themselves. I consider Ulman’s work 
exemplary of both radical narcissism and overidentification as a mode of resistance.  
My works politicises psychoanalysis by critically employing a psychoanalytic 
understanding of subjectivity. By theorising the ways the subject is constituted, I propose 
a nuanced understanding of psycho-social phenomena that allows for new political 
projects. By criticising the Foucauldian Panopticism argument, I make space for a new 
conception of power that is not deterministic and reductionist but allows for creativity and 
resistance. Through the psychoanalytic framework I assemble, we can think of selfies as 
a creative process that allows the subject to re-configure their self-image in relation to the 
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Other. Selfies thus become an anchoring point for a subject who seeks stability in an 
ever-changing world; selfhood comes to represent an evolving yet constant factor in 
one's life and selfies come to create a visual diary of this reality.  
Thus, even though the selfie as a cultural practice does not carry the same authorial 
intentions as Amalia Ulman’s work, it does bear a certain element of what I term in this 
chapter as radical narcissism. If radical narcissism is all about exposing narcissism as 
contingency, narcissism as a modality of relating to the Other, a precondition of all 
sociability, then selfies are a social phenomenon that exemplifies this precise process. As 
selfies are not taken for the user’s own pleasure but rather in order to be shared on social 
media, the implication of the Other’s gaze is an essential element of their very existence 
and popularity. If anything, by closely examining a more avant-garde and artistic use of a 
new medium we can predict and better understand the future of an evolving 
phenomenon. This focus on emerging media phenomena can thus have a predictive role 
in relation to mainstream media cultures, something essential for a future-oriented 
consumer culture research. Consumer cultures change rapidly and constantly and it is 
therefore useful to focus on those fringe experimentations that potentially showcase 
traces of emerging cultural trends. 
This chapter is titled ‘beyond the selfie principle’, a reference to Freud’s paper, ‘Beyond 
the pleasure principle’, where he introduces his controversial idea of the death drive, a 
principle in people’s life that goes beyond the mere seeking of pleasure. In a similar way, 
I have identified ways of thinking about selfies beyond their mere appearance and 
perceived function. I would like to re-contextualise selfies as a phenomenon that goes 
beyond the media culture that gave rise to it, and elevate them into a metonymy of self-
creation; a story of selfhood in flux, selfhood that is essentially open, selfhood that always 
somehow implicates the Other. 
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Gay spatialisation – towards a real imaginary 
In the previous chapter we examined the ways in which psychoanalysis introduced and 
developed the concept of narcissism, first as a psychological pathology and then as a 
structural pre-condition for the birth of ego. Furthermore, we examined how the 
psychoanalytic conception of narcissism could be used in our theorisation of social reality 
and more specifically how it could inform our analysis of media cultures. We particularly 
focused on the structural aspect of narcissism following the ‘mirror phase’ argument by 
Jacques Lacan. In this context, we attempted an analysis of the ‘selfie’ and we reflected 
on various instances from art history where self-portraits played a pivotal role in the 
feminist struggle for representation. 
In order to advance our argument we deployed the concept of radical narcissism as 
developed by Amelia Jones and thus we re-approached social media practices, widely 
understood as narcissistic and we explored their potential political value. In this chapter, 
we will further expand on the complex relationship between narcissism and new media 
technologies, this time, focusing on the figure of the male homosexual as theorised in 
psychoanalytic literature. We do that for two reasons: first, the male homosexual is 
represented in early Freudian texts as the paradigmatic narcissist and by examining this 
theorisation we will advance our understanding of narcissism as such. Second, real time 
gay dating applications such as Grindr offer a great terrain for reflection on new media 
realities and their relation to psychic phenomena.  
After we introduce the main thematic motifs of our discussion and we critically engage 
with the psychoanalytic theorisation of homosexuality, we will focus on the idea of the 
drive, a concept of a great importance for both Freud and Lacan. Our theory of the drive 
will focus on Leo Bersani’s analysis of cruising (the practice of wandering about a 
(typically public) place in search of a casual sexual partner) as a cultural practice that 
relates to sexuality but goes beyond mere sexual gratification. For Bersani, cruising 
relates to ‘sociability’, a term he uses to describe co-existence in the social world. By 
employing the concept of sociability, we will re-contextualise the function of location-
based dating applications. In order to better understand sexuality and its relation to the 
process of subjectification we will also engage with the psychoanalytic theorisation of the 
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Oedipus complex and the problematic of castration and we will do so with a queer ethos 
that goes beyond psychoanalytic orthodoxies. 
Our queer theorisation of Oedipus will allow us then to reflect on the political implication 
of cruising and more broadly on what Leo Bersani calls ‘homosexual ethics’. In the last 
three sections of this chapter, we will engage with the theoretical framework that Jacques 
Lacan developed later in his work. We will focus on the concept of the sinthome that 
appears in the twenty-third seminar of Lacan. Through the sinthome we will then try to 
explore alternatives to an Oedipalised relation to the symbolic order. By focusing on the 
late work of Lacan we will also examine the ways the imaginary domain can in fact offer 
an alternative relation to the real that is not necessarily mediated through the signifier. 
Those insights will allow us to solidify our analysis of the ego as an open-ended entity 
and better understand narcissism’s relation to intersubjectivity. We conclude this chapter 
with an examination of the question of locality/locatability in relation to Grindr and other 
real time dating apps and introduce the problematic of space in new media cultures – a 
theme that we return to in the following chapter.  
Radical narcissisms: the male homosexual 
 
In this provocative self-portrait, a young Robert Mapplethorpe poses in full-leather attire 
with a bullwhip hanging from his anus. Mapplethorpe exemplifies in this photograph the 
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aesthetics of the sadomasochistic gay scene he was part of and fascinated by. In the 
picture, he looks straight at the camera while the whip peeking out of his ass appears as 
an appendix to his body. Building on our analysis of the self-portrait as an act of radical 
narcissism, we might consider this picture an appropriate bridge between the previous 
chapter’s focus on femininity and this chapter’s analysis of male homosexual subjectivity. 
In this picture we encounter yet another narcissistic photographer, posing as the object of 
(his) desire and blurring the lines of the looking/being looked at dyad. 
This implication of the photographer as pornographic model, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, bends the conventional understanding of objectification. Furthermore, the picture 
brings into the mainstream, visual elements from a marginalised sub-culture; it elevates 
into high art what would be conventionally regarded as fetish pornography. The 
homosexual subject/object, in this case, appears not only as an agent of sexual desire, 
but also literally penetrable. Bringing the political struggle of his contemporary gay 
liberation movement into the forefront, Mapplethorpe re-presents what shall remain non-
representable: the male subject – penetrated. Jonathan Kemp in his analysis of the 
penetrated male states:  
Metonymy takes the traditional feminisation of the penetrated male body as evidence of a 
destabilisation of all epistemological categories. Metonymy thereby locates the erotic 
corporeality of the penetrated male body as necessarily inside discourse, as the part of 
discursive reality most resistant to the protocols of representation, and as a consequence 
capable of throwing them into greater relief. (Kemp, 2013, p. 124) 
The metonymic process operates in more complex ways in this portrait. Mapplethorpe is 
not just the receiver of penetration, and therefore he is not just an embodied 
metonymisation of femininity. This picture represents circuits of pleasure that operate on 
different levels. The bull-whip is at the same time what penetrates the body but also what 
is excessive and phallic. The composition evokes an almost human/animal hybrid with 
the whip resembling a tail. While we are looked at by Mapplethorpe himself, in the 
Lacanian sense, the anxiety-provoking gaze emanates from the bull-whip as that is the 
point that operates as a stain on the visual field. The image acquires an intimidating 
dimension while remaining casual and quotidian.   
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One could argue that the internet era is saturated with pornographic imagery; 
nevertheless, an artistically constructed intimate depiction of a sexual body can still 
cause emotional reactions and disturbances. In a psychoanalytic context sexuality 
signifies a stumble of all meaning; a disruptive force not in a sense of being a moral 
provocation but rather being a remnant of the traumatic dimension of the real. As Alenka 
Zupančič vividly describes: ‘sex does not function as a stumbling block of meaning (and 
of the count) because it is considered morally naughty. It is considered morally naughty 
because it is a stumbling block of meaning (Zupančič 2008).’  
What is implied in Zupančič’s comment on sexuality is the relation between sex and the 
real in the Lacanian sense. In the previous chapter we presented Lacan’s three registers: 
the domain of language and law (symbolic), what people perceive through their senses 
(the imaginary) and what lies outside any symbolisation (the real). Sexuality might be 
perceived and codified through words and socially determined rituals, but - according to 
Lacan - it is fundamentally a liminal phenomenon and something that lies on the verge of, 
and resists, symbolisation. 
Contemporary gender and queer studies often define sexuality in relation to Judith 
Butler’s theory of performativity. This approach indeed allows us to grasp the 
complexities of socio-historically defined sexual identities and practices. Butler’s 
performativity introduces a historicist account of embodiment and provides a framework 
were corporeal realities can be understood through an analysis of discursive regimes of 
power. Butler builds on the legacy of Michel Foucault in an attempt to de-naturalise bodily 
practices and - in doing so - escapes a biological determinism previously predominant in 
the analysis of human sexuality. Despite its analytical rigour and political efficacy, Butler’s 
account of gender has been criticised as reductionist by psychoanalytically-informed 
theorists such as Tim Dean and Joan Copjec.  
Copjec’s psychoanalytic argument against Butler’s performativity echoes her critique of 
feminist film studies. According to Copjec, Butler’s performativity prioritises a certain 
account of sexuality that is linked to discursive regimes. In that sense, Butler presents an 
account of sexuality that is bound to what Lacanian ontology defines as the symbolic 
order. Similarly to Laura Mulvey, Butler focuses on the primacy of the signifier in order to 
conceptualise sexual difference and sexuality as a result of the patriarchal Other’s 
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regulatory gaze. The Other is constructed as the inevitable guarantor of all sexual 
relations making defiance difficult, if not impossible, to be conceived of. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, one should not conflate the gaze of the Other with the Foucauldian 
Panopticon, as the two theories are founded on different ontological assumptions. 
Zupančič in her discussion of Judith Butler’s work explains how Butler’s misconception of 
Lacanian theory led to a theory of performativity:  
To a large extent, Lacanian psychoanalysis seems compatible with this account, and it is 
often presented as such. The primacy of the signifier and of the field of the Other, 
language as constitutive of reality and of the unconscious (including the dialectics of 
desire), the creationist aspect of the symbolic and its dialectics (with notions such as 
symbolic causality, symbolic  efficiency, materiality of the signifier) […] All of these 
(undisputed) claims notwithstanding, Lacan’s position is irreducibly different from the 
above performative ontology (Zupančič 2012).  
What seems to differentiate the Lacanian account is not a reductionist biologism that 
would re-centralise the physical body and its instincts, but the idea that on top of the 
performative socially signified body there is an additional something. In Butler’s work 
‘(g)ender is the repeated stylisation of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly 
rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of 
a natural sort of being’ (Gender Trouble). The theory of performativity renders the 
subject’s inner life irrelevant as subjectivity itself only exists as an expression of socio-
historical conditions. 
On the contrary, sexuality in psychoanalysis can never be fully comprehended just by 
analysing its discursive context. In Zupančič’s words: ‘Sex appears in the discourse, it is 
discussed and analysed, it is captured and framed, but it seems to always maintain a 
stain of the real, there is always something eluding definition and linguistic enclosure. We 
can talk of sexuality but we can never capture its essence or explain its experience; 
sexuality in its very essence, threatens to shutter subjectivity.’ 
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Mapplethorpe’s self-portrait might not necessarily cause discomfort or arousal but most 
certainly evokes affective reactions.4 The sexuality of the picture is self-evident yet 
elusive in its conception. The further we move away from genital and reproductive 
understandings of sex, the more difficult it becomes to define sex as such. As humankind 
intensifies the sexualisation of sex, it moves away from defining it as a reproductive 
activity. As Zupančič points out ‘The further the sex departs from the “pure” copulating 
movement (i.e. the wider the range of elements it includes in its activity), the more 
“sexual” it can become.’ 
Queer sex offers a departure for the formulaic ideal of reproductive copulation. Queer 
theorist Lee Edelman, following a Lacanian theoretical trajectory, defines queer sexuality 
as a liberatory celebration of the death drive. Separated from reproductive economies, 
queer sexuality becomes an expression of enjoyment that defies the need for conserving 
the current social status (Edelman 2004). But as Tim Dean notices, it is not only queer 
sex that defies the normativity of reproductive sex; in Freud’s theory, it is in fact all sex 
that is queer, and psychoanalysis is queer theory avant la lettre. When sexual acts 
involve speaking subjects, it is impossible that we have a ‘pure copulation’ that is not 
imbued with the proliferating and perverse vigorousness of fantasy.   
In this chapter, we discuss sexuality in relation to the problematic of the drive. Unlike a 
historicist approach that relies solely on the discursive regimes of truth (such as science 
and religion) in order to form an analysis of subjectivity, we also take in account what 
Zupančič names the ‘additional something’ of the real. Central to this focus on the real is 
the psychoanalytic concept of the drive, described by Freud (1915) as:  
[A] concept on the frontier between the mental and the somatic, as the psychical 
representative of the stimuli originating from within the organism and reaching the mind, 
as a measure of the demand made upon the mind for work in consequence of its 
connection with the body. 
Lacan emphasises that for humans, unlike animals, there is no given relation between 
the drive and its object: “As far as the object in the drive is concerned, let it be clear that it 
                                               
4	I	recall	encountering	the	picture	for	the	first	time	in	Mapplethorpe’s	retrospective	in	Smithsonian	institute,	LA.	I	had	a	burst	of	laughter,	and	then	got	embarrassed	with	my	juvenile	reaction.	I	then	observed	other	visitors	who	had	similar	reactions.		
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is, strictly speaking, of no importance. It is a matter of total indifference” (Lacan 1998, 
p.168). The drive according to Lacan does not have an aim, but it gets satisfaction in 
going in circles around its object.  
If Freud makes a remark to the effect that the object in the drive is of no importance, it is 
probably because the breast, in its function as object, is to be revised in its entirety. […] 
To this breast in its function as object, objet a cause of desire, in the sense that I 
understand the term—we must give a function that will explain its place in the satisfaction 
of the drive. The best formula seems to me to be the following—that la pulsion en fait le 
tour. I shall find other opportunities of applying it to other objects. Tour is to be understood 
here with the ambiguity it possesses in French, both turn, the limit around which one 
turns, and trick. (Ibid. p.168) 
Our prioritisation of the drive in our discussion of sexuality is not an attempt to approach 
the phenomena we examine under an ahistorical and universalist light. The drive in 
Lacanian ontology does not exist outside social relations and, as we mentioned earlier, it 
cannot be reduced to a biological function.  
In the previous chapter, we discussed the relation between narcissism and the drive 
using examples from feminist artists and their self-portraits. In Mapplethorpe’s ‘selfie’, we 
see the archetypal depiction of homosexual narcissism: men perverse enough to take 
their own image as a beloved object. At a first glance, this form of narcissism appears to 
derive conceptually from the female equivalent. Once we investigate the details of the 
two cases, though, we are confronted with the paradoxical possibility: the derivative could 
be very easily assumed to be the original. Narcissus, after all, was a male falling in love 
with his image. The mythical predecessor of all narcissists could be very much assumed 
to be a male homosexual.   
Mapplethorpe, by involving his own body in the picture: vulnerable, penetrable, horny, 
disrupts the politics of objectification as we outlined earlier. Not only does the final 
composition feature his own body at the very centre, but it also diverges from a focus on 
the ‘Apollonian’ abstract ideal body. The body in this self-portrait is sub-cultural, 
subversive, caught in the middle of a sex act. The image he offers to us is difficult to 
digest. It is a particular, autobiographical, fleshed-out picture that resists normalisation 
and canonisation. Mapplethorpe has died from complications related to AIDS in 1989, but 
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before his premature death he was recognised as one of the most important 
photographers of his generation. By transgressing the boundaries of pornography and a 
documentation of a subcultural underground he brought the poetics of fetishism and gay 
desire into the mainstream. What could his provocative, stylised self-portrait tell us about 
contemporary media consumption by gay men? In order to answer this question, we will 
further investigate psychoanalytic conceptions of narcissism while examining Grindr, a 
dating application for men desiring men. 
The body of the drive and the allure of sociability   
Psychoanalysis makes a fundamental distinction between desire and drive. Before 
presenting our main argument, we shall discuss this distinction in order to better 
comprehend our theoretical starting points. According to one of the most famous 
Lacanian aphorisms ‘Man's desire is the desire of the Other’ (Lacan 1998, p.235). This 
demonstrates the positioning of the Lacanian subject in relation to desire. The Other, as 
we have already seen, represents social reality, and thus desire is identified as a 
phenomenon mediated by a linguistic, symbolic reality. The subject enters the symbolic 
order through the process of castration, a term that Lacan extracts from Freud’s 
theorisation of the Oedipus complex. Freud’s first account of castration comes in 1908 in 
his ‘On the sexual theories of children’. 
The child, having been mainly dominated by excitations in the penis, will usually have 
obtained pleasure by stimulating it with his hand; he will have been detected in this by his 
parents or nurse and terrorized by the threat of having his penis cut off. The effect of this 
‘threat of castration’ is proportionate to the value set upon that organ and is quite 
extraordinarily deep and persistent. Legends and myths testify to the upheaval in the 
child's emotional life and to the horror which is linked with the castration complex1—a 
complex which is subsequently remembered by consciousness with corresponding 
reluctance. The woman's genitalia, when seen later on, are regarded as a mutilated organ 
and recall this threat […]. (Freud 1908, p.217) 
 Parental prohibitions against masturbation – ‘stop playing with that or I’ll cut it off’ – are 
recalled with horror when the male child encounters female genitals and registers the 
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lack of penis. Confronted with this lack, the child deduces that the mother must have had 
a penis that she lost, and his penis could similarly be taken away.  
For Lacan (2017, p.163–196), castration is used as a function of the symbolic order. It is 
not the physical penis that is on stake but rather the signifier of the phallus. In this 
account of castration, the mother is initially conceived by the child as a phallic mother, a 
mother that has everything. Soon the child realises that the mother does not possess the 
phallus but that the phallus is the object of her desire. The child will then try to take the 
role of the phallus. At this point, the father (or a third actor) will appear and will disrupt the 
mother-infant relationship, and in the child’s fantasy this person will be imagined to have 
the phallus. The child will have to then accept that it cannot be the phallus for its mother 
(as someone else has it) and therefore accepts its castration which comes as a 
resolution for the Lacanian version of the Oedipus complex. Castration puts a limit to the 
child’s enjoyment of the maternal body and that instigates the process of desire; the 
subject starts looking in the world of signifiers for what it has lost in order to enter that 
world.  
Let us, then, disambiguate the distinction between desire and the drive. Desire is always 
oriented towards a lack, a lack that as we saw, is the result of castration. Something is 
missing due to the process of subjectification and the subject yearns to find it. But the 
object of desire (what Lacan names objet a) is fundamentally un-reachable.  
We must keep in mind that jouissance is prohibited to whoever speaks, as such—or, put 
differently, it can only be said between the lines by whoever is a subject of the Law, since 
the Law is founded on that very prohibition (Lacan 2006, p.821) 
Every time the subject thinks it approaches the object, it transforms into something 
different, making the desiring process a never-ending struggle. The drive, unlike desire is 
not set in motion due to lack. The drive exists in the domain of the real where no lack or 
differentiation exists. While desire is entirely articulated within the symbolic order and the 
subject can experience and express it through signifiers, the drive (and the Lacanian 
jouissance) is not subjected to the same set of principles. Jouissance and the drive are 
concepts that are used to describe the relationship of the living body to what Lacan 
theorises as the real.  
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As we saw in the previous chapter, the Lacanian real is identified with events of affective 
excess (ecstatic moments, orgasmic pleasures, trauma) but the existence of the real is 
also inferred from instances of compulsive repetitions (for example the insistence of the 
neurotic symptom, our inability to move out of a habit). And repetition is indeed one of the 
characteristics of the drive which is often conceptualised as a circular movement around 
the object. As the Argentinian psychoanalyst Néstor Braunstein points out, desire is the 
result of law and prohibition whereas the drive is a force of positivity that knows no lack. 
The drive, unlike biological instincts, does not emanate from an ahistorical transcendental 
genetic origin. It is indeed contingent to the subjectification process without being an 
absolute effect of it. The drive represents a force, a constant force that does not follow 
cycles of satisfaction and relaxation but rather ‘underlines the impossibility of satisfaction 
in its undisrupted insistence’ (Braunstein). In that sense, while desire aims at a goal (and 
constantly re-constructs this potential encounter in fantasy), the drive is aimless. As 
Braunstein points out: ‘The drive does not aim at a visible, sensitive goal, but at the effect 
produced in its return, after having missed and gone around the target, after confronting 
the real, that is, the impossibility of full satisfaction.’ 
But how can we relate the seemingly unbound force of the drive to social phenomena 
emerging in a mediated linguistic reality? First, let us consider the role of the drive in the 
process of narcissism, which is at the core of our theorisation of selfhood. According to 
Bersani’s conception of the ego, narcissism and subsequently the ego are by-products of 
a self-shattering excitation facilitated by the drive. Bersani describes this process as ‘a 
pleasurably shattered consciousness (that) becomes aware of itself as the object of its 
desire’. Narcissism is the process of subjectivity becoming aware of itself due to the 
pleasure it gets out of trying to destroy itself. Narcissism, in the end, is a process that 
allows for intersubjectivity as it can neither fully destroy subjectivity, nor create a perfectly 
closed and self-sufficient ego. 
By building on the theories of narcissism, I will attempt a theorisation of the relation 
between narcissism and sexuality. As we saw in our genealogy of narcissism, in the 
Freudian corpus there is a significant yet controversial psychoanalytic account of 
homosexual desire as inherently narcissistic. In this section, we will attempt a queer re-
appropriation of this aspect of psychoanalytic theory by reframing the Freudian 
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explication of homosexual narcissism with the help of Leo Bersani’s close readings of the 
Freudian text. I will ground these theoretical perspectives on the male homosexual and 
the drive in a discussion of the gay dating app, Grindr5, one of the most popular 
smartphone applications for men who have sex with men (abbreviated as MSM).  
Grindr was launched on 25 March 2009 by ‘Nearby Buddy Finder’ company. The 
company was based in the United States, but the app quickly gained worldwide 
popularity through word of mouth and mentions in various media outlets. Grindr has more 
than 9 million active users in 200 countries across the globe. We consider this application 
an ideal starting point for our discussion as it allows for reflections on narcissism, 
sexuality and new media technologies.  
While reviewing journalistic writing on Grindr, one encounters both enthusiastic and 
critical accounts with regards to the application’s impact on the gay community. The 
usual criticism of app-based dating focuses on the cynicism of a medium that reduces the 
criteria for arranging a meeting to appearance and/or politically dubious categories such 
as race, age, HIV status, body type etc. In addition to that, recent critics highlight Grindr’s 
influence on the closing of LGBT venues in western urban centres. Since people do not 
need to meet in a bar in order to arrange having sex, those spaces where members of 
the community typically gather, become redundant.  
Other voices praise the safety and immediacy of dating apps and go as far as saying that 
Grindr has completely revolutionised the way people relate to each other, forming 
instantaneous communities based on desire and geographical proximity (Blackwell et al 
2015). In this analysis I want to go beyond the debate about whether Grindr is good or 
bad by examining its function, through the lens of psychoanalytic theories of the self. By 
examining Grindr, we can better understand the links between technology, ego and the 
drive.  
Our starting point in our theorisation comes from Leo Bersani’s discussion of cruising in 
his essay ‘Sociability and Cruising.’ By cruising, Bersani refers to the practice of MSM 
                                               
5	Since	the	launch	and	success	of	Grindr	a	series	of	similar	applications	were	launched	and	our	discussion	could	very	much	expand	to	include	them	(though	they	might	offer	platform	specific	elements	that	contradict	some	of	our	claims)	
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walking or driving looking for a sexual partner, usually for a casual, anonymous one-time 
encounter (dict). In order to better utilise Bersani’s argument we will have to trace the 
similarities and differences between old-school cruising and use of dating apps and see if 
Bersani’s theoretical conclusions apply to our analysis of Grindr.  
Bersani develops his main argument around the concept of ‘sameness’, as it appears in 
philosophical and sociological texts of his time. Sameness is defined in opposition to 
difference and according to Bersani, it is often considered ontologically lesser and a 
synonym to identity: the enemy of all change and progress. In this hierarchy, 
heterosexual love is implicitly represented as an eminent encounter with difference 
whereas homosexuals are bound to sameness and narcissism. Bersani attempts a 
deconstruction of this dichotomy, or rather a radical defence of ‘sameness’ as such.  
In order to achieve this, he introduces a theorisation of ‘sociability’, a term he borrows 
from sociologist Georg Simmel. Sociability is proposed as a form of social bonding that is 
not related to desire or pleasure. Bersani describes sociability as an almost ‘ascetic 
conduct’ that leads to what he poetically calls ‘the pleasure of rhythmed being’. Sociability 
seems to be taking place almost automatically; it involves the pleasure of co-existing, a 
peaceful movement within the social world. It seems to almost acquire a metaphysical (or 
hyper-physical) function, as - in order to describe it - Bersani uses metaphors such as the 
relation between the waves of the sea or the molecules of air. Bersani’s definition of 
sociability as ‘a form of relationality uncontaminated by desire’ is similar to Georg 
Simmel’s sociological analysis of the same concept. 
 According to Simmel, sociability is an essentially non-sexual phenomenon. It is not about 
being intimate and passionate but rather about sharing a feeling of general belonging. 
Bersani extends the conditions of Simmel’s sociability from a social bond that is not 
affectively sexual to a process of bonding that transcends identity as such. Sociability 
does not require, Bersani says, a unity under a single identification, nor a collective 
compliance with an ego ideal. Bersani’s argument aspires to draw an ontological 
parallelism between homosexuality and sociability where sameness does not bear the 
stain of stagnation, but on the contrary becomes a manifestation of pleasure in co-
existence. In order to develop his account, Bersani re-examines certain Freudian texts, 
which discuss homosexuality.  
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 Freud, as Bersani informs us, is the first to connect sociability and homosexuality in his 
‘Group Psychology and the Ego’. In this work, Freud identifies at the core of all social ties 
the suppression of homosexual desire. He suggests that it is inhibited homosexual libido 
that is sublimated into social bonds allowing the creation of functional societies. But then, 
in what appears as a contradiction, Freud suggests that even fulfilled (and not 
suppressed) homosexual tendencies are closely related to sociability as well. 
It seems certain that homosexual love is far more compatible with group ties, even when it 
takes the shape of uninhibited sexual tendencies – a remarkable fact, the explanation of 
which might carry us far. (Freud 1921) 
Had he not offered this little paradox, the implication of the text would be very different: 
beneficial social bonds would be conceivable only thanks to the suppression of 
homosexual tendencies, hence homosexual tendencies would have to be suppressed in 
order for normal social bonds to prevail. By including unrepressed homosexuality in his 
theorisation of social bonding, Freud seems to make a more structural, almost ontological 
observation in relation to homosexuality.6 
Bersani further elucidates what he finds an ostensibly ontological claim about 
homosexuality by closely examining another Freudian text, ‘Leonardo da Vinci and a 
Memory of his Childhood’. In this work, Freud attempts a psychoanalytic reading of 
Leonardo da Vinci based on biographical information from his life and specific motifs that 
can be observed in his prominent artworks. One of the main themes of the book is 
Freud’s analysis of da Vinci’s speculated homosexuality. In order to understand the 
Freudian conception of (male) homosexuality we have to briefly engage with one of the 
most contested yet influential Freudian ideas: the Oedipus complex. 
Although Freud first uses the term ‘Oedipus complex’ in his 1910 article, ‘A special type 
of choice of object made by men’, his formulation of the oedipal drama appears earlier, in 
The Interpretation of Dreams, where her conjectures that ‘It is the fate of all of us, 
perhaps, to direct our first sexual impulse towards our mother and our first hatred and our 
first murderous wish against our father’. As the theory is developed over the years, the 
                                               
6 It is noteworthy that Judith Butler reads Freud’s connection between suppressed homosexuality 
and sociability as the foundation of all homophobia: society can only exist while mourning the lost 
homosexual drives. 
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Oedipus complex became a concept that encompassed all unconscious loving and 
hostile experiences that the subject experiences in relation to their parent. In the 
traditional Oedipal schema, the child desires one of the parents and as a result becomes 
antagonistic towards the other parent. The Oedipus complex emerges between the third 
and fifth year and ends when the child renounces their sexual desire for their parent of 
the opposite sex and identifies with the gendered position of the other parent.  
In its simplified form the case of a male child may be described as follows. At a very early 
age the little boy develops an object-cathexis for his mother, which originally related to the 
mother's breast and is the prototype of an object-choice on the anaclitic model;3 the boy 
deals with his father by identifying himself with him. For a time, these two relationships 
proceed side by side, until the boy's sexual wishes in regard to his mother become more 
intense and his father is perceived as an obstacle to them; from this the Oedipus complex 
originates. His identification with his father then takes on a hostile colouring and changes 
into a wish to get rid of his father in order to take his place with his mother. Henceforward 
his relation to his father is ambivalent; it seems as if the ambivalence inherent in the 
identification from the beginning had become manifest. An ambivalent attitude to his 
father and an object-relation of a solely affectionate kind to his mother make up the 
content of the simple positive Oedipus complex in a boy. Along with the demolition of the 
Oedipus complex, the boy's object-cathexis of his mother must be given up. Its place may 
be filled by one of two things: either an identification with his mother or an intensification 
of his identification with his father. (Freud 2001, p.31-32) 
For Freud this theatrical ritual shapes the core neurosis of all people and every 
disturbance at that stage could potentially affect the adult life of the subject.7 
Lacan does not adopt the Oedipus complex as a term and - instead - names the 
phenomena Freud would refer to as Oedipal as ‘family complexes’ (Evans 2007). Lacan 
puts a strong emphasis on the socio-cultural contingency of family structures as Levi-
Strauss and his contemporary structuralist anthropologists who theorised kinship and 
familial relations as effects of social rules, thinkers that heavily influence his work. For 
                                               
7 Freud at the beginning of his theorisation of Oedipus claimed that the two sexes experience symmetrical 
versions of the Oedipus complex. Soon, he realised that this cannot be the case as both boys and girls 
initially desire the maternal body. That means that girls do not start their libidinal lives desiring their father 
and antagonising their mother but this comes as a secondary process.	
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Lacan, the only universal structure that is necessary for the creation of societies is the 
triangular schema that emerges when a third actor (in patriarchal context, the father) 
disrupts the dual relationship between the infant and the mother (the primary caretaker). 
The Oedipus complex means that the imaginary, in itself an incestuous and conflictual 
relation, is doomed to conflict and ruin. In order for the human being to be able to 
establish the most natural of relations, that between male and female, a third party has to 
intervene, one that is the image of something successful, the model of some harmony. 
This does not go far enough – there has to be a law, a chain, a symbolic order, the 
intervention of the order of speech, that is, of the father. Not the natural father, but what is 
called the father. The order that prevents the collision and explosion of the situation as 
whole is found on the existence of this name of the father. (Lacan 1993, p.96, my italics) 
As we saw earlier, the child has to lose something in order to acquire a place in the 
symbolic world. The child has to give up on the pleasure of co-existence with the 
maternal body in order to acquire a name and subsequently in order to gain access to 
language. The father inserts the prohibition: the infant cannot enjoy the eternal joy of its 
co-existence with the maternal body. The prohibition of incest in Lacan comes from the 
name-of-the-father. In French the expression works as a pun, le nom du père (the name 
of the father) sounding similarly to le ‘non’ du père (the ‘no’ of the father) emphasising the 
importance of prohibition (Evans 2007). 
For Lacan, the Oedipus complex becomes a metaphor; the ‘paternal metaphor’. In the 
paternal metaphor the ‘name-of-the-father’ substitutes the signified of the ‘desire of the 
mother’.  
A metaphor, as I have already explained to you, is a signifier that comes to take the place 
of another signifier. I am saying that this is the father in the Oedipus complex, even if that 
must be astonishing to the ears of some people. I am saying exactly this – the father is a 
signifier substituted for another signifier. That is the mainspring […] of the father’s 
intervention in the Oedipus complex. 
The father’s function in the Oedipus complex is to be a signifier substituted for the first 
signifier introduced into symbolization, the maternal signifier. […] [T]he father comes to 
the place of the mother, S in the place S’, S’ being the mother insofar as she is already 
linked to something that was x, which is the signified in relationship to the mother.  
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[…]  The question is – what is the signified? What does she want?  
(Lacan 2017, p.158–159) 
In other words, the subject can enter the symbolic, once it assumes that the answer to 
the question of its mother’s desire lies outside of their dyadic relation: ‘S enters into 
possession of the object of the mother’s desire by way of the metaphor, which henceforth 
presents itself in the form of the phallus’ (Ibid., p.159). This triangulation is according to 
Lacan the foundation of all meaning-making processes. When the paternal metaphor is 
foreclosed (not represented in the symbolic), then the subject is psychotic. The child who 
has not given up on the maternal body and did not internalise the name-of-the-father is 
prone to experience hallucinations and other disturbances of jouissance, as the real is 
not properly separated from the symbolic. We will return to the problematic of the 
paternal metaphor later when we examine post-Oedipal theories of subjectification, but 
for now, let us further discuss Bersani’s take on the original Freudian conception of the 
Oedipus complex.  
While Freud’s starting point is the bourgeois heterosexual family, Bersani nevertheless 
sees in his close reading of Leonardo a potential for queer political disruption within that 
context. For Bersani, the failure of the Oedipal complex in the case of Leonardo da Vinci, 
as described in the Freudian text, could be claimed as a big success from a queer 
standpoint. Following a critical tendency that recognises the descriptive potency of the 
Oedipus complex but does not accept it as a universal and ontologically necessary 
precondition for all life on earth, Bersani identifies the homosexual case study in 
‘Leonardo’ as politically useful. But let us first examine the Freudian text: 
The child’s love for his mother cannot continue to develop consciously any further; it 
succumbs to repression. The boy represses his love for his mother: he puts himself in her 
place, identifies himself with her, and takes his own person as a model in whose likeness 
he chooses the new objects of his love. In this way he has become a homosexual. What 
he has in fact done is to slip back to auto-eroticism: for the boys whom he now loves as 
he grows up are after all only substitutive figures and revivals of himself in childhood—
boys whom he loves in the way in which his mother loved him when he was a child. He 
finds the objects of his love along the path of narcissism, as we say; for Narcissus, 
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according to the Greek legend, was a youth who preferred his own reflection to 
everything else and who was changed into the lovely flower of that name (Freud 1910).  
In the ‘normal’, heterosexual scenario the boy would initially recognise the maternal body 
as a desired object and after the paternal prohibition, the boy would then identify with the 
male position and learn to desire women ‘like his mother’ but not the mother herself. 
Bersani argues that this battle with the father, this patriarchal game of submission, might 
grant the status of ‘normality’ in the social order but nevertheless bequeaths to the 
subject the wounds of a war. In this Oedipal war, if the boy wins against the father, he is 
in danger of becoming psychotic, merging with the maternal body and foreclosing the 
name of the father. If the boy loses, he is a granted a neurotic position in the 
heterosexual universe but with the eternal burden of this loss staining his future sexual 
relations.  
In Bersani’s schema, the male heterosexual defeat in the Oedipal battle is at the core of 
all future gender antagonisms and specifically at the core of misogyny. By accepting the 
absolute prohibition of the maternal body, heterosexual man constructs femininity as a 
radical Otherness, inaccessible and prohibited. This construction of femininity as radically 
‘outside’ will define all future relations between the two sexes. For Bersani, the 
homosexual short-circuiting of this process as described in Leonardo allows for a 
bloodless exit from the battle with the father. In the queer solution of the Oedipal drama 
the subject does not partake in the battle. It avoids the battle by occupying a ‘perverse’ 
alternative position. Leonardo, according to Freud, identifies with his mother’s desire for 
him and as a result he looks for himself into the world. This homosexual position, 
according to Bersani, allows for relationships based on sameness but not identity. The 
distinction between sameness and identity is crucial at this point. The male homosexual 
is not looking for others like him, others who resemble him, but he looks exactly for 
himself into the world, making the world a synecdoche of himself. 
The psychoanalytic homosexual is indeed a stranger to the murderous Oedipal 
antagonism. Bersani describes this subject as someone who ‘wanders in the world – 
cruises the world, we might almost say – in search of objects that will give him back to 
himself as a loved and cared for subject’. This is a twisted version of the narcissist-
homosexual: Bersani’s narcissist is at-home in the world, he is ‘longing for sameness that 
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allows a loving relation to what is different’. In a world of Oedipalised relations, Bersani 
seeks a narcissist alternative that re-territorialises desire within the domain of sameness. 
Unlike the ego ideal that renders the world into a radical alterity, always unattainable and 
always hostile, Bersani’s homosexual narcissist is looking for himself in humanity.  
This selfhood is constitutively displaced and dispersed. Cruising becomes the perfect 
example of a new modality of co-existence. In cruising, the homosexual subject is 
entering a spatialised field of desire; the bodies it encounters become fragments; 
different body parts are connected by nothing else than lust. This is precisely the body of 
the drive: a body not bound to the dictates of the signifier but rather following the 
pulsating streams of the self-shattering drives. Bersani insists that we should not conflate 
the analytic homosexual with contemporary gay and lesbian identified subjects. Gayness 
is in this instance something we need to learn, a new moral practice that goes beyond 
modes of identification. In this context homosexuals need to learn how to be gay too, as 
Michel Foucault has famously proclaimed.  
Replaceable lovers and irreplaceable body parts 
Bersani’s argument opens up the possibility for new understandings of relationality. In 
this section we will further investigate Bersani’s theory of sociability in relation to new 
media technologies and particularly in relation to Grindr. As we saw in the previous 
section, in Bersani’s sociability, individuals find pleasure in not being themselves, or 
rather by exploring the limits of their selfhood within the social sphere. Can we expand 
this theorisation to new media realities that – like cruising practices – rely on a sense of 
anonymity and ceaseless connectivity?  
Tom Roach discusses what he calls ‘fungibility of lovers’ in an attempt to expand the idea 
of sociability as developed by Bersani, to the world of dating apps. According to Roach, 
the experience of being fungible, appearing as one of many interchangeable pictures on 
the Grindr screen, part of a digital mosaic of similars, resembles the experience of being 
lost in a cruising space. Tom Roach, unlike Bersani, directs his analysis towards the 
political critique of neoliberalism. For Roach, the fungibility of the desirable bodies is 
reminiscent of the fungibility of the workers: everyone is replaceable in the capitalist 
machine. In Grindr’s operation, Roach identifies several core values of free market 
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economy: the element of relentless competition, dehumanising superficiality, quick and 
easy consumption. 
Nevertheless, Roach does not restrict his analysis of Grindr to a critique of neoliberal 
subjectivity. Nor does he claim that in Grindr we witness yet another recuperation of a 
homosexual transgressive behaviour (cruising) into a marketable neoliberal practice 
(dating applications). Roach rejects this ostensibly technophobic position and entertains 
the possibility that Grindr could still have a radical potential. Roach develops Bersani's 
concept of sociability, identifying what he terms a "shared estrangement" in the 
experience of Grindr users. It is precisely in this shared estrangement that the potential of 
Grindr to sabotage the neoliberal paradigm is located. Both Roach and Bersani deal with 
the theoretical problem of a relationship reduced to identity. As we saw earlier, Bersani 
warns the reader that once a friendship, group formation, or generally any relationship is 
reduced to the product of identification, then it produces an immediate effect of hostility 
towards anyone different, the outsider, to that which lies outside this identification. As we 
saw in our analysis of Oedipus, identity is shaped by what is constructed as a radical 
Otherness and as a result every in-group identification is functional only in relation to an 
external, negatively signified difference. Tom Roach’s ‘shared estrangement’ allows us to 
think relations outside the tight constraints of identification.  
But how can we experience shared estrangement, and how is Grindr a paradigmatic 
example of that? Unlike more traditional spaces of co-existence, Grindr allows for a 
simultaneous co-existence that is not guided by a necessary sense of ‘assimilation of 
difference into identity’. Roach historicises this form of relationality by identifying certain 
moments and modalities within queer histories where forms of shared estrangement 
defined the structures that allowed for queer communities to exist as such. In a sense, 
Roach insists on the formation of communities that are queer in their structure and 
operation rather than communities that consist of queers.  
The (in)communicative and anti-intersubjective relational innovations of the queer 
community— from the micro (Foucault’s impersonal friendship with novelist Hervé 
Guibert) to the macro (the sexual practice of anonymous cruising)— reveal the value of 
this relational model for political movements, specifically those related to Aids caregiving 
and activism. Friendships of shared estrangement cultivated in queer relational practices, 
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I claim, form the bedrock of activist organisations such as act up, whose powerful 
interventions and tactics continue to resonate.  
Roach uses as his examples communities of care that were not reduced to kinship and/or 
reciprocation and instances were sexuality was not bound to romantic affinity and/or 
monogamous coupledom. In the quoted examples the alienation that seems to 
characterise queer lives was essential in avoiding assimilationist identifications. Queer 
life in that sense can be anti-social without being autistic and, to return to our main 
argument, queer life can be narcissistic without being separated from the world. Both 
Bersani and Roach use in their analysis long-established homophobic tropes and re-
appropriate them in order to advance a theory of co-existence that goes beyond the need 
to exterminate/subordinate the other/different.  
In order to understand the difference between older forms of queer sociability – such as 
cruising – and more contemporary forms of sociability mediated by applications such as 
Grindr, we have to take account of some of the major changes technology brought in 
communication. In the case of Grindr we shall start our investigation with a 
phenomenological reading of the smartphone as a device. In terms of functionality, the 
components of the smartphone that we identify as crucial for our analysis are: the 
touchscreen, the mobile phone camera, the Internet connection and the GPS locative 
technology. But most importantly, as we saw in our previous chapter, we cannot ignore 
the importance of the device itself and the experience of it ‘being there’ in our everyday 
lives. 
The touchscreen is a combination of an input and output device normally layered on the 
top of an electronic visual display of an information processing system (Walker 2012). 
The touchscreen acquired prominence after the commercial success of the first iPhone 
and became the favoured input modality for all generations of smartphones that followed. 
The touchscreen is an interface that has dominated media technologies of the past ten 
years and has become synonymous with mobile media. The specificity of the touch 
screen is found in its double function as optic output and haptic input. The screen shows 
an image; the fingers touch the image, interact with the image, change the image. The 
point of contact is a point of merging between the physical sensorial body and the virtual 
screen-image. The other phenomenological shift that came with the widespread use of 
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smartphones was the incorporation of a portable and easily accessible camera. We are 
particularly interested here in the immediacy of the connection between the camera and 
the screen; the camera captures a moment and the screen displays it instantly. This kind 
of instantaneity had existed before in digital cameras, and in a certain sense in the 
Polaroid camera, but it enters a new era with the almost universal adoption of 
smartphones among a large part of the population. The camera becomes omnipresent 
and the phone literally acquires the function of the mirror.  
In this context, the selfie becomes a central modality of imaginary identifications. Selfies, 
like the mirror, do not construct a rigid self-image that offers a complete apprehension of 
the self. The selfie, insofar as it is shared on social media, implicates the Other not only 
as that which mediates this experience only as a metaphoric entity representing the 
internalisation of the social order within the subject’s psyche, but also in the thousands of 
‘small others’ who have access to the subject’s social media feed. Every picture is seen, 
scrutinised and ‘liked’ by other active users, a swarm of others that in their unknowability 
can be taken as an Other.  
Another kind of body emerges in the images shared on Grindr, glimpsed through 
sexualised close-ups, headless body-shots (for anonymity) and quite prominently, 
through genitalia pictures, the infamous ‘dick-pic’. Unlike selfies, the dick-pic does not 
attempt a reframing of the imaginary body as a whole. In contrast to any attempt for re-
creating selfhood as a complete gestalt, the dick-pic is a manifestation of the body in 
parts.  
Copjec, in her analysis of Cindy Sherman’s untitled stills offers a compelling theorisation 
of close-ups in film. Following Deleuze’s argument, she claims that a close-up is not just 
a closer look at a detail of a scene; it does not isolate a detail of the scene in order to 
magnify it, but rather ‘discloses the whole scene itself’.  In Copjec’s words: 
What, then, is (close-up’s) function? It establishes the reality effect itself; without it, all the 
other details together would compose not a realistic scene, but a hallucinatory one. […] 
(t)he close-up in film represent objects that though included in the scenes, do not properly 
belong to them; they are not subsumable as elements of the set of details composing the 
scene. The partial object of the drive, I will argue, exemplifies this same logic; it does not 
form part of the organism, but implies an absolute change. (Copjec, 2004) 
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For Copjec, the close-up relates to the idea of ‘partial objects’. Partial objects were 
initially mentioned by Freud in his analysis of partial drives but were extensively 
developed and re-theorised by Melanie Klein. According to Klein, the underdeveloped 
perceptive mechanisms of the infant represent the world as a series of objects. The 
primary example and most central in the infant’s perceptive world is the mother’s breast, 
which appears as ‘good’ when it meets the needs of the child (feeding) and as ‘bad’ when 
it disappears (when the mother is not present). For the child all objects are separate and 
independent and do not form a complete entity until much later in the psychological 
development of the infant: only later is the breast experienced as being part of a whole 
mother, for example. For Lacan, all drives are partial and as a result all objects can be 
nothing more than partial too. In this context the body of the drive we talked about earlier 
re-emerges in pieces.  
The screen and the camera split the body into bits and desirable parts. The screen 
functions as a barrier between the subject and the beloved others and at the same time it 
sets in motion the compartmentalisation of bodies and the virtual exchange of body parts. 
For Roach ‘the screen stands as an ever-present reminder of the impossibility of 
intersubjective fusion, and yet feelings of deep interdependence brim over.’ In Roach’s 
analysis, the screen signifies not only a point of convergence between the physical body 
and the virtual body parts but moreover, the screen signifies a generative obstacle. The 
ego that ogles the kaleidoscope of portraits and body parts while cruising online, can be 
nothing more than dissolved, dispersed, yet persistent. Adrift in a sea of resemblance 
and difference, lost in a spectacle of similar – yet not identifiable – others, the self 
recognises itself as one of hundreds, thousands, seeking connection (Roach, 2015b).  
In the previous chapter we discussed the possibility of radical narcissism as a response 
to patriarchal constructions of femininity. The notion of radical narcissism was helpful not 
only as a political gesture – re-appropriating the objectified body as a position of 
resistance – but moreover epistemologically, as it introduces a new possibility of 
theorising the self vis-à-vis the Other. Radical narcissism is exactly radical as it 
acknowledges and showcases the inter-subjective dimension, inherent in the narcissistic 
position. In Grindr, radical narcissism meets the force of the drive with an even more 
dissociative and disorganising result. The circulated body parts re-synthesise hybrid body 
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images, glued by lust and longing. The homosexual narcissist, as we saw in Leonardo, is 
looking for his body parts in the world and Grindr offers a corporeal cartography of an 
impossible coherence.  
It becomes clear that instead of communicating a complete image of the ego, in Grindr 
the ego is no more than a passionate inference – to borrow Bersani’s expression. This 
process, Roach tells us, can be liberating as it is dehumanising. The ego – in a similar 
way to the open-ended ego we theorised in the previous chapter – appears only as an 
inference from its outward reaching orientation rather than due to its coherent individual 
structure. The ego is neither legible – as presented in the Panopticon theories – nor self-
evident as argued in ego-psychology; its existence needs a constant re-affirmation and 
this re-affirmation comes from its reaching towards the beloved objects; a movement that 
threatens its very existence. The ego in Grindr, unlike how it is presented in other social 
media, is not interested in constructing a well-rounded description of itself. 
On the contrary, the Grindr ego is only an amoebian shell that wants to reach out to other 
partial objects, re-constructing its basic outline and finding its essentially temporary place 
within a constellation of fragmented others. This phantasmatic re-construction of the body 
happens in what we introduced earlier as the Lacanian register of the imaginary. The 
imaginary, as the domain of images is the register where most new media realities of our 
times primarily take place. The sensorial perception of the imaginary appears real and 
objective, but it is very often susceptible to cognitive biases due to existing pre-conceived 
notions that shape it (Fink, 1997). In Lacan’s early theorisations, imaginary relations were 
considered illusory and the aim of analysis was to unveil the causality of psychic 
phenomena in the signifiers of the symbolic order.  
 We have already seen that the mirror function introduces the image of oneself as a 
foreign object into psychic reality. That leads to an ambivalent relationship to our own 
image (as constitutively foreign) and all other relationships are modelled accordingly. Our 
analysis of the mirror is informed by the early Lacanian theorisation of the imaginary as 
superficial and often deceiving, contrary to the more authentic underlying structures of 
the symbolic. Later in his teaching Lacan re-examined his understanding of the imaginary 
due to its potential affinity with the real. This led to a transformation of the Lacanian clinic 
that moves away from a strict focus on the signifier; this will also allow us to develop our 
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explorative argument with regards to technology and its relation to the psyche. In order to 
grasp the later Lacanian thought we will now engage with the concept of the sinthome 
that is ostensibly the last major conceptual development in Lacan’s work.  
The sinthome: post-Oedipal technologies of enjoyment 
In order to better understand the relation between subjectivity and technology we will 
follow the analytic framework offered in Jacques Lacan’s twenty-third seminar titled The 
Sinthome.8 In seminar twenty-three Lacan revisited some of his earlier theorisations 
around subjectivity and modified some of his key concepts. We talked earlier about the 
importance of the paternal metaphor in the process of subjectification. In the sinthome 
Lacan attempts a theorisation of a different way to relating to the symbolic order that 
does not involve castration. In his later seminars he employs several mathematical 
concepts, mainly extracted from the domain of topology.  
Lacan is really enthusiastic about paradoxical structures and non-Euclidean geometries 
that work as appropriate models for describing psychic phenomena. In seminar twenty-
three, he assembles a unique combination of literary analysis, mathematics and 
psychoanalytic observations. The main topological concept Lacan uses in this seminar is 
the borromean knot. The borromean knot appears for the first time in his previous 
seminar in order to describe the relation between the three registers of psychic reality. 
According to Lacan the borromean knot showcases perfectly the relation between the 
symbolic, imaginary and real. The main condition of a borromean knot is that if any of the 
links it consists of breaks, all the other links are not connected any more. 
 
                                               
8  Lacan’s seminar twenty-three was published in English for the first time as I was writing this chapter, 
but nevertheless unofficial translations were already in circulation.  
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This condition of the knot is central in Lacan’s theorisation of the three orders. The three 
registers are equally important as the absence of each and every one of them threatens 
the whole structure: ‘The knot which may be termed borromean cannot be cut without 
dissolving the myth it offers of the subject, as non-supposé’ (Lacan 1975, seminar of 18 
November). Lacan uses the schema to also describe the overlapping areas the different 
registers share.  
The three circles of the borromean knot are all three, as circles, equivalent — I mean that 
they are constituted by something which is reproduced across the three. I situate the 
support of consistence in the imaginary. Likewise, I make the essential constituent of the 
symbolic the hole. And I make the real the support of what I term ex-sistence, in this 
sense: in its sistence outside of the imaginary and the symbolic, it knocks up against 
them, its play is something precisely in the order of limitation; the two others, from the 
moment when it is tied into a borromean knot with them, offer it resistance. In other words, 
the real only has ex-sistence ... in its encounter with the limits of the symbolic and the 
imaginary. […] But what is the result of this? — If not that these terms should be 
conceived as linked to each other. If they are so analogous, to use this term, could one 
not suppose that this is due to a certain continuity? And thus we are led directly to tie the 
triple knot. Starting from the inter-balancing, inter-leaving of the three, it is not a great step 
to link up the points and make their arrangement one of continuity. 
  
  133 
The area where the symbolic meets the real is where Lacan locates the symptom. The 
symptom in psychoanalysis is very different to the medical symptom. The symptom does 
not ‘warn’ us of an underlying pathology. In Lacan’s earlier theory, the symptom is 
considered as ‘anything that is analysable’, something that ‘appears behind a mask’ and 
therefore requires deciphering, or interpretation (Lacan 2017, p.305). Psychoanalysis 
unlike most of psychotherapeutic approaches does not aim to the cure of a symptom, as 
in psychoanalytic theory the subsidence of a symptom often gives birth to another 
symptom. Sinthome is essentially a different spelling for symptom, one adopted by Lacan 
in his later work.  
Before we continue with the sinthome, let us briefly return to the borromean cartography: 
the territory where the real and imaginary intersect is where Lacan locates anxiety. 
Anxiety is produced when the real’s unsymbolisable force comes into our perception. The 
imaginary and symbolic meet in the territory of inhibition. Inhibition is according to Lacan 
‘a symptom tucked away in a museum’ (Lacan 2014, p.10). After a symptom has been 
transformed into something else, inhibition comes as a ghost of its past potency. In the 
centre, where all links intersect, and the three registers overlap is where Lacan places 
the object a. The object a is (among other things) what Lacan poses as the object of 
desire. Lacan claims that, according to Freud what binds the three orders is the name-of-
the-Father. In the course of seminar twenty-three he moves away from the Freudian 
conclusion as the sole theorisation of subjectivity.  
Earlier in the chapter we engaged briefly with Oedipus and his everlasting drama. We 
had also the opportunity to engage with the Lacanian conception of the paternal 
metaphor. Sinthome is potentially Lacan’s response to his contemporaries who disputed 
the universality of castration as the only way for a subject to exist. Seminar twenty-three 
takes place a few years after the publication of ‘Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia’, an influential book, co-authored by Felix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze 
(1972). Anti-Oedipus presented a fierce critique against what Deleuze and Guattari 
defined as Oedipalised conceptions of desire. For Anti-Oedipus psychoanalysis in its 
attempt to describe reality ascribes it with certain characteristics. In a sense, according to 
Deleuze and Guattari (similarly to the Foucauldian critique of Freud), psychoanalysis 
claims to be describing when in reality it is brutally re-affirming normative ideals and 
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rituals. Deleuze and Guattari did not only attack Freud but also expanded their critique to 
include the Lacanian departure from the Freudian Oedipus. 
It is the idea of castration as briefly presented earlier that according to Anti-Oedipus re-
affirms a certain perception around desire and the symbolic order. Desire in the Lacanian 
ontology is a response to lack and lack is introduced to the subject through castration. In 
this formula, desire can only exist within the domain of the Other and this implies that all 
desiring subjects are subjected to an existing law (either by affirming or by reacting 
against it). According to Anti-Oedipus the Lacanian desire can never be defiant or lead 
the subject towards an exit from the existing symbolic order. The Lacanian ontology 
according to anti-Oedipus is not only politically reactionary, but also epistemologically 
incapable of conceptualising social change.  
If the law is essential in order for the subject to be, how can we even envision a radical 
horizon outside or against the law? For Deleuze and Guattari the answer comes through 
a negation of the Lacanian argument. It is not the trauma of castration that makes being 
possible but on the contrary, they claim, it is desire as a positive force that needs no lack 
in order to exist, that allows for existence. That is a brief and schematic presentation of 
the Anti-Oedipus argument in order to understand seminar twenty-three’s political and 
cultural context. Lacan in sinthome, responds not only to Deleuze and Guattari’s critique 
but also to a change of attitude – on a social level – towards the paternal function / 
paternal metaphor. If the father is a natural metaphor for the law when Freud produced 
his work, this was not the case when Lacan presented his seminar in the seventies, and 
is certainly not the case nowadays.  
In seminar twenty-three Lacan presents James Joyce as a case study that exemplifies a 
different relation to castration and potentially a new theorisation of subjectivity. In an 
unusual methodological gesture Lacan combines a structural analysis of Joyce’s writing 
and connects it to certain biographical elements from Joyce’s life in order to expand his 
theory of subjectification. In the sinthome, Lacan moves away from the linguistic-
structuralist focus on the signifier of his early teaching or rather re-examines the signifier 
as a more complex entity. At a first glance, the focus on Joyce seems unexpected. 
Lacan’s use of poetry comes from his belief that literature is ‘the aesthetic domain that is 
closest to the analytic experience’ (Harari 2002). 
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Lacan follows a methodology similar to Freud who also discussed artworks in his 
theorisations. Both Freud and Lacan though, do not just apply psychoanalysis on an 
artwork, in order to explain it, or in order to explain the artist’s motives, but they rather 
use the artwork to advance psychoanalytic theory. Lacan was deeply fascinated by 
Joyce’s complex poetic writing. Joyce with a name that reminds us of jouissance (like 
Freud’s name in German that is also reminiscent of Joy) through his writing stretched the 
limits of poetic language and offered new ways in how we understand discourse. Lacan 
is also interested in Joyce’s biography: An alcoholic, absent father; a domineering mother 
and the fact that later on in his life Joyce’s daughter was diagnosed with schizophrenia. 
According to Lacan this family history exemplifies a case of a non-working paternal 
metaphor (MacCannell 2008).  
Apart from the familial problems, what also captures Lacan’s attention is Joyce’s relation 
to language. As an Irish writer Joyce carries the ambivalence and discontent of writing in 
English as in Ireland this is the language of the colonisers. His language is literally the 
language of the Other as the Irish subject becomes linguistically displaced within their 
own land. Joyce’s home country’s language, Irish, is a place he cannot really go back to 
and besides that he very often in his writing stands ambivalent if not outward critical 
towards Irish nationalism and towards the fantasy of going back to a pre-colonised 
Ireland. Joyce’s identity is constructed in this limbo between a past that only exist as 
retroactive re-construction and a future of eternal displacement.  
Joyce deals with this contradictory place in the world by developing his own personal 
language. He uses the language of the colonisers as a starting point for his poetic work 
but at the same time he deconstructs it by inserting Gaelic, French and gibberish; he 
dismantles English from the inside. Joyce’s English become an individual endeavour but 
at the same time he retains it open to interpretation and communication; it is not a 
completely hermetical language, not a psychotic delirium but rather a poetic code. 
Philippe Sollers describes Joyce’s approach to language with the term ‘Velangues’ 
(Harari 2002). This is a pun on ‘les langues’ (languages) with the term elongation. The 
discourse of Joyce, is being stretched-out between languages, stretched-out between 
meaning and non-sense.  
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 Sinthome is the word Lacan chooses to describe Joyce’s relationship to the symbolic. 
Unlike the common neurotic symptom that emerges as a result of castration and 
prohibition of the law; sinthome is the subject’s self-made construction, a psychic gadget 
that allows a subject that has foreclosed the paternal metaphor and hence according to 
Lacanian ontology should be psychotic, to acquire a relationship to the Other. According 
to Lacanian psychoanalyst Roberto Harari, at the core of seminar twenty-three is the 
concept of ‘suppletion’ or ‘making up for.’ ‘Joyce strives to make up or find suppletion for 
what he lacks; his art serves as the guarantee of his Phallus (Harari 2002).’ 
Sinthome is an old spelling of symptom in French. Lacan draws this inspiration by 
Joyce’s sarcastic mention of Hellenization of language in Ulysses. Greek enters French 
discourse as a foreign agent; the language becomes a contested space of origins and 
cultural references. The sinthome, due to its innovative and hybridic nature, is very often 
theorised in relation to new technologies of the late capitalist era. The name of the father, 
the traditional expressions of paternal law fade and new gadgets, new articulations of the 
borromean knot come into being. This is why I consider the sinthome a useful tool in our 
understanding of new media technologies. I argue that the paternal metaphor becomes 
increasingly more obsolete as a foundational myth for subjectivity and we look for new 
gadgets, and individualised structures in our struggle for nuanced understanding of 
contemporary psychic realities. 
In this context Joyce offers an archetypical hero, where a glitch within a traditional familial 
structure offers a new theoretical horizon. In a similar way we suggest that certain 
aspects of contemporary media offer unintentional glitches in the ways we articulate our 
desires and to a certain extend our self-image. There is a quote from ‘A Portrait of the 
Artist as a Young Man’ that Lacan re-visits throughout seminar twenty-three: ‘I go to 
encounter for the millionth time the reality of experience and to forge in the smithy of my 
soul the uncreated conscience of my race.’ The quote exemplifies what Lacan finds most 
fascinating in Joyce: a copious forging of new psychic devices. According to Harari, race 
here stands for linage and not biological race. It is the broken patrimonial line that Joyce 
is trying to re-configure while being in a constant state of exile from his ‘paternal’ land.  
But what makes Joyce’s language so innovative in its form? Joycean scholar D. Hayman 
in his analysis of Finnegans Wake – the last and indisputably most difficult work by Joyce 
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– offers a starting point for this discussion. The discourse of Finnegans Wake is 
according to Hayman made of ‘knots of allusion or meaning, clusters or strips which 
make up topographies and serve as ways of structuring the text rather than as integral 
parts of its argument’ (Hayman). The innovation of seminar twenty-three is this new 
relation to the signifier elucidated here. The signifier is not only part of the signifying 
chain of meaning, but rather organised around strips of phonetic topographies. The text 
expands beyond signification and creates new textual realities that defy the rigid rules of 
the symbolic order.  
For Lacan, the sinthome is the addition of an extra link to the borromean knot. 
Mathematically speaking, one cannot just add an extra link to en existing knot. In order 
for a borromean knot to have four linking parts, one has to do it from the beginning. And 
that is what the sinthome is about: un-linking the orders of reality and re-configuring their 
connections from scratch.  
What is the result if what is of the order of the subject, inasmuch as the subject is always 
merely supposé, finds in the end its support in this knot? Is the triple knot tied into a 
borromean knot enough? (Lacan 1975, seminar of 18 November 1975) 
Lacan’s answer here is that there is always a fourth knot ‘propped’ upon these three 
knots — it is this that Lacan terms the sinthome.  
‘I have allowed myself to define as sinthome not what allows the knot, the knot of three, to 
still make a knot of three but what it preserves in such a position that it seems to be a knot 
of three.’ (Ibid., my italics). Following the last statement, we understand that the sinthome 
in this case is not just something that Joyce utilises in order to cover the lack of paternal 
metaphor in his psychic life, and in extension it is not just an exceptional phenomenon 
that rarely takes place in cases of psychotic geniuses. On the contrary, this transition from 
the triple knot to the quadruple one, introduces a singular innovation in the way we 
approach psychoanalytic ontology. For Joyce, Lacan argues, it was ‘by wanting a name 
for himself that Joyce compensated for the paternal lack’, the lack of the paternal 
metaphor that would, in neurosis, function to bind together the three registers. In Joyce’s 
case, writing provided a means for achieving this: ‘it is clear that the art of Joyce is 
something so particular, that the term sinthome is indeed what is’ (Lacan 1975, seminar of 
  138 
18 November 1975). In this sense, then, Joyce made a name for himself, created a 
singular name, rather than the name of his father.  
The taking of the father’s name is necessarily referred to the past, to a logically prior 
moment in the subject’s history. Joyce’s making of a name has no such reference and is, 
instead, directed to the future. Harari speak of this in terms of ‘anticipation’, an 
anticipated naming. For Harari, Joyce does not just substitute what is missing but he 
anticipates something new. And that is what draws Lacan into theorising the mechanics 
of this anticipation. Harari proposes that we can use the sinthome in order to understand 
the end of psychoanalytic treatment, the end of analysis9. Analysis, according to Harari, 
must initially work towards dissolving the neurotic configurations of the ego. This 
threatens the stability of the borromean knot. Then through the analytic discourse the 
subject re-builds a new structure from scratch. But this time it is a quadruple knot that 
emerges as the process of analysis allows the subject to suture their own configuration of 
a symptom (or more appropriately, a sinthome).  
Harari proposes a new theory for the end of analysis where the analyst is there to enable 
‘the subject to suture, stitch, unstitch—that is, to tie or untie something, to re-tie things 
otherwise. […] There is no unknotting without reknotting, and vice versa’ (Harari 2002). 
Psychoanalysis if we follow this argument, has nothing to do with truth. The subject does 
not strive for finding the truth of their inner selves. The sinthome is yet another barrier to 
the truth. But it is an obstacle that the subject has created for themselves. The subject 
does not aspire for truth but for singularity. Singularity, Lacan warns us, should not be 
confused with particularity. The particular is an ‘illustration of some generality’ whereas 
singularity indicates something that is distinct (Harari 2002).  
In order to understand what Grindr shares with Ulysses, we would have to focus on the 
language of the medium. Keeping in mind what Lacan identifies as a potential shift in the 
way we understand the properties of the signifier we can then apply our theorisation of 
the sinthome into new media realities. What Tom Roach detects in his analysis of 
Grindr’s language is extremely relevant to what Lacan identifies in his close reading of 
                                               
9The	end	of	analysis	is	a	very	charged	topic	within	the	clinical	psychoanalytic	world.	It	signifies	the	moment	when	the	analysand	decides	to	finish	their	personal	analysis	not	because	they	got	rid	of	a	symptom	but	because	they	have	somehow	changed	their	relation	to	the	way	they	enjoy	their	symptom.		
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Joyce. The language of Grindr, Roach tells us, becomes abstract, fragmented, almost 
non-sensical.  
In that way the neoliberal agenda that gives birth to mobile media and subsequently to 
Grindr, is not quite adequately fulfilled in the end. For neoliberal capitalism the desired 
result would be a maximisation of profits and productivity. Instead of that and due to the 
almost accelerationist modality of the medium, Grindr, instead of creating a free market of 
bodies, it ends up offering a platform for the drive that subsequently creates an unruly 
mob of body parts. The interchangeable body parts follow their own pulses and syntactic 
rules that often defy the restrictive grammar of the law. 
The discursive exchanges typical of MSM location-based apps — from the introductory 
interpellations, “hey,” “’sup,” “woof,” to the inevitable request for “pix” — reduce dialogue 
to a series of churlish grunts and crass propositions —connection-as-such: not a 
Facebook post sharing a portion of one’s “personal life” (however fabricated that life may 
be), but a sensual mingling of interchangeable types (twink, daddy, bear, bro) devoid of 
subjective interiority. (Roach 2015:18) 
In seminar twenty-three, the production of nonsense is related to the jouissance of the 
phonemics. Poetic nonsense draws our attention to the materiality of the signifier. The 
signifier becomes an emptied out acoustic experience. This is how the real manifests 
within discourse. What Lacan primarily identifies in Joyce’s language is the resonant 
qualities of the signifier. In order to better understand that, we should revisit the 
borromean knot as we presented it earlier and see how linguistic elements emerge in 
relation to the knot. 
The social rules represented by the symbolic are undeniably the primary domain of 
language. Both the imaginary and the real play a secondary (yet essential) role in our 
perception of language.  The real as we saw earlier is what cannot be codified, what lies 
radically outside of language. Nevertheless the real is part of all linguistic 
communications. Affective elements, slips of the tongue, disruptions of the discourse and 
the enjoyment in talking are all traces of the real within discourse. The drive as an agent 
of the real has the force to disrupt the process of signification. Lacan, as we saw earlier, 
in seminar twenty-three recognises that the signifier has not only a symbolic function but 
can also be resonant, it can also carry the pulsating force of the drive.      
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There must be something in the signifier which resonates. It is surprising that this has 
been in no way apparent to the English philosophers. I call them philosophers because 
they are not psychoanalysts―they have a rock-solid belief that language has no effect. 
They imagine that there are drives and so on (…) for they don’t know what a drive is: the 
echo in the body of the fact that there is speech [dire]; but for this speech to resonate (…) 
the body must be sensitive to it. (Seminar XXIII, lesson of 18 November 1975, 4) 
The signifier, apart from being an abstract linguistic point of reference, acquires 
intonation, rhythmic vibration and corporeal resonance. The resonance of the signifier 
presents an unexpected answer to the question of social change. As we saw earlier in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of castration, the signifier is inevitable –in its conception – 
bound to the law of the Other. According to Lacan, just adding a new signifier cannot 
change the symbolic order that already encompasses all signifiers in a chain of 
interchangeability. To actually change the symbolic order, you need some other force to 
shake it up. A striking signifier, a pulsating signifier, a resonant signifier can come and 
disrupt the chain of signification carrying the untamed virility of the drive.  
The sinthome, in Joyce’s case was not the result of conscious effort. Joyce did not invent 
his sinthome in order to find an alternative way to connect with the symbolic order while 
avoiding the paternal metaphor. But following Harari, we should not think of the sinthome 
as an exceptional irregularity in the process of subjectification. Lacan offers a new theory 
on the subject’s relation to language with multiple potential uses, especially within the 
Lacanian clinic. As we saw earlier in our brief introduction of castration the signifier is 
initially conceived as the barrier of jouissance; we give up on the primordial enjoyment in 
order to acquire a position in the social world.  
As Juliet MacCannell (2008) notes, the sinthome is a formation that allows the flow of 
jouissance and upsets the linguistic economy of castration. By accepting that jouissance 
is not necessarily antithetical or antagonistic to the signifier we can re-configure a libidinal 
economy that goes beyond the dilemmas such as neurosis versus psychosis, language 
versus enjoyment, desire versus the drive. In this new context the role of the imaginary 
order is re-negotiated. The imaginary has a different relation to the real as the former 
does not emerge in the eclipse of the latter. If the symbolic emerges as a negation of the 
real, then we have to employ imaginary mechanisms in order to accommodate a new 
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libidinal economy the era of the sinthome promises. While the symbolic fails to catch up 
with the jouissance overflow of our times the domain of images seems to be doing well.  
Joyce’s writing has, it seems, confronted Lacan with a new means to the truth, which 
depends on a renewed sense of urgency, the urgency of art, the urgency of making 
psychoanalysis a part of this urgency, and reconnecting both to a freshly revalued 
imaginary. This new imaginary is (and must be) realised as providing something both 
completely new and yet very ancient: a confrontation with the real that the self-enclosed, 
self-satisfied “symbolic” no longer seems capable of confronting. (MacCannell 2008) 
There is an urgency for art and representational media in the era of the sinthome as plain 
words fail to encapsulate social reality. We opened this chapter with a provocative 
portrait by Robert Mapplethorpe that underlines this urgency. Mapplethorpe’s body 
transcends symbolic rules: it is betraying maleness while remaining masculine, it is 
penetrable and at the same time a subject of desire. The body in Mapplethorpe’s case 
carries the urgency of the real and perfectly conveys it within the imaginary.  
 Linking to the previous chapter’s analysis of the selfie we can see that the new 
imaginary era is not necessarily destined to be trapped within its vain illusions. The selfie 
is not just the prison of the ideal ego, as repetition does little to convey stability. While 
staring at your image you open up the possibility of realising its fundamental alienation. 
The repetitive aspect of the selfie culture does not solidify a sense of selfhood. In a way, 
selfies aspire to establish a perfectly-shaped ideal ego but miserably fail achieving it. The 
more selfhood is realised as unfinished, the more the subject yearns for more 
connectivity, or in Bersani’s words, sociability.   
Throughout this dissertation I theorise what I consider to be a new articulation of the ego, 
and more specifically the technologically assisted ego. Ego, in early Lacanian teachings 
is represented by a circle. The imaginary according to these accounts, always strives for 
an enclosed totality and hence the circle of the ego is undisrupted. These rules do not 
apply any more. As the symbolic lifts its totalitarian rule, the imaginary fantasy is no 
longer looking for enclosure, it is no longer pressurised to conform to this ideal form and 
can open up to the polymorphous perversity of the drive. The ego turns from an enclosed 
territory to an open shape; a broken circle. 
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In Joyce, Lacan discovered another kind of imaginary and another kind of ego, an open 
one: he diagrams the “open ego” as a set of brackets, rather than as a circular link 
through which experience flows―without being referred back to its effect on the fortress 
with which it has surrounded itself. This is an ego no longer ensnared in (and buried 
under) a mass of verbiage that tries to obscure the enormous power of the drives. 
(MacCannell 2008) 
The Joycean ego is porous and does not resemble a fortress. The selfie is always 
presented in a social openness; it is always presented in long feeds of disparate objects. 
Grindr screen is yet another instance of this process. The exposed body is located, 
literally located, amongst other similar bodies. The temporal and spatial alignment allows 
for identifications at the same time that the dehumanising broken discourse of the 
application disrupts the possibility of community. Unlike the university discourse [footnote] 
and the orientation towards a totalising truth that can be acquired through language, the 
fragmentation of the imaginary allows for a new ethics.  
Linking to the earlier discussion of Bersani’s sociability we could envisage new 
possibilities for imaginary relations, not reduced to an egotistic hatred for one’s own 
image and for the image of the other. There can be the possibility to utilise the pulses 
and drives of the living breathing body in order to create new modes of relationality. The 
new ego I propose in this theorisation is open ended, spreading into the world, leaking 
into new networked realities. This does not necessarily suggest a utopian or radical 
horizon, as the drive does not follow political projects and directions. But it is not bound to 
an existing law, an existing social reality that can predict and recuperate every possible 
outcome in a way the Panopticist argument suggests. 
In order to understand the politics of the drive we need to rethink Roach’s analysis of 
Grindr discourse as a disruption of the neoliberal regime. The fragmented language of 
the medium goes against the aims of the structure that gave birth to it. In contrast to the 
Panopticon argument that would theorise Grindr as yet another expansion of the 
Panoptic gaze, I would argue that Bersani’s sociability and by association Roach’s 
shared estrangement can actually posit a different analytic schema that allows for 
thinking social reality as a non-deterministic, open ended process. Tom Roach is right to 
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say ‘you cannot unlink the rise of these media from neoliberalism’ but at the same time 
neoliberalism cannot be an all-encompassing definitive regime. The Other as we saw 
earlier is defined by his essential lack and his words can resonate differently when 
crushed upon deviant desiring flesh. 
James Joyce, offers a new understanding of language. Lacan suggests that this new 
relationship to language allows for a major re-configuration of our understanding of the 
signifier. The signifier is not just bound to the signifying chain and to symbolic rules. It 
retains its materiality and through that it can convey the pulses of the drive. Besides that, 
James Joyce’s relation to the symbolic seems to circumvent the traditional 
psychoanalytic dogma according to which all subjects need to be subjugated to 
castration in order to acquire a position within the symbolic world. Due to these 
theoretical assumptions, Lacan is able to entertain the possibility of a world where the 
paternal metaphor has no central role. In this new reality, the imaginary domain can offer 
alternative ways in dealing with psychic phenomena –for example through art – rather 
than only dealing with them through strictly linguistic means.  
Emojis and the Japanese unconscious  
In Grindr, language is reduced to empty ‘grunts and crass propositions’, ‘polluted’ with 
slang code-words, dick-pics and emoji. In this chapter, we are interested in identifying the 
ways the imaginary domain allows us to better grasp the domain of the real. The hybrid 
discourse we encounter in the chat-box of Grindr is an excellent case study for this 
examination. In order to further elucidate the complex relation between the signifier and 
images, in this section we will focus on the emergence and mainstreamisation of emoji.  
Emojis are ideograms that portray facial expressions, common objects, places, types of 
weather, and animals. They were introduced in Japanese mobile phones in the late 90s 
and became popular worldwide with their adoption in the iPhone (and subsequently the 
android) standard set of characters. Each emoji is codified as a special letter. Emoji 
means ‘pictograph’ in Japanese (from e [絵, “picture"] + moji [文字, “character”]). The 
initial popularity of emoji in Japan might be related to the way the Japanese writing 
system already combines phonetic writing with ideograms. In this section we will examine 
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Lacan’s analysis of the Japanese writing system and see how his analysis applies to the 
contemporary use of emoji.  
In his introduction to the Japanese translation of Écrits, Lacan informs the reader that 
Japanese neither need nor are capable of being analysed (‘no one who inhabits this 
language has any need to be psychoanalyzed’) (Lacan 1972). The reader may be taken 
aback by this shocking (and offensive) remark. But according to Japanese cultural 
analyst Fuhito Endo (2002), this assertion did not stop the Japanese audience from 
engaging with French psychoanalysis; if psychoanalysis teaches anything after all, it is 
that prohibition is generative. Lacan forms his position on the ‘Japanese unconscious’ 
through analysing the Japanese writing system. He is particularly interested in the ways 
kanji (Chinese ideograms) where introduced in the Japanese writing system. Kanji can 
be read in two ways: it can be read phonetically similarly to the Chinese way (on) and 
semantically (kun) using the native sounds of the Japanese language. Kanji, being 
ideograms, operate at the same time as a letter and as a visual symbol. Following the 
Freudian metaphor of the unconscious constructed as a series of hieroglyphs, Lacan 
comes to an enigmatic conclusion according to which ‘in Japanese the distance from the 
unconscious to the spoken language is palpable’ (Lacan 1972). The unconscious 
‘hieroglyphs’ are exposed in the consciousness through writing, hence psychoanalysis is 
not necessary (or possible). By introducing the ideograms into language the process of 
signification – at least as Lacan theorises it for the west – does not apply. For the signifier 
is an acoustic impression with an arbitrary relation to the signified. In the case of 
ideograms words are images of things. 
Political theorist Kojin Karatani uses Lacan’s argument to advance his anti-nationalist 
deconstruction of exceptionalist notions of Japan-ness (2000). Like Endo, he sees Kanji 
as bringing into Japanese foreign agents that destabilise the internal consistency of the 
language). Karatani uses the co-existence between Japanese and foreign elements 
within the language in order to disrupt the purist nationalist fantasies around Japanese 
culture. The absorption of foreign cultural influences, according to Karatani, does not take 
place in some mystical deep collective unconscious but on the contrary it happens on the 
surface. Thinking of Japanese nationalism might be indeed a strange diversion from our 
main argument, but Lacan here offers an analysis that might help us understand the 
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disruptive potency of the wide-spread adoption of emoji in new media communications. If 
kanji disturbs normative identity formations in Japan what can emoji’ influence be in 
contemporary western discourse? 
Emojis often behave like linguistic signs and condense multiple meaning depending on 
the context. The emoji ‘💃’ (defined by Unicode as ‘dancer’ is often used as slang for 'let's 
party’. In Grindr, the eggplant emoji (🍆) becomes synonym of a penis, and a peach emoji 
(🍑) synonym of a butt. But even when the peach becomes a butt the meaning making 
process at work is that of metaphorization. Lacan in his early work, introduced numerous 
analytic tools from linguistics into his close reading of Freud. Lacan is particularly 
influenced by Ferdinand de Saussure’s theories about the signifier and the signified 
(Saussure, 2011). In order to understand the function of emoji within discourse we need 
to introduce some basic linguistic concepts. According to Saussure, language is a system 
of signs, and each sign is consisted of a conceptual part (the signified) and a 
phonological part (the signifier). The two elements according to Saussure are linked with 
an arbitrary bond. Whereas for Saussure the bond between signifier and signified is 
stable (despite being arbitrary) for Lacan this bond is precarious allowing for slips. Lacan 
in his account of language prioritises signifiers as he considers them (and not signs) to 
be what language is composed of:  
For this primordial distinction [between signifier and signified] goes way beyond the 
debates on the arbitrariness of the sign which have been elaborated since the earliest 
reflections of the ancients, and even beyond the impasse which, through the same period, 
has been encountered in every discussion of the bi-univocal correspondence between the 
word and the thing, even in the mere act of naming. One cannot and need not go further 
along this line of thought than to demonstrate that no meaning is sustained by anything 
other than reference to another meaning. (Lacan, 1966) 
Following the Lacanian maxim according to which ‘the unconscious is constructed like 
language’ we deduce that signifiers are the only way we have to access our unconscious.  
Lacan talks for the first time about metaphor and metonymy in his third seminar (Lacan, 
1955, pp. 214–230) where he equates metaphor with the Freudian term ‘condensation’ 
and metonymy with ‘displacement’ (Lacan, 1955, p. 221). Our ego, in order to protect us 
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from ‘dangerous’ thoughts censors their content. Freud understood that this censoring 
takes two main forms: one is condensation and the other is displacement. In 
condensation ‘a sole idea represents several associative chains’ and in the structuralist 
schematisation this corresponds to the function of metaphor. In displacement ‘an idea's 
emphasis, interest or intensity is liable to be detached from it and to pass on to other 
ideas’ and that functions corresponds to metonymy (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973)  
Metaphor, according to Lacan, is the process where we substitute one signifier in a 
signifying chain with another signifier such that a new meaning is created. Metaphor is an 
essential meaning making process and, as we saw earlier, Lacan places the paternal 
metaphor at the beginning of all signification processes. In this seminar, he theorises the 
primacy of the signifier over the signified and concludes that the signifier defines not only 
the subject’s discourse but the subject as such. 
The mainspring of the metaphor isn't the meaning, which is supposed to be transposed 
from Booz onto the sheaf. I readily admit that someone might object to me that Booz's 
sheaf is metonymic, not metaphorical, and that underlying this magnificent poetry, and 
never named directly, there is Booz's royal penis. But that isn't what gives this sheaf its 
metaphorical quality, it's that the metaphor is place in the position of subject, in Booz's 
place. (Lacan, 1955, p. 225) 
In metonymy, ‘an object is designated by a term other than the one that usually belongs 
to it’ (Dor, 2004, p. 50).  Metonymy usually involves a part of the thing used to describe 
the whole (i.e. sails in the horizon). In a sense, metonymy designates the relation 
between signifiers on the same signifying chain (horizontal relation) whereas metaphor 
involves the substitution of a signifier in one signifying chain by a signifier from another 
signifying chain (vertical relation).  
Emojis introduce an irregularity on the written text as they introduce an image that is 
closer to the signified than to the signifier. In that sense emoji can operate as symbols 
allowing for metaphorization. A peach emoji as we saw earlier can represent a butt. At 
the same time, emoji retain something irreducible to the symbolic, they retain their 
imaginary promise of self-coherence, a quality of the signified. They are after all pictures 
of things. Sometimes a cigar is just a cigar as Freud has famously said, and accordingly, 
sometimes a peach emoji is just a peach emoji.  
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Grindr raised controversy in 2017 while launching its own series of ‘gay’ emoji (the 
gaymojis) including, amongst other ‘naughty’ images, a capital T which is, according to 
some users, slang for crystal meth (colloquially known as Tina). The capital T was 
subsequently withdrawn and in an attempt to appease the public (and the strict rules of 
apple-store) Grindr banned users from using certain emoji, such as the syringe emoji ‘💉’ 
that was also used to signify use of drugs. In the context of our analysis, it is not only the 
fragmented discourse that threatens the application’s legality and capitalist productivity 
but now images and abstract symbols carry new, disorganising threats. The Lacanian 
theorisation of metaphor and metonymy comes from Lacan’s early period when the 
signifier was the most important aspect of analysis. As we saw in this chapter, the 
primacy of the symbolic as the only way to access and understand our jouissance (and in 
extension our symptom) has been contested by the late Lacanian re-conceptualisation of 
the imaginary; emoji are yet another instance where the imaginary is introduced and 
disrupts the normative function of the symbolic. 
The circulation of signifiers is intercepted by representatives from the order of things. In 
2015, Oxford Dictionaries named 😂 (face with tears of joy) the word of the year. Oxford 
Dictionaries president, Caspar Grathwohl claimed that ‘traditional alphabet scripts have 
been struggling to meet the rapid-fire, visually focused demands of 21st Century 
communication’ (“‘Face with tears of joy’ emoji named Word of the Year by Oxford 
Dictionaries | The Independent,” n.d.). According to Lacan, the introduction of symbols 
that are both linguistic entities and ideograms in Japanese language made the Japanese 
un-analysable. Shall we infer that the same goes for millennials and all those who use 
emoji in their everyday communications? Even entertaining the Lacanian provocation 
seems risqué. Nevertheless, if psychoanalysis was conceived as the study of signifiers, it 
might be indeed at risk when social interactions are increasingly mediated through 
images. If everyone is an-analysable maybe it is time for the analytic process to change.  
An element of Grindr we did not have the time to reflect upon in this chapter is that of 
location. Grindr is a location-based service that along a series of other similar 
applications takes the GPS positioning of the user as a starting point for its operation. It is 
this exact element of locating oneself within the world that will be developed in the next 
chapter where ego will be theorised in relation to imaginary and material geographies. 
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We are interested in investigating the poetic articulations and entanglements between the 
ego and the spatial reality. We will examine how the subject can answer the question 
‘Where am I?’ especially in the context of mobile technology. 
 We echo in this endeavour the Bersanian schematisation of the ego as a passionate 
inference as we consider this analysis a spatialised metaphor for the psyche. As we saw 
earlier, Bersani traces the homosexual ethics as a constant search for oneself into the 
world: ‘[I]f our psychic centre can finally seem less seductive than our innumerable and 
imperfect reappearances outside, it should then seem not only imperative but natural to 
treat the outside as we would a home’ (Bersani, 2010, p. 62). We want to rethink of that 
‘at-homeness’ in the context of new technology. In our final chapter, we will introduce and 
develop the concept of ‘poetics of self’, in order to describe the new possibilities we see 
in the narcissistic processes that become available through new media.  
We want to explore how the imaginary allows for new encounters with the real and how 
these encounters shape our social reality.  In the introduction of the literature review we 
presented Hito Steyerl’s metaphoric representation of new media environment as the 
result of an exploded cinematic screen. The fragments are everywhere, and we are left to 
deal with them. On a similar note we aspire to theorise the ego as an exploded circle; 
looking for oneself in the world; composing of oneself as an assemblage made of traces. 
This new cartography is essentially a personal diaristic collection of moments and 
reflections, the sinthome on the map.  
Conclusion 
In ‘beyond the selfie principle’ my focus was on the function of the ego, the image and 
the Other at the level of the imaginary, as mediated by the symbolic function of the 
Other’s gaze. In this chapter, I take the discussion beyond the level of the imaginary, to 
understand how the image of the ego is invested libidinally (as object of desire and 
conduit for the drive) and how it is manifested in the practices of daily life (for example, in 
the social exchange of Grindr). The aim here is to make a contribution to the 
understanding of how the Real and the Imaginary, in the Lacanian sense, intersect. As 
the title of the chapter indicates, my focus here is on gay life and practice. Why this 
particular attention? There are two key reasons. First, my discussion in ‘beyond the selfie 
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principle’ is orientated by the work of female artists and writers, whose discussion 
concerns the woman’s body; a focus on men and the male image provides a useful 
counterpoint. Second, narcissism and homosexuality have been historically linked, with 
psychoanalytic theory focusing on the libidinal investment of the body image in cases of 
homosexuality. It makes sense, then, to bring this body of theory to bear when thinking 
about narcissism and libido.  
Since the nineteenth century, the figure of Narcissus has been adopted as the 
prototypical narcissist, the man who is in love with his own form and looks for it in the 
world. We introduced this discussion by centring on a provocative self-portrait by Robert 
Mapplethorpe. Continuing the discussion of self-portraiture as a form of exploring the 
limitations and creativity of narcissism, I analysed the characteristics of the picture that 
make it so resonant in relation to our previous discussion. The subject of the sexually 
staged self-portrait blurs the subject–object division, as in this instance the photographer 
presents his own body as an object. Mapplethorpe’s self-portrait introduces the 
dimension of the body in its relation to self-image. The main question of this chapter was 
to determine how this same relation is expressed in gay dating apps.  
In this chapter, I move the analysis of narcissism on from one that is strictly to do with 
self-image and the articulation of the ego, in order to bring in the domain of sexuality and 
desire. If the body in front of the mirror strives to acquire an imaginary completeness, the 
body we see in Mapplethorpe's picture, or the bodies that appear when we open gay 
dating apps, are electrified by the unsettling effects of lust. They are bodies that seek the 
pleasures of fucking and being fucked, bodies that strive not to acquire a completeness 
but rather to shatter themselves – at least temporarily – in the intensity of pleasure. 
Sexuality in psychoanalysis, as we saw in our discussion of Zupančič, is a disruptive 
force that can never be properly captured within discourse; or more accurately, it is what 
hinders discourse from being properly articulated as such. This theorisation of sex and 
the sexed body, which focuses on its anti-egoic, self-shattering qualities, takes a distance 
from prevalent approaches within social theory that tend to adopt a more Butlerian 
theorisation of gender and sexuality as performative.  
However, if sexuality is not defined purely as a product of discursive and socio-historical 
regimes, how can we avoid the pitfall of reinstating a naive biological definition of sex? As 
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we saw in this chapter, Freud introduces an important conceptual distinction in his work 
by identifying the difference between the instinct and the drive. I focused on the 
importance of the drive, in order to understand what Lacan describes as the domain of 
the Real, but it is important to reiterate that the psychoanalytic drive is not an ahistorical 
force that operates independently of socio-historical conditions. The drive cannot be 
simply defined as constructed within language and as we saw earlier in the chapter it is 
not a biological instinct either. My work focused extensively on the concept of the drive 
and its analytical potency, opening new ways of understanding the sexed body and the 
different modes of relationality one encounters in gay dating apps. By utilising the 
concept of the drive and the related concept of jouissance I opened up my analysis to 
incorporate what cannot be captured within discourse but yet what is essential in 
understanding sexuality as such. 
By showcasing the theoretical affinity between narcissism and the drive, I introduce a 
psychoanalytically-informed theorisation of Grindr, the gay dating application. My 
analysis focuses on the phenomenology of the application usage: the experience of 
scrolling and browsing body parts within a virtual mosaic of assembled skin. My analysis 
is influenced by Leo Bersani’s theoretical account of gay cruising practices; where 
cruising takes place in physical locations where anonymous bodies create a field of 
affection and estrangement, Grindr accelerates this process by adding the layer of a 
virtual interface. Bersani’s account of sameness and sociability that I present in this 
chapter opens up new opportunities for theorising communication technologies. If 
sociability for example is defined as a social bond that is uncontaminated by (imaginary) 
identifications, we can, perhaps, see modern social networks as facilitating a sense of 
sociability that fosters a feeling of co-existence that does not require in-group 
identification.  
Bersani connects his discussion of sociability and homosexuality through a queer 
appropriation of Freudian accounts of homosexual subjectivity. Bersani takes Freud’s 
remarks on homosexual men and their tendency towards forming social bonds at face 
value and uses them in his discussion of sociability and cruising. Building on this 
theoretical exercise, I discussed the temporary and fragile communities that emerge on 
Grindr and how their function can inspire new ways of relating to each other. In this 
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discussion, I utilised Tom Roach’s concept of ‘shared estrangement’, an idea Roach 
developed by closely examining different moments of queer relations and communities. 
His concept of shared estrangement suggests a new form of community that is not based 
on similarity and identification but rather on lust and spontaneity.  
One of the Grindr phenomena I focus on in this chapter is that of the ‘dick pic’. Despite 
the ubiquity of the dick pic – more than 50% of millennial women have received one – the 
phenomenon has received little or no scholarly attention to date. My discussion in this 
chapter employs cinematic theory as developed by Joan Copjec, to understand the 
function of the close-up in relation to the dick pic. Cinematic close-ups are then taken to 
represent the partial objects of psychoanalytic thought, objects of the drive that are not 
just parts of a whole but rather separated pieces with their own place in the libidinal 
economy. I consider this focus on the partial objects particularly relevant in modern 
media landscapes where mobile cameras recreate the effect of cinematic close-ups 
constantly in our everyday interactions through social media. The screen separates our 
bodies into distinct body parts, and the dick pics acquire a new life of their own. In their 
circulation, dick pics create a new libidinal economy of detachable and exchangeable 
phalluses; here again, we see the implication of the other in the narcissistic image, not 
simply as the anonymous other with whom the image is shared, but also as the Other of 
the symbolic exchange itself, the one to whom something is given and from whom 
something is expected (even if that something is nothing more than a lack of response).  
 
Central to this chapter is the Lacanian theorisation of the sinthome, a concept articulated 
by Lacan in his twenty-third seminar, which offers a different articulation of the human 
psyche, one that goes beyond the need for castration in order for the subject to enter the 
symbolic order. Earlier in his teaching, Lacan saw the paternal metaphor as a decisive 
logical moment in the formation of the subject, one in which the desire of the other is 
named and metaphorized, and the identification with a position other than that of the 
desiring mother is made possible. It is a moment that marks the subject’s entry into 
language and the beginning of desire itself. In the 1970s, Lacan began a reformulation of 
this cornerstone of his thought, seeing the paternal metaphor as just one possible 
outcome of the subject’s encounter with lack, a kind of fiction to which the subject 
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cleaves. From now on, other fictions can be conceived of as performing a similar function 
in subjectivity, binding together the three registers of symbolic, imaginary and real. The 
sinthome performs this function; it is an idiosyncratic, singular response to lack that 
functions to bind together the three registers, a fourth loop that snakes between the three 
rings of the Borromean knot, preventing their falling apart. In seminar twenty-three, Lacan 
attempts a theorisation of subjectivity that does not centre castration. Influenced by his 
reading of mathematical topology and by his close reading of James Joyce he came up 
with the idea that there might be a different way for the subject to access the symbolic 
order, a sort of a self-creation or ‘gadget’: namely the sinthome.  
James Joyce makes his own name. By adopting a theorisation of the sinthome we open 
up space for a new discussion of the relation between the psyche and technology. The 
sinthome is an invention, and just like the countless hardware and software 
augmentations of our psychic life, it offers a new way for us to relate to each other. By 
taking this in account, I offer a sinthomatic reading of Grindr that breaks away from 
ethnographic observations and rather focuses on the structural elements of the 
application that transform how the user experiences reality. In seminar twenty-three, 
Lacan proposed a new understanding of language. Instead of focusing on the signifier as 
a element of the symbolic order, in this seminar, Lacan suggests that the material 
resonance of language is equally important. Each signifier takes its place in the signifying 
chain, but at the same time the sound and the resonance it has within the human psyche 
should not be neglected. I used this conception of the materiality and jouissance of 
language in my analysis of the Grindr chat and its potential disruptive capacity. The 
language of Grindr, devoid of deep meaning, is reduced to ‘churlish grunts’, which 
according to Tom Roach creates less of a field of signification and more of an affective 
terrain where the jouissance of the phoneme meets sexual lust and boredom.  
One of the innovations of my research was the adoption of the idea of the ‘porous ego’ in 
my analysis of self-image in new media cultures. Following Juliet MacCannell’s analysis 
of the imaginary order and its relation to the real, I re-approached the imaginary aspect of 
ego, not as an illusory domain of a bodily identification but rather a potent field where 
meaning is produced and exchanged between subjects. Living in an era of visual media, 
we have to re-consider the primacy of visuality in the subjectification process. Moving 
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away from a theory of the subject that prioritises the signifier and language, we were able 
to re-evaluate the importance of art and the screen in the process of understanding 
modes of relating to each other.  
Following this foregrounding of the imaginary, I then suggested a new theorisation of the 
emoji. The starting point for this divergence was the prevalence of the use of emoji within 
dating applications such as Grindr and the creative ways in which emoji are used within 
that context. The linguistic qualities of the emoji have been discussed in length especially 
in relation to their ostensible corruption of written communication. While some critics of 
emoji argue that this use of images within text might disrupt language as we know it, 
more moderate linguists note that the inclusion of ideograms within written systems of 
communication is as ancient as writing itself. What drew my attention was how Jacques 
Lacan, in his discussion of what he calls the Japanese unconscious, focuses on the 
coexistence of different writing systems (ideogrammatic and phonographic) within the 
same alphabet and how that affects the relation Japanese subjects have to their 
unconscious. In Lacan’s analysis here we see a movement from the symbolic to the 
imaginary that reflects the arguments that I have made throughout this chapter. In the 
case of the emoji, images are interrupting traditional signifiers, creating a new hybrid 
language. 
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Poetics of self, geographies of the real 
We have discussed so far different aspects of the subjectification process in relation to 
new mobile technologies. Starting from narcissism and its relation to the screen, we 
traced a new conception of the ego as inherently dependent on the Other. By centralising 
the function of radical narcissism we theorised the selfie as an open-ended process of 
identification. Then by discussing the drive and desire in relation to location-based dating 
services we examined different ways in which new technologies affect – if not shape – 
the ways we relate to each other. 
What I want to address now is the ‘mobile’ aspect of mobile media: its portability and 
omnipresence, and most importantly, the fascinating intrusion of the private into the 
public. In order to discuss the mobility of mobile media, we need to re-thematise space 
and our understanding of it. To the extent that ‘space’ has already appeared in our 
previous discussions, it has been primarily as a metaphor. Psychoanalysis since its very 
foundation has instrumentalised spatial metaphors in order to describe psychic 
structures. From Freud’s conception of the Preconscious-Conscious-Unconscious and 
subsequently the Ego-Superego-Id, to Lacan’s non-Euclidean topography, we have 
already encountered plenty of spatial metaphors. In this chapter we will talk about space 
not as a metaphor for psychic structures, but on the contrary these psychic structures will 
guide us in our theorisation of the spatial, and in particular, of urban geographies.  
In this discussion, I centralise ‘locative media’, those media products whose function 
relies on the specific geo-location of the user. We specifically focus on Pokémon GO 
(PG), a popular locative game that, with its 2016 launch, changed the mainstream 
perception of video games as an activity that strictly takes place within the confined 
environment of the user’s private space. Our discussion of PG allows us to reflect on 
psychogeographical understandings of space and investigate the implications of 
augmented reality for our analysis of psychic phenomena. In this chapter we will have the 
opportunity to deal with urban subjectivities in the light of our theorisation of selfhood.  
What we saw in the previous chapter as ‘the ‘body of the drive’ will be further developed 
here in order to talk about the ‘city of the drive’. The city of the drive becomes a factory, 
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producing and reproducing selfhood in all kinds of failed ways. In this analysis we insist 
on the concepts of the porous ego, the broken circle we described in the previous 
chapter. The city of the drive becomes a factory forging different sinthomes, creating 
pulses and moments of excitation and stasis, merging and separating from the bodies of 
its inhabitants, and expanding beyond the signifying chains that once gave birth to it. The 
city of the drive explodes into myriad tiny pieces of deranged code. This city sets in 
motion a certain kind of poetics of the self. 
We borrow the term poetics here to designate both poetry (poiesis) as making, and to 
designate the poetic function of language as we identified in our Lacanian reading of 
James Joyce’s work. In many ways we could argue that the Dublin of Joyce is the 
archetypal city of the drive. At the same time, it is a land of exile and the most dear 
home, the city of alienation and love, the city of psychotic hallucinations and 
intersubjective communication. In order to examine the poetic function of the urban 
environment I created a small locative game where - within the conventions and forms of 
PG - people were invited to write and locate within the city small Pokémon-poems. The 
result is a series of geo-located autobiographical poems that create a different 
cartography of the city, one that goes beyond what is visible. This approach allowed 
participants to reflect on their experience both of the city and of the media they use in 
order to navigate the city. In a sense, this project allowed for an embodied reflection upon 
new technologies by allowing for a poetic questioning of subjectivity as such.  
The ‘perceptive cocoon’ of mobile media and its relation to 
the ego 
In our analysis of the city we are particularly interested in the ways the city is mediated 
and thus constructed through everyday use of mobile media. For our analysis of the 
materiality of the city, we draw from the Lacanian articulation of psychic reality as 
presented in earlier chapters: symbolic, imaginary, real. We first identify the symbolic city, 
this is the city that is structured by historical and socio-cultural relations and antagonism. 
The symbolic city is not immediately available for inspection as by this term we refer to 
the socio-symbolic structures that allow for the emergence of the city. The symbolic city is 
constructed through certain regimes of power and knowledge that solidify the social 
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relations that gave birth to its architectural and environmental elements.  
But, as we saw, the symbolic is unable to provide an all-encompassing totality, and 
accordingly the city can never be reduced to its history. The city of images, the imaginary 
city or what we could potentially call the narcissist city is the city that emerges in our 
perception. The imaginary city is constructed through our phenomenological strolling 
through the urban environment. Most importantly for our research, the imaginary city 
carries myriads of sounds, images and text messages that we carry in public spaces 
through the consumption of mobile media.  
The media theorist Michael Bull (2006) discusses how the introduction of the Sony 
Walkman changed the way people experience the urban environment on a 
phenomenological level. The Walkman was the first instance where mobile media 
affected significantly and on a large scale the way people consume music. Something 
that preciously took place in a private space (home) or in designated areas (concert halls, 
bars etc.) becomes something that happens anywhere in the city. For Bull, the Walkman 
allowed users to create ‘manageable sites of habitation’, virtual spaces where time and 
space are made manageable. The Sony Walkman was introduced in the market in 1978 
and was soon adopted by teenagers and public transport commuters and later by a wider 
community of consumers.  
When we discuss the spatio-temporal effect of the Walkman, we refer to a series of 
parameters. First, Walkman users experience a change in their perceived boundaries; by 
blocking certain environmental stimuli they create a private space of auditory seclusion. 
In addition to that, according to Bull, Walkman soundscapes allow the user to create a 
site of fantasy, with the cinematic effect of music being introduced in their everyday lives. 
What is unique in the history of the Walkman is that, for the first time, the subject shifts 
their attention from the visual to the auditory domain. If we first learn to observe and 
consume urban reality primarily through vision, a portable music device makes the 
soundscape of the city equally important.  
Bull insists that the significance of sound is under-theorised in contemporary media 
studies and suggests that there is ‘an unexplored gulf between the world according to 
sound and the world according to sight’ (Bull, 2006, p. 241). What I find particularly 
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striking in his analysis is a passing reference to an aphorism by George 
Berkeley: ‘sounds are as near to us as our thoughts’ (Ibid. p.241). While this statement 
resonates, it is hard to grasp its full meaning. What is it about sound that brings it closer 
to our internal world, in a way that image is not? We will return to the relation between 
sound and the unconscious later in our analysis but, for now, let’s get back to our 
analysis of mobile media.  
We use as a starting point in our analysis the Walkman not because it is an earlier 
example of ‘mobile’ media (as we saw in our introductory chapter writers such as Jason 
Farman (2012) claim that in fact books are the first mobile media), but because what 
makes the Walkman unique is  – as its name suggests – the fact that it was made to be 
used while in transit: mobility was intrinsic in its function. The user was encouraged to 
‘curate’ their own soundscape and take it with them wherever they go. As we mentioned, 
commuters were amongst the first adopters of the device and soon after the launch of the 
product it became very visible in trains and buses of all big metropoles. From New York 
to Tokyo and from Berlin to Paris the world was warming up for the coming of a new era 
in mobile media.  
The innovation of portable devices that play music (and we can generalise here from the 
Walkman to iPods, other mp3 players and smartphones) is that they fill an ‘empty’ space 
with stimuli. In the case of public transport, the personal soundscape of the portable 
stereo separates the user from the unpleasant (for most) and certainly under-stimulating 
experience of commuting. The curated soundscape adds an extra layer of meaning in the 
experience that makes the time of commuting more palatable. For Chambers (2005) this 
becomes necessary as late capitalist metropoles expand and the time to get to work gets 
longer. The subject of late capitalism spends more than an hour commuting a day, 
making this transit areas an important part of contemporary urban life. The contemporary 
worker not only spends a lot of time in transit but can, in fact, be working from cafes or 
any place with a broadband connection. The contemporary worker becomes then a 
‘digital nomad’, a person that carries a virtual office with them anywhere they go.   
A life in flux and instability is re-grounded in memories and emotional landscapes 
constructed through music. Familiar voices and melodies establish a sense of continuity 
while the material environment in its constant change becomes replaceable, almost 
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unimportant. The subject needs new nodal points for its subjectivity, nodal points that 
incorporate immaterial and perhaps non-linguistic elements. We claimed in earlier 
chapters that a selfie might be a (failed) attempt of the subject to construct a stable ego 
image. In the context of ‘nomadic’ subjectivity this need is persistent. The subject uses 
selfies in order to anchor the identity into something that seems to promise stability, the 
stability of a fixed ego. Those small rituals (a familiar song, browsing pictures of familiar 
faces) allow the subject to make meaning within an environment that constantly changes.  
Mizuko Ito (2007) theorises the transitional space that mobile users create when listening 
to music in public spaces as ‘perceptive cocoons’, within which  the subject finds safety 
within the urban environment. I consider these perceptive cocoons to be conceptually 
relevant to our earlier analysis of the open-ended ego. Those cocoons separate the 
subject from its immediate environment, but not in a radical and truly antisocial way. One 
can still see what is going on and maintain a relative relation to their surroundings. In 
fact, the separation that the perceptive cocoon offers is not aggressive to society, but 
rather allows the subject to ‘survive’ in a potentially hostile society: the narcissism of this 
separation allows the subject not to hate its fellow commuters. An auditory cocoon allows 
you for example to enjoy a train commute as music accentuates the beautiful colours of 
the sunrise. In a way, those cocoons might be essential for the subject to accept the 
absurdity of the capitalist mode of production and work conditions.  
Perceptive cocoons are in-between spaces where the other exists, but their existence is 
mediated through an inserted layer of meaning. The subject sets its boundaries on the 
fundamental level of perception: when music is playing, the other cannot talk to you, at 
least not without actively making you taking off your headphones10.  
In this chapter we will examine augmented reality technologies in which we are to take 
this semi-openness into account. Augmented reality applications operate exactly on the 
interplay between real world and virtual elements. The interplay between 
attention/inattention, central in navigating media-rich environments of the contemporary 
city, exercise our perceptual mechanisms in an intense mental gymnastics, in a circle 
                                               
10 and sometimes the other is willing to go that far 
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between introspection and ‘extrospection’, attention and inattention.   
The private consumption of digital music does not only change our perception of the city 
but also – and potentially more importantly – it affects the ways we comprehend and 
consume music. The ‘shuffle’ mode of the iPod and other MP3 players broke the 
aesthetic barriers of what were previously strictly defined genres. In contrast to the 
cassette (and of course in contrast to vinyl records) the music curation follows more 
randomised and affective flows. The shuffle option, the easy access to cheap or pirated 
music, the ability to buy songs instead of albums, and the absolute privacy of the medium 
allowed for people to mix music in unusual and highly personalised ways. The same iPod 
could contain heavy metal and Britney Spears tunes and play them back to back. Once 
again we see the erosion of rigid and well-defined rules and categories and the 
emergence of a highly-individualised creativity.  
In our analysis of the city in relation to the Lacanian domains of psychic reality, we 
omitted the domain of the real. The real city emerges when the subject is lost. The real 
city is the city of anxiety, the city that we encounter when our smartphone runs out of 
battery, when the maps do not load, and we have to find our way back home. The gaze 
of the Other, as we saw in the previous chapter, is located to that blind spot in our 
perceptual field. The real city emerges in the dark alleys and the unknown shortcuts, in 
the delayed trains and obstructive demonstrations in city centre. The real city emerges 
where we are not, a place that threatens to eradicate us but at the same time reassures 
us that the Other cannot inhabit the whole of the urban matrix. Even in the cities of hyper-
surveillance and industrialised panopticism there will always be territory of the ‘real’ 
threatening to dismantle symbolic and imaginary architectural constructions.  
The drive and the cyborgs 
In our discussion of Grindr we examined a geography of the drive. The drive, in its self-
shattering outward thrust, changes our perception of selfhood and at the same time 
defines our understanding of the world. Instead of following a symbolic compass in order 
to go from point a to point b, we follow a desiring path that never quite reaches a 
destination. The city becomes an endless composition of infinity paths. The Mobius strip 
we saw earlier as a metaphor for the psyche becomes a representation of urban 
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subjectivity in motion. Mediated through new media applications, our psyche is more than 
ever an ‘extimate’ entity. Our intimate thoughts and perceptive mechanisms are mediated 
through technological and corporate constructions. The city of Grindr is the city of the 
drive; just as the drive follows a circular movement, so the city expands while the drive 
moves outwards and then it collapses back to the tight limits of the ego when the drive 
hits back.  
Bersani’s homosexual subject looks for itself in the world, takes the world as a 
synecdoche of itself (Bersani, 2002). That does not mean that the world is a friendly and 
accommodating space. The homosexual subject assumes the world as itself but as a self 
radically alienated and essentially lost. In that sense, every stroll around the city, every 
attempt at ‘cruising’ is essentially a re-assembling of selfhood as such. The subject I 
describe here borrows from the city to complete itself - a mode of being that reflects that 
of the cyborg. The city gives back a sense of selfhood but it is short-lived and 
unsatisfying, as it never reaches completion. Late modernity provides us with a perfect 
metaphor for this process in the figure of the cyborg. Donna Haraway borrows the idea of 
the cyborg from science fiction in order to substantiate a new theory of subjectivity.  
For Haraway, subjectivity is an assemblage of human and non-human parts. In her 
seminal Cyborg Manifesto (1999), Haraway argues that humanity has to overcome the 
legacy of the Oedipus complex and to reconfigure subjectivity outside the domain of 
castration. Like Deleuze and Guattari, Haraway proposes a new ontology that will 
eventually allow for the transformation of society. Modern technology, despite the fact it 
was developed in order to allow for maximisation of profits and serve the interests of 
neoliberal capitalism, has in Haraway’s view diverted from its purpose and, in an 
accelerationist motion, has given birth to monstrous entities that go against the will of the 
reality that gave birth to them. For Haraway, the cyborg is the hybrid creature that will end 
the hetero-patriarchal racist regime of our times.  
The Harawaysian cyborg emerges as a hybrid that is able to erase its linage, to erase the 
history of its forefathers and creators. It is an embodiment of the negation of all rigidly 
constructed dichotomies of modernity; the cyborg can at the same time be animal and 
human, biological and technological, physical and immaterial. Haraway considers the 
development of communication technologies a major point of departure for humanity as 
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virtual elements become essential part of ourselves. But what is most fascinating about 
Haraway’s cyborg is that it is not only free from the desires of its capitalist creators but it 
is also free from all fantasies of past-utopias.  
[The cyborg] has no truck with bisexuality, pre-oedipal symbiosis, unalienated labour, or 
other seductions to organic wholeness through a final appropriation of all the powers of 
the parts into a higher unity. In a sense, the cyborg has no origin story in the Western 
sense – a 'final' irony since the cyborg is also the awful apocalyptic telos of the 'West's' 
escalating dominations of abstract individuation. (Haraway, 1999, p. 273) 
Tom Roach (2015a) follows a similar line in his analysis of Grindr: Grindr came into being 
thanks to the ruthless rules of capitalist free markets but offers a tool for dismantling the 
existing system of oppression. In the question ‘how does the cyborg erase its 
genealogy?’ Haraway is herself troubled: ‘The main trouble with cyborgs, of course, is 
that they are the illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism, not to 
mention state socialism. But illegitimate offspring are often exceedingly unfaithful to their 
origins. Their fathers, after all, are inessential.’ (Haraway, 1999, p. 273) ) 
The diminishing power of the paternal figure in Western metaphysics allows Haraway to 
envision a world without fathers or more accurately, a world where fathers are 
‘inessential’; not because they are not essential for the rise of cyborgs but rather because 
they are emptied of their metaphysical essence, evacuated by the power to grant 
meaning to subjectivity. Once the paternal function was questioned it lost all meaning, as 
it relied on its metaphysical threat. But what does a world beyond the paternal metaphor 
look like? If we accept that we are moving towards a post-Oedipus reality, what does that 
mean for our ability to connect and communicate with each other? In all its 
oppressiveness, the paternal metaphor subjected everyone to the same law, the law of 
the Other. In a world of sinthomatic singularity, communication might look and feel very 
different.  
In a 2015 article, tech-blogger Lauren Smiley cautions us that new communication 
technologies do little to connect people: 
In 1998, Carnegie Mellon researchers warned that the internet could make us into 
hermits. They released a study monitoring the social behaviour of 169 people making their 
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first forays online. The web-surfers started talking less with family and friends and grew 
more isolated and depressed. “We were surprised to find that what is a social technology 
has such anti-social consequences,” said one of the researchers at the time. “And these 
are the same people who, when asked, describe the Internet as a positive thing.” (Smiley, 
2015) 
Most certainly, the idea of networked hermits does not seem compatible with the 
previously described idea of sociability as developed by Bersani. But are we moving 
towards an era of digital hermits or is that fear part of some moral panic around the 
emergence of new technologies? The case study that exemplifies the fears expressed by 
Smiley comes, once again, from Japan, where more than half a million people live as 
‘hikikomori’. Hikikomori (literally, "pulling inward, being confined”) are reclusive 
adolescents or adults who decide to withdraw from all social activities and become some 
sort of hermits (Teo, 2012). Hikikomori are usually children of middle-class families who 
at some point abandon all social life and only want to stay in their rooms, playing video 
games, watching anime and pornography. The phenomenon is well-documented in 
Japan with suggested explanations ranging from psychoanalytic and psychiatric to 
sociological and cultural analyses.   
First coined by the Japanese psychologist Tamaki Saiko, who claimed there are a million 
such individuals in his country, the term hikikomori usually refers to a son or daughter of 
a middle-class Japanese family who avoids all social contact and has withdrawn 
indefinitely to his or her bedroom, or indeed any space whatever equipped with a 
networked computer. 
For our analysis we follow Scott Wilson’s (2010) investigation of the phenomenon, as he 
theorises hikikomori in relation to the Lacanian sinthome, a conceptual framework we 
have already explored in depth in the previous chapter. Wilson introduces the topic of the 
hikikomori by following Lacan’s suggestion that the Japanese are unanalysable. For 
Lacan, the structure of the Japanese writing system upsets the theoretical assumptions 
of his theory which was developed taking into account Western writing systems. For 
Wilson, the hikikomori phenomenon suggests that the Lacanian argument might hold 
some truth: living in a society that is increasingly dependent on multimedia, multi-
sensorial stimuli, a theory that prioritises the signifier might indeed fail to grasp the new 
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challenges of contemporary subjectivity.   
Wilson suggests that the Lacanian argument does not in fact render the Japanese 
language deficient in relation to Western writing systems. It is rather an observation of a 
different relation to jouissance that Lacan also noted in the case of James Joyce. 
Consequently, the idea of the sinthome might allow us to both understand and theorise 
the hikikomori phenomenon, as the sinthome is ‘a signifying formulation that exceeds 
meaning accessible to interpretation, but nevertheless provides a means of organising 
jouissance and holding the subject together’ (Wilson, 2010, p. 393). This theory of 
subjectivity might be more appropriate for our times where the world is rendered in 
multiple non-linguistic ways:  
We are networked beings in which a range of virtual identities are determined in various 
profiles enabled and delimited by different codes and algorithms. Are we, in this sense, 
becoming Japanese, such that for an increasing number psychoanalysis has become 
neither possible nor necessary? (Wilson, 2010, p. 393) 
Psychoanalysis made its name as a talking cure and thus it is built upon the premise that 
the subject can speak of themselves and their symptoms. In a radical departure from 
psychoanalytic orthodoxy, Wilson adapts the psychoanalytic argument to the post-human 
era by examining one of the classic Freudian texts, Civilisation and its Discontents. In 
that explorative essay Freud gives an account of the beginning of civilisation. Similarly to 
the post-human discourse, Freud theorises the human as a prosthetic god. Humans only 
became human when they started using tools, and technology allowed them to fantasise 
that one day they would be able to make everything they imagine possible. In this 
fantasy, Freud identifies the paradox of technological progress: instead of enabling 
humans to transcend reality by using tools, technology made humans realise their radical 
insufficiency. In Freud’s words, ‘Man has, as it were, become a kind of prosthetic God. 
When he puts on all his auxiliary organs he is truly magnificent; but those organs have 
not grown on to him and they still give him much trouble at times’ (Freud, 1927, pp. 91–
92). 
And we have certainly reached a point in history when the prostheses on our bodies are 
undeniably troublesome; the closer we come to our godlike potential, the more worried 
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we become of the repercussions. Wilson suggests that in order to understand the 
subjectivity of our times, in order to be able to theorise hikikomori and other odd psychic 
formations of our networked realities, we need to expand our understanding of the 
unconscious. His attempt involves the introduction of what he names the ‘audio 
unconscious’, a concept that I suggest is very relevant to our discussion of the ‘resonant’ 
signifier. In our earlier theorisation, the signifier’s materiality is looked upon through an 
examination of language’s musicality, rhythm, and pulses. We live in times when 
linguistic rules diminish while the enjoyment of language as a series of sounds 
increases.11 
In our discussion of the Walkman, we saw how sound is considered to be ‘closer to our 
thoughts’ than images. Wilson (2015), following a similar trajectory, analyses the music of 
Richard D. James, also known as Aphex Twin, whom he considers as particularly 
relevant to hikikomori subjectivity. Aphex Twin, Wilson tells us, produces his work in his 
bedroom in a state of semi-reverie. Dissonant and tense sounds, through delay and 
reverberation, gain the status of what Aphex Twin himself calls ‘braindance’. This music 
is not produced to relax the listener as the album title Ambient Works Vol. 2 might 
suggest but, on the contrary, to challenge and stress the brain. According to Wilson, 
‘through multiple rhythms, tones and timbres, electronic continuity between neural circuits 
and circuits of digital information, creating billions of new synaptic connections between 
neurons in a more immediate and efficient way than language’ (Wilson, 2015, p. 191). 
Aphex Twin’s braindance is an intense stimulating experience that blurs the distinction 
between human and machine, between neutrons and chips; it is for Wilson a music that 
exemplifies the potency and disorganising effects of the drive, or what he calls the ‘audio 
unconscious’. Like the hikikomori, Aphex Twin produces his work secluded from his 
physical environment while remaining online. His computer music, criticised for being 
solipsistic, seems to revolve around himself.  He often includes anagrams of his name in 
the titles of songs and albums and also includes his face in the visual material 
accompanying his music. Like James Joyce, Aphex Twin is constructing his sinthome 
                                               
11 The most tragic aspect of this development is perhaps the rise of Donald Trump and the 
whole post-truth aesthetic, with language being no more than a stream of affective non-sense. 
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through art. Instead of using linguistic means to achieve it, he creates a soundscape, an 
audio environment that is uninhabitable, yet at the same time, a room of one’s own.  
Aphex Twin – like Joyce – builds a complex sensorial universe that operates on its own 
rules. His countless puns and anagrams of his name, featuring in song titles, his various 
aliases and the use of his face in the visual elements of his records could be perceived 
as an attempt to make a name for himself ‘in the absence of a paternal signifier’ (Wilson, 
2010, p. 405). Once again we encounter a generative narcissism, narcissism as a 
starting point for the formation of subjectivity. This narcissism is not bound to stagnation 
and isolation but is a creative process that allows for the creation of a meeting point with 
the Other. For Wilson, the figure of the hikikomori is another sign that our conception of 
the unconscious needs to be conceptualised beyond the signifier. Lost in a sea of 
pornography and video games, the hikikomori is isolated by the Other and not bound by 
the paternal law that defines intersubjectivity. Yet the hikikomori are not autistic hermits; 
they are in constant state of connectivity through the internet.  
In his article, Wilson urges us to engage with a new ‘modality of intersubjective 
interactivity’. I want to suggest that augmented reality gaming offers an opportunity to do 
precisely this. In Pokémon Go, briefly a cultural phenomenon when launched in the 
summer of 2016, before fading somewhat, we find an intersection between the enclosed 
virtual worlds of the hikikomori and the cruising adventures of Bersani's queer subject. 
Expanding on my earlier theorisation of Grindr, we will now examine the different ways 
the subject navigates the city through media.  
In order to understand Pokémon GO, we have to first understand the phenomenological 
shift that augmented environments bring to new media users especially in relation to 
older applications of virtual reality. Virtual reality has been discussed in the context of 
critical media theory since its very conception. The idea that the futuristic possibility of a 
virtual environment is identical (or better?) than our sensorial reality raises new ethical 
and political questions. In virtual reality (VR) computers can simulate realistic 
environments where the user acquires experiences that were otherwise not accessible to 
them. 
 VR was theorised as ‘an image or space that is not real but appears to be’ (Mirzoeff, 
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1999, p. 91), yet very often virtuality involves not only immaterial but also invisible 
aspects. For example, we consider virtual identities as identity formations that are 
mediated through networked communication technologies. André Nusselder, a 
researcher working on the intersection between digital technologies and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, offers some insights with regards to the new virtual spaces and their 
relation to psychic processes. He analyses cyberspace in an attempt to understand how 
subjectivity changes in the age of information (Nusselder, 2010). 
For psychoanalytic ontology and post-human studies the world is already virtualised 
through language: as André Nusselder (2010) notes, citing Pierre Lévy, ‘Human 
language virtualises real time, material objects, actual events, and on-going situations’. 
Nusselder expands on this notion and by suggesting that if reality is already constructed 
like fiction then it already resembles what we theorise as a virtual world. A virtual world is 
essentially a semiotic matrix, and if we define reality as a result of the symbolic order 
then the ‘real world’ as we perceive it, is not much different than the virtual one. For 
Nusselder, information technologies ‘fundamentally alter the relation of signified to 
signifier’ ((Nusselder, 2010, p. 61). As we saw in our earlier discussion of emoji, the 
relation of the signifier and the signified is essential in the process of meaning production.  
Nusselder claims that in the case of new information technologies, it is not only the 
relation between signifiers and signifieds that gets disrupted but there is a new category 
of signifiers that emerge: the ‘flickering signifiers’. In a sense, Nusselder suggests that 
new information technologies caused an acceleration in the process that Lacan defines 
as sliding of meaning in the chain of signification. The signifiers that are fundamentally 
designed to change position and meaning according to the context in the VR paradigm 
become then more prone to changes, ‘metamorphoses, attenuations and dispersions’ 
(Ibid., p.61). Once again, we see how technological advances affect the ontological 
qualities of the signifier.  
Nusselder argues that virtuality is essentially a process of constant metaphorisation, 
following media scholar Marshall McLuhan who claims that ‘all media are active 
metaphors in their power to translate experiences into new forms’ (Nusselder, 2010, p. 
16). As we will see later in our analysis it is exactly the modality of translatability that 
allows a new conceptualisation of subjectivity that goes beyond the realm of linguistics 
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and a thinking of the role of images, sounds and other affective elements in this process. 
In our analysis we focus on PG, a mobile game that is based on augmented reality (AR) 
technology. AR transforms space into an assemblage of material and virtual elements, 
which interact and co-create each other. AR projects reject the totalising effect of VR as 
they leave an open space for interaction between physical and virtual elements and in a 
way they accelerate the process of metaphorisation we described earlier as they blur the 
difference between reality and virtuality.  
Pokémon and new media geographies 
As stated in the introduction of this chapter, this research project was initially conceived 
as an investigation of the relationship between space and media. The notion of locative 
media has been at the core of this investigation. As locative media we define media 
whose consumption is contingent to the geolocation of the user. In order to better 
understand the function of locative media, I will present here some examples and then 
proceed with linking them to undercurrent themes of my research such the unconscious, 
sinthome and subjectivity.  
In locative media projects, the city is understood as a territory for creative exploration. As 
we saw in our literature review, locative media practitioners use different technological 
applications ranging from site-specific performances to audio-tours and interactive 
installations. Nevertheless, the most significant locative media expansion as a genre 
came through the widespread adoption of GPS technologies especially after the 
mainstreamisation of smartphones. Both iPhones and other smartphones could 
subsequently operate as platforms for the development and consumption of locative 
media projects ranging from history and information-based applications (that expand the 
concept of the traditional city-guide) to projects that involve music and poetry and of 
course games.  
Locative media have been often theorised in relation to the concept of ‘urban exploration’ 
(Pinder, 2007). The user wanders around the city with the assistance of an artistic project 
that aims at re-signifying the urban environment. The small intervention coming in the 
form of a site-specific text, image or sound allows the subject to re-approach the city 
disrupting its everyday normativity. Cultural geographer David Pinder (2009) follows in his 
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account of urban exploration psychogeographical theory and practice, as developed by 
Guy Debord and the Situationist International. Psychogeography involves a series of 
artistic practices that re-signified the urban territory. At its core, psychogeographical 
practice is a political project aiming at the de-stabilisation of the normative way that 
modern cities are organised around notions of surveillance and productivity.  
As the term suggests, ‘psychogeography’ is an attempt to understand the complex 
relations between emotions, thoughts, desires and the material city. In contrast to the 
functionalist understanding of the modernist city as a space of productivity and 
consumption, psychogeography counter-suggests the flâneur, a rebellious figure that 
choses to wonder in the city in the most aimless ways. The city of the flâneur is not a city 
of normative directions but an open playground for exploration and diversions. The 
flâneur thrives in getting lost, losing track, finding what they did not know that existed. 
Following our earlier analysis, the flâneur is a true child of the ‘real’ city, the city of 
impossibility and anxiety, the city of the drive, where confusion and discordance guide 
the subject to a journey of impossible self-making.  
Locative media projects attempt to untangle the different threads that make 
contemporary cities into what they are and then reconstruct them in new innovative ways. 
Many of the audio-walks we presented in our literature review deconstruct the notion of a 
‘guided’ tour as developed in traditional tourist applications. Instead of guiding the subject 
into a superficial understanding of the environment, psychogeographical alternatives dig 
holes in mainstream narratives around the city’s established understanding. In Janet 
Cardiff’s project for example, what starts as a conventional audio-tour of Whitechapel’s 
library soon diverts into an exciting (and scary) crime story. Cardiff calls the user to follow 
her voice, follow her steps around Whitechapel, see and be seen, smell and hear what is 
going on around them. By introducing a layer of narrative in the perceptive environment 
of the user she allows them to re-visit a familiar territory. The city of her narrative is the 
same city that the user walks through in their everyday life, but now, everything is 
charged, mysterious and alluring.  
But it is not only the relation to the city as a series of sensorial experiences that can be 
shaped through locative media. It is also the relation to the city as a network of 
relationships (Wilken, 2010). The city is the space where we encounter countless other 
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people, a place where other people live and meet. According to media theorist Rowan 
Wilken, mobile media generate instantaneous communities of affinity. Those 
communities, according to Wilken, cannot be reduced to identification but allow the 
possibility of fluidity and difference. In that sense, Wilken’s argument resembles Roach’s 
account of ‘shared estrangement’ and it helps us expand the theorisation we built around 
Grindr, to include other location-based applications and creative projects.  
The assemblage of virtual and physical elements that comes as a result of locative media 
projects poses new challenges in the analysis of both space and subjectivity within 
space. In order to understand the complex semiotic network of images, text, sound and 
sensorial stimuli from the environment, we need to develop multi-dimensional creative 
tools. In my attempt to grasp how a subject navigates those complex semiotic networks I 
developed a methodological framework that combines ethnographic observation and art 
practice. Starting point for this investigation is the 2016 commercial success of Pokémon 
GO, a locative media project that got mainstream attention and instigated a discussion 
around the potential of AR large-scale projects.  
Pokémon GO caused a world-wide frenzy in its launch, becoming the most downloaded 
app in history in its first week. The game’s premise was similar to the main Pokémon’s 
franchise games. Pokémon first appeared as a game for the hand-held console devices 
of Nintendo (the Game Boy). It soon evolved into a media phenomenon, with a 
successful TV series, movies, trading cards, stickers and all kinds of merchandise. 
Pokémon was initially developed by Satoshi Tajiri in the mid-90s. Tajiri, who is himself in 
the autistic spectrum, claimed he draw his inspiration for developing the Pokémon game 
from the pleasure he experienced while collecting insects as a child. And the main 
objective of the Pokémon game is exactly that: collecting as many different Pokémon as 
possible and putting them in battles with each other in order to level them up and make 
them stronger. The American Pokémon TV show captures the spirit of this process with 
its iconic slogan ‘gotta catch 'em all’.  
Pokémon shares in its conception many of the problematics of the sinthome as we 
examined it earlier. The main character (both in the games and in the TV show) has no 
father; his father does not appear neither as a character nor as a memory, he is 
completely absent. The character, a 10-year-old boy, starts a long journey in order to 
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collect all of the Pokémon. In the English version of the anime, the main protagonist’s 
name is Ash Ketchum, a literal reference to the series motto, gotta catch ’em all. the 
protagonist’s name comes from what he plans on doing, creating a circular paradox. The 
process of obsessively collecting Pokémon organises the player’s anxiety and 
enjoyment. The Pokémon universe is odd and nonsensical if seen from a traditional, 
linear understanding of narrative. Nevertheless, it became a media empire and more than 
twenty years later it keeps fascinating children (and adults) all over the world. The 
Pokémon generation is arguably the generation of the sinthome. A generation that grew 
up in a world where the paternal law has receded.  
On December 1997, Pokémon caused worldwide panic when an episode of the anime, 
reportedly caused hundreds of children to get epileptic seizures. In the episode Electric 
Soldier Porygon, the series protagonist, Ash Ketchum, gets trapped in a virtual reality 
world. During a battle in the virtual world a huge explosion covered the screen into red 
and blue flashes for a few seconds. The strobing lights, were accused for the seizures of 
over 600 children in Japan, and the episode was never screened again. Electric Soldier 
Porygon caused an extreme case of what we presented earlier as braindance. In this 
case, the flashing lights operate as a disorienting force. There is a literal disruption of 
normative perceptive functions, and the break caused dangerous overload of the viewers’ 
cognitive capacity. Similarly to the Aphex Twin music, the Electric Soldier Porygon 
attacks subjectivity by creating an unbearable sensorial environment. Even though the 
TV show production team was more careful after that incident, the Pokémon franchise 
was built around and continued to produce material that was essentially based on 
repetitive electronic sounds and flashing colours. I would argue here that Pokémon is 
indeed build upon the same principles as the braindance music we discussed earlier. The 
main game and the TV show narrative is ostensibly irrelevant; the main driving force of 
the character is just to collect as many Pokémon as possible – an obsessional and 
repetitive task that can never be fulfilled as more Pokémon are added almost on a yearly 
basis. The collection of all Pokémon is the sinthomatic ‘suppletion’ that the character 
uses as a substitution for his lack of a father.  
Unlike the console-based Pokémon series, in Pokémon GO the players could find and 
collect Pokémon in real world locations, landmarks, parks and streets. Despite the fact 
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the technology was there for at least ten years before the game was launched, Pokémon 
GO was the first mainstream success of a location-aware AR game. In Pokémon GO 
(PG) the user looks for Pokémon in the real world and as a result the whole of the world 
becomes the arena of the game. Since PG is relatively recent and its hype was 
admittedly short-lived there is little research around the phenomenon. Most research 
focuses on the aspect of physical exercise that separates PG from traditional video 
games. In public health studies (Althoff et al., 2016; LeBlanc A.G and Chaput J.-P, 2017), 
the possibility of popular video-games that encourage their players into physical activity 
opens new horizons for healthier living. Others (Serino et al., 2016), still operating within 
the health sciences fields, flag the potential danger for injuries during playing PG, as the 
users are focusing on the screen while walking in the real world, raising the probability of 
accidents.  
But it was another work of medical research (Tateno et al., 2016) that gained my 
attention, as the group of psychiatric researchers in a series of published papers argue 
that Pokémon GO might be the solution in relation to the socio-psychological problem of 
the hikikomori. The hypothesis is simple: the hikikomori decide to never leave their rooms 
and instead they just want to be playing video games. But if their video game’s function 
incorporates the real world, then they have an incentive to leave their home. Tateno 
follows certain patients, diagnosed as hikikomori, and presents an unexpected 
improvement in their condition after the launch of Pokémon GO. In his team’s big surprise 
several of their hikikomori patients started going regularly out leading them to think that if 
we could develop similar applications that connect the virtual world of gaming with the 
real world it would greatly benefit more hikikomori patients. This assumption is crucial for 
our theorisation of Pokémon in relation to the sinthome as it shows how subjects that are 
essentially separated by society find a way to re-connect to the symbolic order through 
an invention of a psycho-technical gadget.   
Pokémon GO was not developed by Nintendo, the company that originally developed 
and distributed all other Pokémon games. PG was instead developed by Niantic, a 
smaller company based in San Francisco that specialises in location-aware applications 
and transmedia narratives. Niantic’s first major success that led to PG was the popular 
mobile game Ingress. Ingress, despite its reasonable success for a mobile game, never 
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captured the mainstream fascination but nevertheless was used by Niantic to pilot the 
concept of an AR game in order in order to attract Nintendo’s attention. Ingress has been 
theorised as the first multiplayer augmented reality game (Chess, 2014) and was 
criticised for using its players for excessive data mining (Hodson, 2012; Hulsey and 
Reeves, 2014), a criticism that later on was expressed against PG.  
According to media theorist Sophia Drakopoulou (2010), location-based games, such as 
Ingress, change the way the world is being materialised. Drakopoulou analyses the 
interaction of players with their environments in several locative games that pre-date 
Ingress and notices that in all instances the players experience time and space differently 
from each other. Drakopoulou follows de Certeau according to whom ‘Every story is a 
travel story—a spatial practice’ in order to investigate how locative games do in fact 
change the environments within which they take place. The city becomes part of a 
narrative that was not there before the game and one that interestingly will persist in the 
memory of the player after the ending of the game.  
One of my first experiences with augmented reality applications came during my visit to 
Helsinki in 2015. I was there for a conference and stayed at a couch-surfer’s place in the 
northern suburbs of the city. When my host heard that I was interested in locative media 
he informed me enthusiastically he was one of the best Ingress players in Finland. The 
next day he took me for a long walk to show me the game mechanics and thus my first 
playing experience with Ingress came during a long summer day in Helsinki. Before we 
went out he wore trekking clothes, presenting an unconventional image for a gamer. Our 
experience of the city was very different to a traditional site-seeing walk. The game’s 
narrative indeed affected the way I experienced the different landmarks we visited. The 
landmarks that belonged to the team my host was part of were discussed with loving 
affectation whereas those belonging to the enemy were approached with suspicion and 
disappointment. Nevertheless, when we met another player who indeed was playing for 
the opposing team, my host was very excited to meet another Ingress player and they 
exchanged tips and stories.  
Having experienced ingress, I was very excited when I was informed that Niantic was 
preparing a new Pokémon game in early 2016. In the summer of 2016 and while I was in 
Athens I had the opportunity to experiment with and talk to players to players of Pokémon 
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GO. Unlike Ingress, in PG the players in the first view weeks would represent much more 
varied demographics. Thanks to the massive hype that followed the game launch a large 
portion of non-gamers downloaded the application, although most of them did not remain 
active after the first few weeks. PG was a game that since its launch attracted a 
remarkably gender-balanced audience (especially in comparison to other video games 
where young males comprise the large majority). In the first couple of weeks of the game 
the players were hyper-visible in the city. The elements that made them visible were: a. 
walking down a street while looking at the screen b. carrying a portable battery charger 
(as the game was draining the battery of the smartphone) c. they were moving in groups 
in arranged Pokémon-hunting walks. The PG players were apparent to people that would 
not notice a video game phenomenon normally. A taxi driver told me: 
Yesterday, I got a client in Vrilissia [Athens suburb] and he wanted to hunt Pokémon. He 
took a taxi to hunt Pokémon! If this continues I will make a special offer, 20 euros for an 
hour of Pokémon hunting.  
The augmented reality disrupts the city inserting a parallel narrative. For the taxi driver 
Pokémon hunting is, even as a joke, a legitimised and potentially profitable urban activity. 
Unlike the virtual environments of video games, augmented reality applications ‘spill over’ 
into the real world. In the taxi driver’s account, PG was a paradox, but, even as such, it 
was acknowledged as part of urban life. In that sense, PG can be theorised in relation to 
the concept of sociability we examined in the previous chapter. The users are at the 
same time in relation to each other but without necessarily being implicated in a 
relationship. PG functions in accordance to Roach’s quoted phrase: ‘the screen stands 
as an ever-present reminder of the impossibility of intersubjective fusion, and yet feelings 
of deep interdependence brim over.’ The players will encounter each other within the city, 
as they will meet countless others who happen to pass by. The PG players during the 
game will explore neighbourhoods of the city they would never normally visit and interact 
with people they would not have interacted otherwise. Like postmodern flâneurs, PG 
players will get lost in the city, in the city that the video game creates.  
In order to examine the phenomenon of Pokémon GO and reflect on the idea of locative 
gaming as a potential sinthomatic endeavour, I set up a different Pokémon game that 
combines the main game mechanics of PG with creative writing and diaristic self-
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expression. By engaging with this experimental methodology I wanted to see how people 
would interact with space if they got the opportunity to create their own locative narratives 
and site-specific personal poems. Taking as starting point the experience of Pokémon 
GO, I invited a series of writers and asked them to create their own locative Pokémon-
poems. Combining creative methodological tools such as poetry as research and site-
specific performance as research, I aimed at both expanding the methodological horizon 
of consumer research and creating embodied experiences as reflections on my research 
questions. The result is a multidimensional network of images, texts and personalised 
maps of Athens.  
Poems in the city 
In this section I shall make what is essentially a methodological leap. From analysing a 
cultural phenomenon by examining its context I move to staging an intervention that gets 
inspired, influenced and shaped by the cultural phenomenon itself. The intervention is 
then used for drawing conclusions. By inviting art practitioners within the framework of my 
research I mainly aspired to open up the epistemological methodology into the openness 
of creativity. As I have presented in my introductory chapters, I strongly believe that 
research should not be confined within the discursive limitations of academic writing. In 
the previous chapters we saw how certain theoretical orthodoxies are being challenged in 
new media environments. We re-evaluated for example the importance of the imaginary 
domain within Lacanian ontology, suggesting new approaches to psychic phenomena 
would potentially centralise artistic expression and creativity. Besides that, in our 
examination of the sinthome we saw how James Joyce’s poetic discourse was able to 
create a new relation to the symbolic order and that is something we aspire to reproduce 
in our poetic project called Pokémon Poetry Go.  
Building on these assumptions and theorisations, I wanted to create a locative media 
platform, invite a series of people and see the different ways they interpret the framework 
of ideas I developed during my research. Before I go into details around the final results 
of this project I would like to refer to the process that led to that as this ethnographic 
component is important for the contextualisation of the work. Going back to the early 
stages of the research, as I stated earlier, the analysis of space through mobile 
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technologies was at the core of my research. While researching relevant artistic projects 
that dealt with similar topics, I was surprised to find that many locative projects were 
developed in Athens, the city I lived in as a student and went often back as a visitor.  
During one of my visits, I met with members of the ‘Akoo-o’ collective, a group that was 
very active in the local art scene. Akoo-o is a group of musicians, anthropologists, visual 
artists and other inter-disciplinary artists and academics. Their work revolves around the 
experience of walking in the city, urban soundscapes and site-specific interventions. 
Through my relationship with Akoo-o, I became acquainted with their methodologies 
including field recordings, the use of binaural microphones and most importantly the 
development of locative sound-based applications. When I first met them, they were 
using noTours, an open-source android application developed by the Spanish 
programming and sound art group Escoitar.  
In noTours, the user could place on a map of the city a series of different sounds. Then, 
using a mobile phone with GPS capacity, the user could walk in the city and hear the 
sounds in the places corresponding to the map positions. The platform fascinated me 
and I experimented with it for a while. After I met Akoo-o I realised they were one of many 
local art projects that engaged with locative applications and site-specific artworks in 
Athens during that period. According to G, a member of Akoo-o, a possible explanation 
for this is the fact that Athens, due to the continuous period of crisis and the subsequent 
socio-cultural shifts that took place in the last decade, was somehow perceived as 
contested territory. If Athens was a contested territory where meaning was not solidified 
but, due to the uncertainty and unruliness of everyday reality, was open to dispute, 
locative media were thriving as they could add an extra layer of meaning. Similarly to our 
observations, Drakopoulou in her mapping of Athenian locative projects notices that most 
of them are heavily politicised and as expected deeply affected by the current political 
climate (2010). 
A city that is disputed, stretched to fit historical narratives, lingering between a glorious 
past and a dystopian present; a city in constant identity crisis. This is the city where 
mobile media can insert a series of meaningful layers and contest mainstream narratives. 
Akoo-o creates soundscapes that thematise contemporary topics and play with the 
naturalised auditory perception of space. Akoo-o (meaning ‘to hear’ in Greek) sets in 
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motion an active process of hearing, or rather a process of ‘active listening’ in urban 
space. Sounds can set your brain in motion – to return back to the braindance argument 
we developed earlier. 
As my relationship with Akoo-o members grew, we decided to collaborate and organise a 
few open workshops inviting people to experiment with locative media. The first 
workshop took place in the context of ‘sound acts’, a festival that focuses on gender, 
sound art and performance in May 2015. In the workshop I had my first contact with the 
Echoes platform. Echoes, unlike noTours, was very easy to navigate, offering an online 
platform that allows the user to upload their own media files and then stream them 
through the echoes application (which is available both for android and iOS devices). 
Echoes was developed by Josh Kopeček, a composer and programmer with a strong 
interest in the intersections between sound art and technology. During the workshop we 
had a Skype call with Josh and he presented his vision around creating an accessible 
locative media platform that could be used in educational and artistic projects.  
Echoes, unlike noTours, was more flexible in terms of media it supports. Despite being 
developed with a main focus on sound, it nevertheless supports text, images and video. 
When a user creates a new map/project they are invited to add different ‘echoes’ in 
different locations on the map. Every echo can include different elements depending on 
what the user wants to create. Admittedly, the prominence of sound in locative media is 
not incidental. As we have already seen, the main function of locative applications is 
combining elements of the actual environment with augmented features. Soundscapes 
allow us to experience the visual aspect of the city while investing it with an extra 
sensorial layer. 
Soundscaping becomes a representation of what we described earlier as the audio 
unconscious – an unconscious dispersed and non-linguistic, an assemblage of digital 
and biological elements, a semiotic field of stimuli. The subject is tapping into a stream of 
free associations. In our new methodological intervention, we seek to provoke new kinds 
of introspection that are socialised and organised in open spaces; dispersed in urban 
environments and outdoors expeditions. The introspection, lost in space, allows for an 
outsourced cartography of the unconscious. Walking as a method of introspection is far 
from a new invention, nevertheless, in the case of locative applications, we enhance the 
  177 
experience with additional sensorial stimuli. Words and sounds intercept memories, stain 
our associations with resonant obstructions, rhythmical structures, unfinished 
symphonies. We need new languages in order to describe those experiences. My 
ethnography is stained, broken and mediated through those obstructions. An 
ethnography of the unconscious requires a poetic language, détournements and 
deviations.   
But as we stressed earlier in our analysis of the drive, the Lacanian real is not conceived 
as an a-historical and depoliticised terrain of operation. Accordingly, the post-linguistic 
understanding of the unconscious we presented in our analysis of the hikikomori does 
not go beyond an analysis of power relations. Our analysis does not aim to a fetishisation 
of the unconscious as a fundamentally revolutionary force. Both the city and our 
subjectivity are still governed by power structures. Locative media often attempt to 
thematise, uncover and disrupt these power structures. Jason Farman (2015), for 
example, uses locative narratives in orders to disrupt mainstream understandings of 
space. Space is always narrativised through established power regimes, the histories 
that we perceive as a place’s history are the ones that kyriarchal models has allowed to 
exist. For Farman, locative media can be grassroots-organised and antagonistic to 
mainstream narratives around space. He proposes a guerrilla digital colonisation of 
space with what he considers marginalised narratives. In one of his locative research 
projects, for example, he located stories of disabled students in places within his 
university campus were accessibility was limited. In a way, he allowed the able-bodied 
users of the locative application to experience space in a way that is normally invisible to 
them.  
In the Pokémon Poetry Go, we also intended upsetting normative power structures and 
kyriarchal narratives. First, we wanted to disrupt a series of orthodoxies around the 
distinction between private and public space. The poems are often auto-biographical, 
personal, intimate. By placing them in different spots in the city, we disrupt the 
permissible way of self-expression in public. At the same time, due to the hybridic nature 
of the medium, our ‘vandalism’ is not visible to everyone, and thus it operates in a 
different way to a stencil / public poster; the medium itself obscures the distinction 
between public and private. The urban poetry of our project does not raise social issues 
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in a direct way, as Farman’s project does, but it still uncovers an affective aspect of the 
city that is often hidden. By humanising the city, by exposing the bare bones of the 
inhabitant memories, intimate stories, fears and even nonsensical deliriums, we disrupt 
the normative function of the city as a well-organised and efficient machine.  
In Pokémon Poetry Go, the hosts’ poems varied both in their writing style and their 
relation to space. The ten writers who responded to my initial call for submissions, 
contributed 21 different site-specific poems. In the coming section, we will examine some 
of the poems and their relation to the places they were installed in and then we will 
examine the actual experience of someone ‘visiting’ and consuming the poems. 
Pokémon Poetry Go 
Pokémon Poetry is a project that evolved over the years. Initially, it was a collection of 
online poems that was created in ta tetxoia (meaning: the such), an experimental poetry 
forum that started in 2009. A common practice in ‘ta tetxoia’ was the collective writing of 
poems, with a user offering the beginning of a poem/text and other users expanding it. In 
the forum – of which I was a core member – users’ poetry often incorporated internet 
lingo, greeklish (writing Greek using the Latin alphabet, a usual practice in Greek online 
communities) and neologisms that were developed within the forum. It is worth saying 
that using greeklish and internet colloquialisms in poetry was at the time extremely 
uncommon. In addition to that, ta tetxoia, unlike more traditional poetry websites was 
very much invested in incorporating humour and playfulness into the produced discourse 
and poems, often including references to contemporary and internet-based phenomena. 
In that sense, when I first started the ‘Pokémon Poetry’ thread I was operating within a 
framework that was very open to this kind of unholy couplings. The initial inspiration for 
Pokémon Poetry came when I heard an older writer saying something like: ‘can the 
Pokémon generation really write any poetry?’ This rhetorical question insinuated that my 
generation has lost touch with the ‘true’ emotions that are essential in poetry writing. 
Pokémon for him seemed to represent a post-modern disruption to what he understood 
as authentic expression, pointing to an approach of creativity and poetry which is rather 
different to those mentioned in previous chapters. Following James Joyce (and Lacan’s 
reading of his work), we can reflect on the relationship between language and technology 
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and aspire for a poetry that goes beyond tradition and facilitates self-making and 
singularity. 
Pokémon Poetry opens up the opportunity for creating poetry that goes beyond the name 
of the father, a poetry that - similarly to braindance music - merges the virtual and the 
physical, bridges the digital and the biological. Pokémon are sinthomatic inventions; they 
are the rootless subject that yearns to connect to the symbolic order. Nevertheless, the 
first collection of Pokémon Poetry – developed in ta tetxoia forum – deliberately 
incorporated forms and narrative structures borrowed from old-school lyrical poetry. In 
that sense, Pokémon Poetry created a strange contemporaneous co-existence of past, 
present and future. The Pokémon generation responds to the poet’s accusation of being 
an a-social and autistic group of people by appropriating lyricism and hyper-romanticism 
in order to present a paradoxical and disorienting hybrid poetics.  
After the initial development of the poems, Pokémon Poetry was transformed into a 
series of music lieder (a type of German song of the Romantic period, typically for solo 
voice and piano accompaniment) by composer Fil Ieropoulos. Ieropoulos followed the 
lyrical tone of the poems and adapted them into (semi)classical songs. The final result 
was recorded with the voice of Ioanna Forti, a mezzo-soprano, and Alexandros Drosos 
playing the piano. The work was presented live in 2015 at sound acts festival in Athens. 
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The operatic singing further underlined the paradoxical aspect of the project, with a 
soprano essentially singing the stories of Pokémon characters.  
Central in this project is the concept of transmediality. As transmediality we define the 
constant crossing of boundaries and blurring of the lines between rigid media disciplines. 
Pokémon Poetry is inter-or-trans/disciplinary in its very conception: making music out of 
poems that were created as a response to a video game. Discourse gets imbued with 
images, is codified, deconstructed and re-constructed in a different medium. 
Transmediality as a methodological priority answers our earlier question around the 
limitations of psychoanalytic theorisation of contemporary media realities. We are 
essentially describing a form of translation that goes beyond the symbolic production of 
meaning and opens up to the unexpected and multi-sensorial, constantly changing and 
transforming modes of expression. 
Translation is a concept that occupies a central position in the thought of contemporary 
post-structuralist theorists such as Jacques Derrida and Walter Benjamin. Derrida, 
through examining the impossibilities of absolute translation, finds a way to discuss the 
discursive limitations of language as such. Unlike Derrida, who emphasises the 
impossibility of translation, Benjamin provides a more positive account in his paper ‘The 
task of the translator’ (Benjamin, 2004), initially published in 1923. For Benjamin, 
translation is a future-oriented process, with translatability being a quality that certain 
texts carry, allowing them to survive in time. A work of art only survives through its 
capacity to keep being translated. That is why a translation is always a gesture towards 
the future and translatability is essentially the quality of a cultural object to dynamically 
position itself towards the future. We have to develop translatable pieces and in order to 
achieve that – and to bridge with the Derridean position – we have to allow the 
impossibility of absolute translation to change, disrupt, and network our produced 
creative work; we have to allow and trust the intersubjective alienating force of 
misunderstanding. Our future and the future of our work are essentially relying on 
translatability and the effective capacity to be misunderstood. 
Transmediality and intertextuality call for an expansive network of references. Connecting 
thoughts and territories, linking images and sounds, text and games, memories and 
fantasies. Following the ’Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?’ future-oriented question, 
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we ask: ‘can Pokémon write poetry?’ Our post-human poetry emerges after the death of 
the author as proclaimed by Roland Barthes and after the death of the father as 
described in the sinthome seminar. As we saw earlier in Donna Haraway's essay, the 
concept of the cyborg is a rejection of rigid boundaries, notably those separating ‘human’ 
from ‘animal’ and ‘human’ from ‘machine.’ Haraway writes: ‘the cyborg does not dream of 
community on the model of the organic family, this time without the oedipal project. The 
cyborg would not recognise the Garden of Eden; it is not made of mud and cannot dream 
of returning to dust’ (Haraway, 1999, p. 273). The cyborg poet is a de-centralised, half 
machine, half human creature that causes a braindance of flashing lights and letters.  
In Pokémon Poetry Go (PPG), we take Pokémon Poetry a step further by constructing a 
poetic video game. The Pokémon-poems in PPG become localised elements in an 
augmented reality environment. Katherine Hayles, one of the founding voices of post-
human studies, theorises human bodies as assemblages of flesh and information. 
According to Hayles (1999), the body, in the information era is being transposed into 
data, and our embodied experiences encompass networked and virtual elements. 
Following our earlier argument on translatability, we could claim that the process of 
transforming bodies into data is a process of translation. Selfhood is changing both in 
terms of the building blocks it consists of, and in the terrain it operates within. We 
encounter a re-codification of what we understand as a self-contained agency. In 
contemporary reality, technology becomes intrinsic in the process of subjectification. 
While traditional founding myths of selfhood such as the paternal metaphor subside, we 
invent new ways of articulating ourselves and our relation to the Other. The new 
selfhood, partly virtual and partly physical, half-biological and half-machinic, is based on 
a hybrid openness.  
Pokémon-poems are small gadgets of self-creation. They bind autobiography, poetic 
language, images, places and emotions. With Pokémon Poetry we aspire to open a 
discussion on creativity in times of augmented reality and to reflect on the future of media 
consumption in general. In PPG we take a traditional form of expression (poetry) and 
apply it to a very contemporary technological framework (augmented reality mobile 
media). Digital platforms allow the creation of art that combines different media: text, 
images, sounds, and interactive elements. We re-examine our relation to poetry, a 
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traditional literary mode, in a digital context. Poetry in this context transgresses textual 
limitations and becomes a methodology of creative transmediality. 
The poetics of PPG is not textual but rather embodied experiences, localised in space 
and time. I argue that the poetics of PPG become what I call ‘poetics of self’. Following 
the analysis of the sinthome, I invited the participating artists to create personal traits that 
re-configure not only their relationship to space, but also the relationship of space to 
themselves and others. Pokémon-poems, are deeply personal, yet anonymised and 
socialised in a shared platform. The psyche becomes a map, and the application’s map 
showcases a series of open ended, fragmented, exposed egos. The ‘homosexual 
subject’ we encountered in the previous chapter is constantly looking for their pieces in 
the world; in the case of PPG those pieces are organised in space in a way that allows 
for an inter-subjective sense of belonging.  
Ten poets submitted their work after the initial call for participation. The poems were all 
initially submitted in Greek and were translated to English by me for the needs of this 
dissertation. An essential aspect of the project is that all poems are anonymised on the 
map and the user can never know who wrote what. In that sense the poems become part 
of a collective fragmented subjectivity. Every poem creates a triangle of meaning 
between the image (Pokémon character chosen by each contributor) the submitted text 
and a specific location. Younger writers that knew Pokémon better (as they grew up with 
them) put more effort in including the Pokémon’s actual qualities and back stories into the 
text whereas older contributors focused more on the location and then picked a Pokémon 
that somewhat synesthetically fit into the narrative they developed in their poem. In our 
first example, P., a young poet, writes a Pokémon about Dragonite, a fat dragon 
Pokémon.  












I move comfortably, most of the time 
the world recognises me from afar 
like a mustard, winged lil’ ball 
with a beer belly lifting my weights, 
postmodern postal pigeon. 
I was once inversely invisible, truth be told; 
shadowy guardian, causing terror, 
hallowing in the sea. 
I have lamented and responded to injuries 
with my eye-headlights; 
I was crying in code-words, always out of tune; 
feeding their mysticism splendidly. 
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In his poem, the actual Pokémon is implicated and described. The Pokémon-poem uses 
a first-person narrative. In a sense, we hear the voice of Dragonite as it strolls down a 
narrow street in Kolonaki, a central and posh neighbourhood of Athens. The poem 
stresses some specificities of the medium. The main character is presented as inversely 
invisible. This double negation implies a hyper-visibility, nevertheless, the poetic 
discourse allows for a stressing of the imaginary aspect of the character. It is hyper-
(in)visible exactly as an imaginary beast would be. In the second poem of the same poet 
we encounter the same motif: the character speaks of their history.  
Gengar   
I occurred, 
with a sticky evil grin, 
Colgate ad. 
deadly fearsome 
with a long history 
in the ghostly world; 
ominous and jagged 
and with a great tongue; 
the banality of evil 
embodied perfectly; 
half shade, 
half negative-image of my friends. 
I cool the atmosphere down 
I grow a third eye 
This poem takes place next to the most prestigious and centrally located cemetery of 
Athens. Gengar, the Pokémon character of the poem, represents the so-called ‘ghost’ 
Pokémon. Ghost Pokémon are a dark element of the original game as they are created 
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after someone has died. Following the metaphors elucidated by this poem we could claim 
that Pokémon-poems in a sense haunt the city. They are semi-visible, semi-present; they 
bring past stories into a contemporaneous level of existence. PPG is in a way a 
hauntological project. Hauntology is a portmanteau of the words haunting and ontology; a 
term coined by French philosopher Jacques Derrida in his article ‘Spectres of Marx’ 
(Derrida, 1993). For Derrida, ‘the figure of the ghost is that which is neither present, nor 
absent, neither dead nor alive’. Derrida, in his attempt to deconstruct western logocentric 
metaphysics, claims that all meaning production relies in a retroactively constructed 
mythical origin. Thus, meaning production is a process fundamentally trapped in its own 
vision of the past. In this context, the ghost is the figure that emerges underneath all 
attempts to identify a historical fact or identity of meaning.  
The term hauntology was introduced to cultural analysis through Mark Fisher’s (2014) 
analysis of contemporary electronic music projects that used retro-sounding elements in 
their composition. Fisher discuses projects such as Burial, Belbury Poly, The Focus 
Group, and the Advisory Circle, all of which incorporate lo-fi elements such as crackles, 
tape hiss and samplings of analogue effects. Following Mark Fisher’s definition of 
hauntology as ‘nostalgia for lost futures’ we could identify Pokémon Poetry as a 
hauntological project. The Pokémon-poems bring childhood nostalgia into a futuristic 
augmented environment. The Gengar poem, maintains the melancholy of the original 
character transposed into a poetic present. The Pokémon are located within a matrix of 
meaning. Meaning extracted both from their relationship but also the relationship of the 
different points on the map. The ways the user choses to connect those points create 
different routes within the city, different walking patterns and in fact a different city.  
We have extensively analysed the different relations the subject has to the symbolic 
order through the sinthome. The sinthome allows for a conceptualisation of poetic 
language that potentially escapes the patriarchal rules of the paternal law. Feminist 
psychoanalyst Julia Kristeva also attempted a theorisation of poetic language as a 
disruption of the primacy of the symbolic order in her seminal work Revolution in Poetic 
Language (2006). Kristeva, presents in this book her conception of the ‘semiotic chora.’ 
She focuses her critique on the Lacanian concept of castration. As we have seen earlier, 
according to Lacan, the infant has to give up on the ‘oceanic’ feeling of enjoyment it 
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experiences in its unmediated relationship with the maternal body in order to acquire the 
capacity of language. Through the process of castration, the paternal law is introduced 
and operates as a model for all patriarchal social rules. The initial psychic imprint of the 
law comes as a negation of the female’s phantasmatic ability to satisfy all needs.  
According to Kristeva, there is a field of signification that emerges before castration; a 
pre-linguistic form of signification that is extremely important for the psycho-social 
development of the infant. This field is what she names the semiotic and she juxtaposes 
it to the Lacanian symbolic order. The semiotic is an embodied field of communication 
between the mother and the child that emerges as a field of bodily tensions and 
fluctuation of libidinal energy. Both the maternal body and the body of the infant become 
a realm of tension, circulation of energy and of pulses. The touch, the pre-linguistic vocal 
sounds, the act of looking; all small gestures create areas of tension and significance.  
For Kristeva, this plurality and liquidity of communication is repressed in order for proper 
language to emerge. But this function does not completely disappear in adult life as it re-
emerges in discourse through poetic language. Thus, poetic language carries the 
capacity to disrupt and destabilise everyday language.  
The problematic of the ‘resonant’ signifier also troubled Lacan in his conceptualisation of 
the sinthome. There seems to be something in poetic language that carries an irreducible 
materiality, a materiality that does not lead back to the chain of signifiers. Following 
Kristeva’s analysis of the semiotic and Lacan’s sinthome, I consider poetry central in my 
analysis of subjectivity. The semiotic chora in the case of locative poetry does not 
emerge between a subject and the maternal body but rather takes place within the urban 
environment. The subject produces resonant signifiers in order to ‘communicate’ and 
connect with the pulses of the city. Words imitate the rhythms of urban life, abrupt stops 
become crevices of the asphalt, quotidian every-day expressions become fragments of 
discussions one hears while strolling downtown, confessional narratives are the secrets 
the city could not digest. The ‘semiotic chora’ becomes the ‘city of the drive.’  A city 
unravelling as the desiring urban bodies realise its polymorphous perversity. The 
semiotic chora emerges through the circulation and stasis of bodily drives, shaped by an 
inter-subjective play of presence and absence, excitation and inaction, pleasure and 
displeasure. I consider the semiotic chora an appropriate analytic model for PPG as it is 
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essentially a cartography of the drive connecting and disconnecting fragmented body 
parts to external objects.   
After I installed all poems in the intended spots on the map, it was time to actually try and 
see how the application works. We did a test run with a friend and we decided to visit 
each and every Pokémon-poem driving around Athens. We decided to use a car to reach 
the further placed Pokémon-poems but also to walk through the central locations where 
there is a greater concentration of poems. We started our trip in the evening as it was 
mid-august and we wanted to avoid walking under the sun. My friend A. who came with 
me was very worried she would not ‘get it’ as she is 36 years old and did not watch or 
play Pokémon as a kid. Soon, she realised that one does not need to know Pokémon in 
order to be able to enjoy Pokémon Poetry. We started our Pokémon adventure in Patisia, 
a working class neighbourhood in central Athens. The first Pokémon-poem we encounter 
is porygon. 
i go where i am loved  
far away from here  
in the warmth of cables  
and whispering of electrons  
i go where i am loved  
to waves of photons  
streams of liquid crystals  
far away from here  
to tears of keyboards  
and orbits of lost digits  
i go where i am loved  
where corners make space  
excellent space  
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so that i can button  
my head 
Porygon is the Pokémon that was featured in the cartoon episode we discussed earlier, 
the one causing epilepsy to over 600 hundred children in Japan. The braindance of the 
polygon explosion here is transformed into a melancholic narrative. Porygon is a great 
starting point for reflecting on our project as the character appears in the video game as 
a ‘virtual’ Pokémon. According to the game narrative, unlike other Pokémon that are 
actual biological organisms, Porygon is the result of programming, and thus it is the ‘first 
digital Pokémon’. Since its only appearance on the cartoon is linked to 600 children 
getting seizures, Porygon was never featured again in the show as it was a reminder of 
the ‘braindance’ episode. The poem seems to echo this story as the Porygon laments its 
exile. It goes away, hiding in cables and streams of liquid crystals. The Porygon of the 
poem, just like the hikikomori we discussed earlier, finds peace in the virtual world where 
it can button its head.  
Here we encounter once again the post-human hybrid of the techno-organism. The 
Porygon-poem uses the words of the technological world in order to describe human 
feelings. Love turns into hardware, loneliness gets diluted in binary digits. The metaphors 
around energy remind us of theories of the drive. Indeed in Freud, libido is often 
discussed in metaphors of energy circulation. According to Kristeva, the energy 
movement that is characteristic of the semiotic chora is something that can never be 
properly represented within discourse. Once again, we have to deal with the problem of 
translatability: translating energy into words, pulses into sentences. Kristeva uses in her 
analysis examples from French poet Stéphane Mallarmé. Mallarmé according to Kristeva 
provides verse that is ‘indifferent to language, enigmatic and feminine, this space 
underlying the written is rhythmic, unfettered, irreducible to its intelligible verbal 
translation; it is musical, anterior to judgment, but retrained by a single guarantee: 
syntax.’ (Kristeva, 2006). 
The syntactic rules of rhythm and resonance allow for a construction of poetic discourse 
that imitates the structures of the symbolic but instead of meaning, Kristeva’s poetic 
mimesis dissolves subjectivity into a primitive polymorphous perversity. One of the 
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poems we encountered with A. during our big Pokémon Poetry summer expedition was 
hidden behind Iera Odos, next to the botanical garden of Athens. Cacnea, is a Pokémon 
that looks like a cactus, the image conveys strong emotions as it carries a series of 
synthetic associations.  The poem is formed in minimalist, haiku-esque verse. The words 
are prickly like the cactus character.  
Cacnea 
1. 
on the seedbed, a howl: 
botanic collections 
take some rest 
2. 
tainted glass 
hundreds of thorny weeds 
in search of meaning 
3. 
the bedrock drains well 
screaming DE-SPA-CI-TO 
summer abandonment  
4. 
thorny-elbows 
bloody wrists, bloody fruits 
our struggles in vain 
5. 
open gates: 
desire for scent 
of those lost 
6. 
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golden flowers 
the desert of the real 
an invitation to doom 
7. 
thirty days 
a delay to the wrinkling 
silent fungi 
The narrative is cryptic yet generates a strong affective reaction to both of us. As A. said 
when we read the poem: ‘we are playing a treasure-hunt, but the more clues we find, the 
more we lose’. She was playful in that remark but it was nevertheless correct. Most of the 
poems carried a dire melancholy, which, combined with the Athenian derelict urban 
environment, created a suffocating dialectics. The melancholy and nostalgia of the 
project affected the way we consumed it. I asked A. what does this project reminded her 
of. She retrieved a memory of early mobile phone use:  
It was when we first got mobile phones and we were really excited, and there was this 
anticipation in hearing back, and then the message would be something stupid and small.  
(I ask) you think the poems are stupid? (we laugh)  
No, No! they are fine, I just remember this anticipation and then the text message on the 
screen, I don’t know… 
Mobile media throughout my research are often discussed in relation to anxiety. The 
anxiety of the selfie, the anxiety of the phone not ringing, the anxiety of the dead battery. 
In our Pokémon Poetry Go treasure hunt, anxiety comes during the process of searching. 
What could the next Pokémon-poem be, how can it affect our sensitive souls? What if it 
sucks? The poems in this version of the platform are about 20 so they are not really that 
many. We reflected on the possibility of many more poems being dispersed everywhere. 
A. told me: 
I like to imagine there are many more poems to find. I really like the idea, you know, 
hidden behind trashcans, inside the metro. I like the idea of poems floating around. 
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We envisage a public space that is open to an extra layer of meaning. In the actual 
consumption of the project we were able to fantasise about its potential expansion. That 
was definitely encouraging in thinking of this project as a model for future 
experimentations. Another element that came up during our expedition had to do with the 
fact that we shared it. Similarly to the ethnographic notes from the actual Pokémon GO 
game, we formed an urban pack that went playing in the city. The poems were shared 
between us. On the topic of ownership, A. asked me at some point: 
now that I read the poem, can other people still find it or did I ‘get’ it?  
(I respond) Other people can still find it. 
Oh that sucks (we laugh)  
The intimate moments we get through ‘collecting’ poems feel so personalised that led A. 
thinking she is the only one that can find them. The intimacy feeling was especially strong 
when poems resonated with particular personal memories. Risking banal 
experimentalism, I have to record my own strong emotional reaction towards a poem that 
was placed near a hospital building in the northern suburbs of Athens. 
Bromzong 
Receiving video signals 
transmitted half a century ago 
                                            sudden condensation of sense:  
                   I never know what time it is 
signals bouncing off 
                                      inverse lunar lacunae 
folded inside my head: 
the creation of a new map 
replete with gaps and stop signs 
                                                   points of infection:  
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I will always remember  
the specific amount of time  






reciting albas of  
being ported off: 
 are we not drawn onward to a new era? 
                                  a problematic inflection point:  
 aibohphobia as an emerging possibility 
A Santa at Nasa. 
I could wake up screaming 
in a body that is no longer mine. 
(in fact,  
this has already happened) 
Again, similarly to Kristeva’s theorisation of the semiotic, it is hard to locate any affective 
reaction towards this poem as stemming from a sort of narrative. Often the wordplays 
and sentences are non-sensical and confusing. Nevertheless, there is a syntactic 
organisation of sounds, pictures and space that moved me. The notion of syntactic 
organisation is expanded here to include the extra elements that locative poetry brings 
into play. Me having been hospitalised in that particular building had strongly influenced 
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the effect of what I was reading. In that moment, I completely identified with the 
anonymous poem, I even identified with the bell-shaped Pokémon.  
The last poem we visited that night was placed really far from Athens. We had to drive for 
about an hour in order to arrive to a beach in Loutsa. There was a little church there and 
we sat to reflect on the Pokémon-ridden night we had just spend. The poem was this: 
Doduo 
excavating the marble, making a place to rest 
excavating my chest, somewhere to lean on 
constantly looking for something 
if only Margarita had brought us an ashtray 
I would cut off your head so you’d look like, 
but she didn't – she was barely there 
she was a convenient invention to battle our awkwardness 
unfortunately, I’m bad with jokes 
it’s my downfall  
yet I keep good company – come and try 
I unravel gracefully – you would not expect 
notwithstanding, I am 
and I might have other advantages too 
let’s leave them unspoken of – a mystery so you want me more 
I’ve arranged everything nicely 
the only thing missing is a small church by the sea so we seal 
the excavated marble, 
I saw the perfect one, next to Loutsa 
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you won’t like it – i’m afraid 
we need to compromise – that’s a relationship 
I swear 
This love poem reminds us of the loving carvings of initials one finds on the benches of 
romantic sea-side beaches. The poem is loving but not necessarily romantic as it rather 
carries a cruel ending/realisation presenting all relationships as compromises. The 
Pokémon-poem hunting has left us a bitter-sweet taste. It definitely allowed us to see 
Athens through a different lens. We visited places we have never seen before and we re-
lived moments and memories of other people. Those memories were rarely explicit but 
rather emerged as hauntological traces. We walked, following other people’s steps, but 
we could only grasp abstract bits of their stories.  
Conclusion 
In his later work, Freud wrote of the ego as an agency constantly subject to the impulses 
of the id and the demands of the external world: two ‘severe masters’. In ‘gay 
spatialisation – towards a real imaginary’, I looked at how the ego image is implicated at 
the level of desire and drive or, in Freudian terms, what we might think of as id impulses. 
In ‘poetics of the self, geographies of the real’, I turn my attention to the ego’s relation to 
the external world. Rather than considering this in terms of social norms around 
behaviour, I chose instead to look at how the self is augmented perceptually to engage in 
new ways of being with the world, whether through the perceptive cocoon created by the 
Walkman or through the disruptive effects of sound, as in braindance. I argue that these 
modifications of the self can be considered ‘cyborgian’ and suggest that the smartphone 
has a similar function, inasmuch as it opens new modes for the subject to engage with 
the world. Pokémon Go is exemplary of this – combining non-traditional narrative with the 
external world to create a new practice that we might, I argue, consider sinthomatic. In 
this final chapter, I focus on a novel media category, that of locative media. The potential 
use of this technology to create site-specific media experiences and in adding new layers 
of meaning onto the city through augmented reality, opens up a series of new questions 
with regard to technology and the psyche.  
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In this chapter we revisit the concept of the sinthome. Here I use the sinthome 
analytically in a case study context. One of the biggest challenges of my research design 
was in finding a framework where the sinthome could be elucidated, in order to allow me 
to ground my analysis in examples from everyday reality. Inspired by Lacan’s analysis of 
James Joyce, I re-approached the city as a laboratory of sinthomatic endeavours, 
through developing a creative methodology that situates poems within the city’s streets. 
Lacan reads Joyce’s Dublin as a city of the drive, a city that becomes an amalgamation 
of fluxes and tensions, bodily excitations and fleeting ideas. The body is reflected in the 
city just as much as the city operates as a terrain for subjective contemplation. In this 
chapter, I re-create this dimension of sinthomatic writing of and within the city, by utilising 
locative media and poetry. The final product of this endeavour is Pokémon Poetry Go, a 
poetic game I constructed with the help of ten fellow poets, which merges the idea of the 
Pokémon Go video game with autobiographical locative poetry. 
In this chapter, I emphasise the difference between mobile media and traditional forms of 
media consumption, particularly in the portability and subsequently the omnipresence of 
the former in the public sphere. Mobile media create hybrid spaces by blurring the limits 
between the private and the public; these perceptive cocoons allow the subject to relate 
to their urban environment in novel ways. By listening to music while walking in the 
streets, for example, you add an extra layer of aesthetic stimuli to the experience. By 
bringing familiar songs into the streets as an individual soundtrack, I suggest that the 
subject can achieve a sense of belong in an alienating urban environment. Locative 
media are, then, the perfect tool for sinthomatic engagement with the city.  
In this chapter I also revisited the idea of the cyborg, as conceptualised in Donna 
Haraway’s 1984 Cyborg Manifesto. Haraway’s thought is considered foundational to 
post-human studies, as it offered a new understanding of the technological future that 
goes beyond technophobic generalisations. In the context of my research, the cyborg is 
discussed in relation to the sinthome, as both theoretical concepts refer to new modes of 
subjectivity that go beyond the Oedipus complex and the logic of castration. Both the 
cyborg and the sinthome appear as illegitimate children of late capitalism, alternative 
ways of being, emerging at a time when the paternal function loses its authoritarian role 
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as the guarantor of meaning.  
The video game Pokémon Go is one of the main focus points of the chapter. In my 
research I focused on the ways in which Pokémon Go and other locative applications 
operate but also on how we can develop new site-specific media interventions in order to 
create unique auto-cartographies of the cities we live in.  According to my analysis, 
Pokémon Go is a very good example of both the cyborgian and the sinthomatic 
subjectification process. First of all, in the very foundational myth of the video-game, an 
important plot point is the complete absence of the father figure, who is never 
encountered in the game or mentioned in the narrative. This sets the tone for a bizarre 
narrative that revolves not around conventional storytelling tropes but rather around the 
protagonist collecting as many Pokémon as possible.  
Similarly to Joyce’s strange relationship to language, the Pokémon universe has its own 
rules and mechanisms. But what is fascinating is that the unorthodox worlds created by 
Joyce and the creators of Pokémon offer alternative structures that are not completely 
incompatible with the symbolic order and, as a result, the audience can still connect with 
these fantastic universes, relate to them, inhabit them. Taking a step forward, Pokémon 
Go re-produces this reality for mobile platforms and layers it on top of real spaces. As a 
result it creates an augmented version of the city.  
The biggest innovation of this chapter comes from the adoption of a creative 
methodology. Inspired by Pokémon Go but also by existing fringe artistic locative 
projects, I decided to set forward a small experiment. I invited ten writers to contribute a 
single or a series of poems related to specific Pokémon characters and to place them 
somewhere in the city, with the help of the locative platform Echoes. Each contributor 
approached the association between space, poem and Pokémon character differently. 
This unique experimentation, taking the name Pokémon Poetry Go, allowed me to 
expand my fieldwork in two unique ways. First of all, it enabled me to introduce a series 
of artists to the new tools that locative media has to offer to their practice. Through a 
series of workshops I had the opportunity to invite young artist to experiment and play 
with what was at the time one of my primary areas of interest. In that way I created a new 
field of research, as these people engaged with the locative tools and produced original 
work. Secondly, through the involvement of the invited artists, I was able to develop a 
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whole network of poems that spread throughout Athens creating a unique collective 
poetic cartography of the city. Each one of the participants offered fragments of their own 
personal story and putting them together allowed me to create this augmented city that 
incorporates the intimate thoughts of its inhabitants and wears them as poetic ornaments. 
Pokémon Poetry Go, the end result of this experimentation took the form of an artwork, 
something one could consume through the hosting application, Echoes. At the same 
time, I was able to use the consumption of this artwork as a new fieldwork opportunity. By 
taking people to the spots where poems where located and by consuming the poem with 
them on the allocated location, I was able to observe first-hand how this locative media 
experience affects its audience, how it frustrates or satisfies them, how it is moving or 
boring, how it is profound or funny. I developed a three-fold research design which 
produced rich material in all of its aspects. The data produced by this hybrid 
methodology, combining practice-based methods such as poetry, writing and 
ethnographic observation is something that I would like to revisit in the future and expand 
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Concluding thoughts 
In the previous chapters we examined the different ways new technologies not only 
shape our understanding of ourselves, but also how they are used in the creation of 
selfhood. Contrary to critical media analyses that focus on the problems of new media 
technologies in relation to issues like surveillance and bio-politics, we focused on 
moments of potential emancipation or disruption of normative regimes of power. Our 
three main case studies offer different responses to the question of subversive politics 
within technological advances in consumer cultures. The important starting point comes 
from the contradiction inherit in the paradigm within which those case studies emerge: 
consumer culture does not aim at emancipating the subjects and obviously does not aim 
at disrupting itself. This contradiction is in fact very important in our analysis of the 
phenomena I describe. In order to theorise the possibility of disruption of patriarchal 
power regimes, for example, in the ‘narcissism’ chapter I had to re-examine the 
epistemological framework of feminist critiques of the cinematic screen. By criticising 
Foucauldian conceptualisations of power as an all-encompassing force that shapes all 
aspects of social and psychic life I was able to envision the possibility of resistance and 
subversion within the current political reality. That is not only useful analytically but 
moreover it is essential in order to create a politically useful knowledge. 
Throughout my work I present examples that deliberately come from consumer products 
and applications. A question arises: doesn’t that obfuscate the larger structural 
inequalities that give rise to this exact consumer culture my examples ostensibly subvert? 
How can I ignore the problematic context that gave rise to these technologies and 
structures? It is quite obvious for example that selfies were not delivered to assist a 
process of radical narcissism, Grindr was not designed taking in account the 
psychoanalytic drive and Pokémon GO was not a psychogeographical exercise on 
Sinthomatic self-creation. This exact tension is thematised by Donna Haraway in her 
Cyborg Manifesto which I used extensively in my work. The cyborg, Haraway tells us is 
the ultimate result of advanced techno-capitalism but due to its hybrid nature was able to 
erase its lineage and envision itself in a fatherless horizon. This is the reason I chose to 
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engage with the concept of the sinthome a concept that is connected to the diminishing 
importance of what Lacan names the ‘paternal law’ in late capitalist societies.  
My work engaged with a plethora of different theoretical traditions. I recognise this as a 
shortcoming of my research project as some of the discussions needed more space and 
attention. At the same time I see how the multiplicity of my analysis reflects on the 
fragmentation of the phenomena I focus on. My desire to use concepts such as the 
sinthome required that I was able to introduce many fundamental psychoanalytic 
concepts that precede it in order to allow for a better understanding of the context. That 
might have led to quick overview of certain concepts and might have made my text 
difficult to follow for those who have no experience with the psychoanalytic discourse. My 
attempt to bridge media and consumer studies with Lacanian psychoanalysis was 
challenging both methodologically and theoretically. I hope, that in the future of my 
research will allow for smoother theoretical encounters. As observed in my literature 
review there is a growing interest from different disciplines–including critical marketing–to 
engage with psychoanalytic theories and methodologies. I aspire to continue this work 
towards making this bridging possible. Despite the difficulties I phased in my present 
attempts I strongly believe that there are lots of applications and insights to be extracted 
by the use of psychoanalysis in consumer studies and I would like to discuss some of 
them here.  
While writing on new media from a psychoanalytic point of view I felt the need to engage 
with the current debate around narcissism in new media cultures. While reading the 
Freudian analysis of the phenomenon I realised that contemporary takes on narcissism 
often brush out the nuances of the theory in order to promote a very simplistic 
condemnation of narcissism. In these accounts narcissism is a symptom of our era, with 
social media exaggerating a problem already prevalent in capitalist consumerist 
societies. What I found troublesome in this critique is its totalising and pathologising 
aspect. And indeed while tracing these theories back to Christopher Lasch’s theory of the 
‘society of narcissism’ it became obvious to me that the anti-narcissistic rhetoric can 
easily slip to reactionary and primitivist positions. For Lasch the antidote to narcissism 
was the return to traditional family structures. For contemporary critics of narcissism the 
social media seem to signify a radical evil that should be fought at all costs. In that 
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context I offered an reluctant defence of narcissism by approaching it as a necessary 
pre-condition for the ego formation. I was then able to re-define the politics of narcissistic 
identification by connecting my theorisation to examples from feminist art history. Key to 
this exploration was Amelia Jones’ conception of radical narcissism. By understanding 
radical narcissism as a feminist strategy we can see how a potentially problematic or 
essentialist project –such as a defence of narcissism– can become politically poignant in 
the right context. Without claiming all selfies, or selfie culture is necessarily a project of 
radical narcissism I focused my analysis on the work of Amalia Ulman, an artist who uses 
selfies as means of her artistic work. My discussion of narcissism as a more complex 
phenomenon that does not necessarily obstruct intersubjectivity allowed me to 
substantiate a model of the ego that is open-ended rather than closed and fixed to an 
identity. 
By examining the relationship between the ego and its image I was able to discuss the 
relationship between ego and technology, as technology plays a central role in the 
construction of our self-image. This phenomenological question of how we relate to our 
body and how we construct our body through a mediated apprehension of it, was also 
central in my discussion of Grindr. The interface of Grindr offers some remarkable 
features that created thought-provoking dialogues with psychoanalytic theory. There is 
something striking in the homepage of the application with the wall of different bodies one 
next to the other constructing a mosaic of desire. And it is the element of sexuality that 
makes this mosaic so interesting: the fact that these body parts are all there motivated by 
the same drive. If my second chapter was particularly focused on the idea of the body 
image and the effects of narcissism, my third chapter attempted to tackle the complex 
problematic of the drive. Sexuality in the psychoanalytic context is a category that upsets 
certainties and identities and this was definitely observable in the case-study of dating 
applications. In order to address the effects of sexuality on subjectivity I followed Leo 
Bersani’s argumentation around the concept of sociability: a concept that praises the 
homosexual ethics of sameness in opposition to the antagonistic modes of relationality 
that the sexual economy of difference produces. 
I also followed Bersani in his queer re-examination of the classical Oedipus complex 
theory. Bersani suggested that the supposed failure of Oedipus complex that leads to the 
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homosexual subject position is a very welcome failure, as ‘successful’ Oedipus complex 
resolution creates alienated subjects that can never overcome the violence of the conflict 
with their same sex parent. Oedipus complex is a highly contested concept both within 
psychoanalysis and of course for its critics. A frequent feminist criticism for example 
focuses on the prioritisation of the penis in the Freudian narrative. In my third chapter I 
engaged with the post-Oedipal theorisation of Deleuze and Guattari and most importantly 
with Lacan’s response to the criticism as developed in his twenty-third seminar. The 
concept of the sinthome introduced by Lacan in that seminar proposes a ground-breaking 
re-conceptualisation of the human psyche. Once again we are discussing a case of a 
‘failed’ Oedipus complex, a case where the subject cannot obey to the totalising effects of 
the paternal law and the have to create their own mode of relationality to the symbolic 
order. While in earlier conceptions of subjectivity it is always the externally imposed law 
that shapes the subject, the sinthome seems to introduce the possibility of a self-made 
construction that goes beyond that limitation.  
This argument makes perfect sense in the context of late capitalism where new 
communication technologies play an increasingly central role in the construction of 
subjectivity allowing for a multiplicity that defies the totalising effects of law. I argue in my 
thesis that we are moving away from a reality that is primarily organised by the regulatory 
function of the signifier and we are moving towards a paradigm where reality is primarily 
organised through images. Lacan anticipated this shift in his analysis of the sinthome 
where he prioritised artistic expression over textual analysis in the understanding of 
reality. I was particularly impressed by Lacan’s analysis of Japanese culture as the 
paradigmatic example of this shift. For Lacan the reason Japanese culture is like that is 
due to the fact that their writing system combines both words and ideogrammatic 
symbols. The image enters the domain of language disrupting the function of metonymy. 
I drew parallels between that phenomenon and the adoption of emoji in mobile media 
communications. Emojis are a good example of the introduction of images in the domain 
of language. Similarly to the Japanese writing system, the language of chatting mixes 
words made of letters and ideogrammatic symbols.  
My engagement with the sinthome continued in my fourth chapter. The sinthome is a 
concept that Lacan developed while he was analysing James Joyce’s work. For Lacan, 
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Joyce was not subject to the paternal law, as his father was absent during his upbringing 
and he generally grew up in a tough environment. Besides that, Joyce’s writing, 
according to Lacan also showcases a strange relationship to the symbolic. Lacan argues 
that Joyce, not subjected to castration –the process that would have made him part of the 
symbolic order– he had to invent his own way to relate to language. Joyce’s discourse is 
in that sense an invention, a psychic device that goes beyond castration. Inspired by that 
idea I decided I would like to engage more with the poetic function of language. In my 
fourth chapter I invited a series of poets to work alongside me in producing a poetic 
mapping of Athens.  
The innovation of the project was the medium we chose to present it in. Instead of 
making a publication or a spoken-word performance, we used the Echoes smartphone 
application which allows the user to place upon the map different media elements (texts, 
images, sounds). Then other users can visit the actual physical locations and access the 
material. The inspiration to develop this project came from the augmented reality game, 
Pokémon GO which became a sensation a year ago. Pokémon GO was the first instance 
of a transmedia location-based platform becoming mainstream. The hybridisation of 
space in augmented reality was a topic I was interested in since the beginning of this 
research project, and Pokémon GO resonated with many of my earlier arguments. And it 
was not only the medium that was relevant to my methodological ambitions; it was 
Pokémon as universe that attracted me. I found significant parallelism in discourses 
around the sinthome and the Pokémon games. If my generation was closer to the end of 
the paternal law and the emergence of the sinthome, then our childhood fascination with 
Pokémon could not be incidental. I challenged the poets to write about Pokémon, and 
most of them were more than happy as they grew up with Pokémon and were able to 
challenge memories and personal experiences. This triangulation of poems, Pokémon 
and specific location in the city produced a rich material for analysis and reflection. 
Pokémon Poetry Go (as the project was named) was also important for another reason: 
setting a locative project in Athens in the particular time period is yet another intervention 
in a highly-contested space. Athens during the past decade of the financial crisis, 
experienced a series of shocking changes. The city is linked to images of political 
violence in and extreme poverty at the same time it becomes a hip arty destination and 
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cultural hub. Athens is more than ever a contested space with many trying to form a 
narrative about it. The clashing narratives allow for creative interventions, street art and 
in our case locative narrativization,  
The methodology I developed in my fourth chapter is something I plan on revisiting in my 
future work. Having a practice based component, while something not uncommon in art 
related research projects it is still innovative in the current disciplinary context of my 
research. My main incentive to develop this methodological approach came from my own 
involvement with the arts, which grew significantly while I was developing my research 
project. In 2010 when I met Fil Ieropoulos, we started together the ‘audio-textual’ duo 
FYTA. Due to my participation in FYTA I started reflecting on the different artistic 
methodologies not only as means of expression but also as tools for socio-political 
commentary. The work we produced with FYTA takes different forms but almost always 
addresses contemporary social issues. After I was exposed to the potency and 
multiplying effects of artistic methodologies it was hard for me to return to a traditional 
academic writing approach, especially since the context I wanted to investigate was in 
itself a multimedia and rapidly changing field. I was very hesitant when I first initiated the 
experimentation of Pokémon Poetry Go, as I was worried about the kind of ‘data’ that this 
intervention would produce. First, there was the poetry, which included lots of 
information. Second hand there was the ethnography of setting up such a project: getting 
in touch with people who had the know-how, sharing this knowledge with more people, 
brainstorming on the final format of the platform etc. And then there was the consumer 
analysis of people actually using the application which produced rich results too: my 
interview with the first person who visited all the poems using the application was crucial 
in understanding the experience of new media environments. I plan on re-visiting this 
research material in order to expand on this methodological intervention and give more 
space to the different aspects of the project.  
The title I chose for my dissertation is ‘New media poetics as a strategy for political 
subversion’ and I would like to conclude with a few words on that.  My research questions 
throughout this research orientate themselves towards praxis and social change. I look 
for the subversive in the social because I want to see the social reality subverted, 
changed, transformed. The discussion I was mostly interested in engaging with was the 
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relationship between politics and poetics, seeing how aesthetic experiences can produce 
meaningful socio-political critiques. My focus on new media was deliberate too, as there 
is a suspicion with regards to their emancipatory potential. Without offering a utopian 
alternative, I wanted to examine the ‘resonant’ signifiers and their capacity to change a 
dysfunctional system not by understanding and explaining what it lacks but by shaking it 
up.  
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Appendix: Pokémon Go Poetry 
1. Cubone (KET theatre)  
the skull of my mother  
is a jewel and a reminder  
even if i usually  
forget about its existence; i forget  
it's there mostly so that the rest of the world remembers  
and niches filter out the pitfalls,  
no marrow will ever meet  
a better moment  
than this mystical union 
 
2. Porygon (Karaiskaki Square) 
i go where i am loved  
far away from here  
in the warmth of cables  
and whispering of electrons  
i go where i am loved  
to waves of photons  
streams of liquid crystals  
far away from here  
to tears of keyboards  
and orbits of lost digits  
i go where i am loved  
where corners make space  
excellent space  
so that i can button i can button i can button  
i can button my head 
 
3. Lickitung (Kanella Restaurant) 
disgust towards the world  
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is sometimes the most unexpected gift  
because it hides within it a sort of naive love  
a love of a taste connoisseur of change  
 
a change that is not easily swallowed  
but leaves a gentle aftertaste 
 
4. Sunflora (Exarcheia Square) 
no dope can substitute what has been lost  
and the more you say that the more you alienate me in this discussion  
no dope can substitute what has been lost  
cos it seems you don't understand  
what i see when i gaze upwards  
i see it when the light burns my eyes  
what i see when i gaze upwards  
i see it when i m teary and asleep  
i am asleep in my own urine  
i am asleep in my own urine  
no gaze can bring back what peels away from my skin  
and no matter how hard you try to convince me  
you're just wasting your time  
no gaze can bring back what peels away from my skin  
and when you water me with acid rain  
i taste the floor 
 
5. Mr Mime (Zapeio) 
of all your demands  
the one i could truly  
never figure out  
was that "i shouldn't be alike"  
i still can't get it  
but now you're not here  
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to control all that 
 
6. Scyther (Petralona Square) 
if we hug  
we will inevitably  
cut each other  
best case scenario  
we'll turn into small squares  
and blood perhaps – before we're cut  
i dont know what else  
what else could our love mean  
 
… chatting somewhat  
about our problems  
chatting somewhat  
in those final moments  
chatting somewhat  
about our problems  
and cutting them into bits 
 
7. Wailord (Niarchos Foundation) 
my submersion allows  
that my belly touches  
a warm rock  
in a single breath i manage  
a three-hour dive  
in total darkness  
every time i decide  
not to return to the surface  
but something in my crooked  
construction  
causes  
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undesired buoyancy  
when consciousness  
fades away  
my withdrawal does not permit  
that i keep my promises to othes  
in a single breath  
i forget everything  
i forget that i  
fundamentally exist 
 
8. Vanillux (Asteroskopio, Filopapos Hill) 
one day  
when i'm really  
happy  
i'll take a  
big drag  
of liquid nitrogen  
so that i can keep forever  
the snowy imprinting  
of an incomparable happiness 
 
9. Doduo (Vravrona Church) 
excavating the marble, making a place to rest 
excavating my chest, somewhere to lean on 
constantly looking for something 
if only Margarita had brought us an ashtray 
I would cut off your head so you’d look like, 
but she didn’t – she was barely there 
she was a convenient invention to battle our awkwardness 
unfortunately, I’m bad with jokes 
it’s my downfall 
yet I keep good company – come and try 
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I unravel gracefully – you would not expect 
notwithstanding, I am 
and I might have other advantages too 
let’s leave them unspoken of – a mystery so you want me more 
I’ve arranged everything nicely 
the only thing missing is a small church by the sea so we seal 
the excavated marble, 
I saw the perfect one, next to Loutsa 
you won’t like it – i’m afraid 
we need to compromise – that’s a relationship 
I swear 
 
10. Bronzong (Alexandra Hospital) 
Receiving video signals 
transmitted half a century ago 
sudden condensation of sense: 
I never know what time it is 
signals bouncing off 
 
inverse lunar lacunae 
folded inside my head: 
the creation of a new map 
replete with gaps and stop signs 
points of infection: 
I will always remember 
the specific amount of time 
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anymore 
reciting albas of 
being ported off: 
are we not drawn onward to a new era? 
a problematic inflection point: 
aibohphobia as an emerging possibility 
A Santa at Nasa. 
 
I could wake up screaming 
in a body that is no longer mine. 
 
(in fact, 
this has already happened) 
 
11. Gengar (First Cemetery of Athens) 
I occurred, 
with a sticky evil grin, 
Colgate ad. 
deadly fearsome 
with a long history 
in the ghostly world; 
ominous and jagged 
and with a great tongue; 
the banality of evil 
embodied perfectly; 
half shade, 
half negative-image of my friends. 
I cool the atmosphere down 
I grow a third eye 
 
12. Dragonite (Kolonaki) 
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I move comfortably, most of the time 
the world recognises me from afar 
like a mustard, winged lil’ ball 
with a beer belly lifting my weights, 
postmodern postal pigeon. 
I was once inversely invisible, truth be told; 
shadowy guardian, causing terror, 
hallowing in the sea. 
I have lamented and responded to injuries 
with my eye-headlights; 
I was crying in code-words, always out of tune; 
feeding their mysticism splendidly. 
 
13. Ludicolo (Vas. Amalias 133) 
Crowned king of the game, 
Ridiculous! 
the moving joy of the child, 
I would like to live in yellowish green 
blessed and depressed 
on a tree house in Fortree City. 
 
14. Cacnea (Geoponiki Scholi) 
1. 
on the seedbed, a howl: 
botanic collections 
take some rest 
2. 
tainted glass 
hundreds of thorny weeds 
in search of meaning 
3. 
the bedrock drains well 
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bloody wrists, bloody fruits 
our struggles in vain 
5. 
open gates: 
desire for scent 
of those lost 
6. 
golden flowers 
the desert of the real 
an invitation to doom 
7. 
thirty days 
a delay to the wrinkling 
silent fungi 
 
15. MissingNo (Kato Patisia Station) 
how can you hear his screams? 
how can he speak 
whispering for the first time, 
his name? 
 
16. Ninetails (Megalou Vasileiou 22) 
In the thousands mutations of femininity 
I grow new spears 
to protect myself 
my juiciest spots 
And the world from my wrath 
Until a day 
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In my final evolution 
I will become a tail 
meow little kitty 
Kill! Kill! 
 
17. Metapod (Damokleous 2) 
I look around 
I scroll down  
and I see you  
I recognize you 
despite the costume  
the list now has seven  
I found Porigon Zi! 
I spent so much thinking of him as Scyther 
but it doesn't matter  
I still think of you 
let it be an re-appropriation 
it's better like that  
we can't live here  
there are no supermarkets nearby 
I want it to be in walking distance 
but I ended up on my first choice 
I'm a meta-bug  
you are a bird 
I change my mind 
I'm torn  
 
saliva during the day  
bug during the night 
thank god you like them both 
 
that saves me. 
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18. Rotom (Metaxourgio) 
Current flowing within colourful cables in random frequencies. 
Change me. 
Put me inside the washing machine, inside the fan, in the lawnmower, in the microwave  
within devices. 
in your computer 
And fuck it. 
lick the texture of the screen 
from front to the little apple on the back 
in all its length 
press my keyboard 
rim my stream and cares my corners. 
Put it inside your electrical appliances then drag me out. 
 










Only ashes of the dead 
Only little stones  
Only today 
Only fish houses 
Only peaches 
Only today 
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Only seaweed and rhinestones 
Only sharpened shovel  
Only today 
 
20 Trubbish (Sismanoglio Hospital) 
I open my mouth. 
to swallow all of you 
swallow 
All your plastic wrappers, 
all the garbage,  
doctor prescriptions and used contact lenses, cigarette butts and teeth 
feet and teeth. 
I will fill all my bags with pieces from you. 
And you will count 4 minutes 
for each one of them 
and I will have to pay 
 
21. Komala (Victoria Square) 
touching my cold limbs   
on your warm body 
pushing you, turning you, spinning you around 
You are still and resilient. 
the only sign of life is the light between your wooden glasses 
the light that is reflected on your eyes 
and makes the world turn 
And while the world is turning 
you turn around 
and I can finally stay still. 
And I watch 
And I do not want to 
And I cannot sleep 
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And at least I drag you with me 
so I can have you with me and you can be a burden. 
And I use you. 
 
22. Cosmog (Start of 3 Septemvriou) 
made of darkness 
A mixture of jealousy and weakness 
Emotional and compressed violence 
Beautifully shaped with sweet characteristics. 
I radiate small rays of darkness all around me. 
each of them hides millions of universes for exploration.  
Countless attempts at big banging 
And a continuous, relentless end. 
A mouth without ears. 
I'm the best fit for you. 
Teach me. 
 
23. Magearna (Chaidari) 
Chaidari has no pokémon 
 
  
 
